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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.[1] Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

EnterpriseT1566.001Sub-techniqueObject v2.2 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Spearphishing Attachment matters because it is an initial-access path that turns a normal business workflow—opening emailed files—into a potential entry point on Windows, macOS, or Linux systems. The decision issue is not simply whether users receive phishing email; it is whether the organization can prevent, inspect, detonate, log, and respond when a targeted attachment reaches a user and relies on User Execution.

Executive priority

Treat this as a resilience and evidence question: can the organization prove that email controls, endpoint malware defenses, user reporting, account privilege limits, and incident response workflows work together before a malicious attachment becomes broader access? The ATT&CK relationships show this technique is used across multiple campaigns and groups, including espionage, ransomware-related, and critical-infrastructure-relevant campaign context, so leaders should prioritize coverage where business operations, regulated data, or safety-critical environments depend on ordinary email workflows.

Technical view

For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate the full chain from email delivery to endpoint execution. ATT&CK does not provide official detection text for this object, but the related DET0236 detection strategy indicates detection should be considered across OS platforms. Focus on attachments such as Office documents, executables, PDFs, and archives; user interaction; attempts to bypass protections; password-protected archives; misleading file extensions or icons; and endpoint execution or exploit behavior after opening. Tie email evidence to endpoint, account, network boundary, antimalware, and audit logs so analysts can distinguish blocked delivery, user-reported phishing, attachment detonation, and confirmed host execution.

Likely telemetry

  • Email security gateway or mail platform logs showing sender, recipient, subject, attachment name/type/hash, delivery disposition, spoofing results, and quarantine actions
  • Attachment analysis or sandbox results for Office documents, PDFs, executables, and archives, including password-protected archive handling where available
  • Endpoint telemetry on Windows, macOS, and Linux for file creation, process execution, child processes launched from document/PDF/archive handlers, and security control prompts bypassed by users
  • Antivirus/antimalware alerts, remediation records, and update status across endpoints
  • Network intrusion prevention or boundary logs for malicious payload retrieval, callback attempts, or blocked traffic following attachment execution

Detection direction

  • Do not measure coverage only at the email gateway; validate whether telemetry links delivered attachments to endpoint execution and account activity after user interaction.
  • Tune for common attachment abuse patterns described by ATT&CK: Office documents, executables, PDFs, archives, password-protected attachments, deceptive extensions, and icons that make executables appear to be documents.
  • Use relationship context from T1566 Phishing and User Execution to test whether alerts are correlated across initial access and execution rather than handled as isolated email events.
  • Account for false positives from legitimate business attachments and encrypted archives by combining sender context, attachment properties, user behavior, endpoint execution, and antimalware results.
  • Confirm DET0236 or equivalent detection logic is operational across Windows, macOS, and Linux where those platforms are in scope, and document gaps where endpoint visibility is absent.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with user training focused on recognizing, reporting, and avoiding social engineering that asks users to open files or bypass protections, aligning with M1017 User Training.
  • Reduce blast radius with M1018 User Account Management by enforcing least privilege and appropriate account lifecycle controls so successful user execution does not automatically become high-value access.
  • Harden software configuration under M1054 for applications that open common attachment types, especially settings that limit risky content execution and unsafe default behavior.
  • Use M1049 Antivirus/Antimalware on endpoints and keep protections current so malicious payloads attached to email can be blocked or remediated after delivery.
  • Apply M1021 Restrict Web-Based Content and M1031 Network Intrusion Prevention to limit follow-on downloads, unsafe web access, and malicious network traffic associated with payload execution.
Analyst notes and limits

T1566.001 is a sub-technique of T1566 Phishing and replaces revoked T1193. The supplied relationships include multiple campaigns and groups using this behavior, which supports treating it as broadly relevant, but they do not prove current activity against any specific organization. External references include anti-spoofing/SPF material and detection research context, but the official ATT&CK detection field for this object is not provided.

