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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1543.002: Systemd Service

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.[1] Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Systemd utilizes unit configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user owned directories (`$HOME`).[2]

Inside the `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:[3]

* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost` directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on system start if the service is set to automatically start. * `ExecReload` directive executes when a service restarts. * `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.

Adversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem.[4][5][6]

The `.service` file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions.

Systemd services can be created via systemd generators, which support the dynamic generation of unit files. Systemd generators are small executables that run during boot or configuration reloads to dynamically create or modify systemd unit files by converting non-native configurations into services, symlinks, or drop-ins (i.e., Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts).[7][8]

EnterpriseT1543.002Sub-techniqueObject v1.6 Modified
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Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Systemd service abuse matters because it turns normal Linux service management into a persistence and possible privilege-escalation path. If an attacker can create or alter a service unit, service directive, user setting, symlink, or generator, malicious code may run again at boot, service start, reload, or stop. For leaders, this is less about a single file type and more about whether Linux servers, cloud workloads, and operationally important systems have trustworthy service configuration, change control, and logs.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where Linux systems support critical applications, cloud/container infrastructure, or operational technology workflows. ATT&CK links this sub-technique to persistence and privilege escalation, and relationships include malware, groups, and the 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, so it is relevant to resilience and incident scoping. Executives should ask whether teams can prove who changed systemd services, whether privileged account use is controlled, and whether service persistence would be found during response rather than only after reboot or recurring compromise.

Technical view

Validate monitoring for creation or modification of systemd `.service` unit files, service directives such as `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, `ExecStartPost`, `ExecReload`, `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost`, changes to the `User` directive, symlinks placed in systemd service directories, and dynamic unit generation through systemd generators. ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, but relationship DET0253 specifically covers detection of systemd service creation or modification on Linux. Detection engineering should focus on authorized baseline comparison, privileged write activity, service reload/start events, and suspicious command paths or user context changes in service definitions.

Likely telemetry

  • Linux file creation, modification, ownership, permission, and symlink events for systemd service and user unit locations described by ATT&CK
  • Contents and version history of `.service` files, especially execution and `User` directives
  • Process execution telemetry for `systemctl` and service-managed payloads
  • Authentication, privilege escalation, and privileged account activity associated with service changes
  • System boot, service start, stop, reload, and configuration reload events

Detection direction

  • Confirm DET0253 or equivalent logic exists for Linux systemd service creation and modification rather than relying only on malware signatures.
  • Baseline approved services and expected directive values; alert on new, modified, or user-owned service units that run unexpected commands or change execution user context.
  • Tune for legitimate administrator and package-management activity to reduce false positives, while preserving visibility into privileged manual edits and unusual service reloads.
  • Include symlink and generator-based persistence paths, which can be missed if detection only watches static `.service` files.
  • During incidents, compare current service configuration against known-good state and investigate services that re-execute payloads at boot, start, reload, or stop.

Mitigation priorities