This take is limited to the supplied ATT&CK STIX fields, references, and relationships. It does not assert active exploitation, specific adversary targeting, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection. Local mail architecture, endpoint logging, attachment handling, user privileges, and response procedures are required to determine actual risk and coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Spearphishing Attachment

Adversaries may send spearphishing emails with a malicious attachment in an attempt to gain access to victim systems. Spearphishing attachment is a specific variant of spearphishing. Spearphishing attachment is different from other forms of spearphishing in that it employs the use of malware attached to an email. All forms of spearphishing are electronically delivered social engineering targeted at a specific individual, company, or industry. In this scenario, adversaries attach a file to the spearphishing email and usually rely upon User Execution to gain execution.[1] Spearphishing may also involve social engineering techniques, such as posing as a trusted source.

There are many options for the attachment such as Microsoft Office documents, executables, PDFs, or archived files. Upon opening the attachment (and potentially clicking past protections), the adversary's payload exploits a vulnerability or directly executes on the user's system. The text of the spearphishing email usually tries to give a plausible reason why the file should be opened, and may explain how to bypass system protections in order to do so. The email may also contain instructions on how to decrypt an attachment, such as a zip file password, in order to evade email boundary defenses. Adversaries frequently manipulate file extensions and icons in order to make attached executables appear to be document files, or files exploiting one application appear to be a file for a different one.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1193 Spearphishing Attachment Spearphishing Attachment revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0080: Cobalt Group

Cobalt Group is a financially motivated threat group that has primarily targeted financial institutions since at least 2016. The group has conducted intrusions to steal money via targeting ATM systems, card processing, payment systems and SWIFT systems. Cobalt Group has mainly targeted banks in Eastern Europe, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia. One of the alleged leaders was arrested in Spain in early 2018, but the group still appears to be active. The group has been known to target organizations in order to use their access to then compromise additional victims.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7] Reporting indicates there may be links between Cobalt Group and both the malware Carbanak and the group Carbanak.[8]

Group Enterprise

G0032: Lazarus Group

Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]

North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]

Group Enterprise

G1031: Saint Bear

Saint Bear is a Russian-nexus threat actor active since early 2021, primarily targeting entities in Ukraine and Georgia. The group is notable for a specific remote access tool, Saint Bot, and information stealer, OutSteel in campaigns. Saint Bear typically relies on phishing or web staging of malicious documents and related file types for initial access, spoofing government or related entities.[1][2] Saint Bear has previously been confused with Ember Bear operations, but analysis of behaviors, tools, and targeting indicates these are distinct clusters.

Group Enterprise

G0037: FIN6

FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

Group Enterprise

G0018: admin@338

admin@338 is a China-based cyber threat group. It has previously used newsworthy events as lures to deliver malware and has primarily targeted organizations involved in financial, economic, and trade policy, typically using publicly available RATs such as PoisonIvy, as well as some non-public backdoors. [1]

Group Enterprise

G0112: Windshift

Windshift is a threat group that has been active since at least 2017, targeting specific individuals for surveillance in government departments and critical infrastructure across the Middle East.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0060: BRONZE BUTLER

BRONZE BUTLER is a cyber espionage group with likely Chinese origins that has been active since at least 2008. The group primarily targets Japanese organizations, particularly those in government, biotechnology, electronics manufacturing, and industrial chemistry.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G0090: WIRTE

WIRTE is a cyberespionage actor, believed to be a subgroup of the Hamas-affiliated Gaza Cybergang, that has been active since at least August 2018. WIRTE has targeted diplomatic, financial, military, legal, and technology organizations across the Middle East, North Africa, and in Europe to gather intelligence. WIRTE has remained persistently active despite the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict and has expanded their operations to include wiper malware attacks against Israeli targets.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G0069: MuddyWater

MuddyWater is a cyber espionage group assessed to be a subordinate element within Iran's Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Since at least 2017, MuddyWater has targeted a range of government and private organizations across sectors, including telecommunications, local government, finance, defense, and oil and natural gas organizations, in the Middle East (specifically the UAE and Saudi Arabia), Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America. MuddyWater has reused domains dating back to October 2025, and has a preference for NameCheap and Hosterdaddy Private Limited (AS136557). In late 2025 and early 2026, MuddyWater used commercial satellite internet (i.e., Starlink) for command and control (C2) communication. [2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Group Enterprise

G0045: menuPass

menuPass is a threat group that has been active since at least 2006. Individual members of menuPass are known to have acted in association with the Chinese Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Tianjin State Security Bureau and worked for the Huaying Haitai Science and Technology Development Company.[1][2]

menuPass has targeted healthcare, defense, aerospace, finance, maritime, biotechnology, energy, and government sectors globally, with an emphasis on Japanese organizations. In 2016 and 2017, the group is known to have targeted managed IT service providers (MSPs), manufacturing and mining companies, and a university.[3][4][5][6][7][1][2]

Malware Enterprise

S0447: Lokibot

Lokibot is a widely distributed information stealer that was first reported in 2015. It is designed to steal sensitive information such as usernames, passwords, cryptocurrency wallets, and other credentials. Lokibot can also create a backdoor into infected systems to allow an attacker to install additional payloads.[1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1064: SVCReady

SVCReady is a loader that has been used since at least April 2022 in malicious spam campaigns. Security researchers have noted overlaps between TA551 activity and SVCReady distribution, including similarities in file names, lure images, and identical grammatical errors.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0428: PoetRAT

PoetRAT is a remote access trojan (RAT) that was first identified in April 2020. PoetRAT has been used in multiple campaigns against the private and public sectors in Azerbaijan, including ICS and SCADA systems in the energy sector. The STIBNITE activity group has been observed using the malware. PoetRAT derived its name from references in the code to poet William Shakespeare. [1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0148: RTM

RTM is custom malware written in Delphi. It is used by the group of the same name (RTM). Newer versions of the malware have been reported publicly as Redaman.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0458: Ramsay

Ramsay is an information stealing malware framework designed to collect and exfiltrate sensitive documents, including from air-gapped systems. Researchers have identified overlaps between Ramsay and the Darkhotel-associated Retro malware.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0011: Taidoor

Taidoor is a remote access trojan (RAT) that has been used by Chinese government cyber actors to maintain access on victim networks.[1] Taidoor has primarily been used against Taiwanese government organizations since at least 2010.[2]

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0001: Frankenstein

Frankenstein was described by security researchers as a highly-targeted campaign conducted by moderately sophisticated and highly resourceful threat actors in early 2019. The unidentified actors primarily relied on open source tools, including Empire. The campaign name refers to the actors' ability to piece together several unrelated open-source tool components.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0015: C0015

C0015 was a ransomware intrusion during which the unidentified attackers used Bazar, Cobalt Strike, and Conti, along with other tools, over a 5 day period. Security researchers assessed the actors likely used the widely-circulated Conti ransomware playbook based on the observed pattern of activity and operator errors.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Campaign Enterprise

C0037: Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution

Pikabot was distributed in Water Curupira Pikabot Distribution throughout 2023 by an entity linked to BlackBasta ransomware deployment via email attachments. This activity followed the take-down of QakBot, with several technical overlaps and similarities with QakBot, indicating a possible connection. The identified activity led to the deployment of tools such as Cobalt Strike, while coinciding with campaigns delivering DarkGate and IcedID en route to ransomware deployment.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Group G0080: Cobalt Group Enterprise uses · Malware S0669: KOCTOPUS Enterprise uses · Campaign C0028: 2015 Ukraine Electric Power Attack Enterprise uses · Malware S0447: Lokibot Enterprise uses · Group G0032: Lazarus Group Enterprise uses · Group G1031: Saint Bear Enterprise uses · Malware S0331: Agent Tesla Enterprise uses · Group G0081: Tropic Trooper Enterprise uses · Group G0037: FIN6 Enterprise uses · Malware S1064: SVCReady Enterprise uses · Group G0007: APT28 Enterprise uses · Malware S1066: DarkTortilla Enterprise uses · Group G0018: admin@338 Enterprise uses · Group G0112: Windshift Enterprise uses · Group G0060: BRONZE BUTLER Enterprise uses · Group G0090: WIRTE Enterprise detects · Detection Strategy DET0236: Detection Strategy for Spearphishing Attachment across OS Platforms Enterprise uses · Group G0069: MuddyWater Enterprise uses · Group G0045: menuPass Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware Enterprise uses · Malware S0428: PoetRAT Enterprise uses · Malware S0148: RTM Enterprise uses · Group G0027: Threat Group-3390 Enterprise uses · Group G0047: Gamaredon Group Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1049: Antivirus/Antimalware

Antivirus/Antimalware solutions utilize signatures, heuristics, and behavioral analysis to detect, block, and remediate malicious software, including viruses, trojans, ransomware, and spyware. These solutions continuously monitor endpoints and systems for known malicious patterns and suspicious behaviors that indicate compromise. Antivirus/Antimalware software should be deployed across all devices, with automated updates to ensure protection against the latest threats. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Signature-Based Detection:

- Implementation: Use predefined signatures to identify known malware based on unique patterns such as file hashes, byte sequences, or command-line arguments. This method is effective against known threats. - Use Case: When malware like "Emotet" is detected, its signature (such as a specific file hash) matches a known database of malicious software, triggering an alert and allowing immediate quarantine of the infected file.

Heuristic-Based Detection:

- Implementation: Deploy heuristic algorithms that analyze behavior and characteristics of files and processes to identify potential malware, even if it doesn’t match a known signature. - Use Case: If a program attempts to modify multiple critical system files or initiate suspicious network communications, heuristic analysis may flag it as potentially malicious, even if no specific malware signature is available.

Behavioral Detection (Behavior Prevention):

- Implementation: Use behavioral analysis to detect patterns of abnormal activities, such as unusual system calls, unauthorized file encryption, or attempts to escalate privileges. - Use Case: Behavioral analysis can detect ransomware attacks early by identifying behavior like mass file encryption, even before a specific ransomware signature has been identified.

Real-Time Scanning:

- Implementation: Enable real-time scanning to automatically inspect files and network traffic for signs of malware as they are accessed, downloaded, or executed. - Use Case: When a user downloads an email attachment, the antivirus solution scans the file in real-time, checking it against both signatures and heuristics to detect any malicious content before it can be opened.

Cloud-Assisted Threat Intelligence:

- Implementation: Use cloud-based threat intelligence to ensure the antivirus solution can access the latest malware definitions and real-time threat feeds from a global database of emerging threats. - Use Case: Cloud-assisted antivirus solutions quickly identify newly discovered malware by cross-referencing against global threat databases, providing real-time protection against zero-day attacks.

**Tools for Implementation**:

- Endpoint Security Platforms: Use solutions such as EDR for comprehensive antivirus/antimalware protection across all systems. - Centralized Management: Implement centralized antivirus management consoles that provide visibility into threat activity, enable policy enforcement, and automate updates. - Behavioral Analysis Tools: Leverage solutions with advanced behavioral analysis capabilities to detect malicious activity patterns that don’t rely on known signatures.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1047: Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures.

Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

System Audit:

- Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks.

Permission Audits:

- Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions.

Software Audits:

- Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives.

Configuration Audits:

- Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems.

Network Audits:

- Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
2330d6693b0d97d9...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.2 Current bundle 2330d6693b0d…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Unit 42 DarkHydrus July 2018

    Falcone, R., et al. (2018, July 27). New Threat Actor Group DarkHydrus Targets Middle East Government. Retrieved August 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    ACSC Email Spoofing

    Australian Cyber Security Centre. (2012, December). Mitigating Spoofed Emails Using Sender Policy Framework. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Elastic - Koadiac Detection with EQL

    Stepanic, D.. (2020, January 13). Embracing offensive tooling: Building detections against Koadic using EQL. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft Anti Spoofing

    Microsoft. (2020, October 13). Anti-spoofing protection in EOP. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attack T1566.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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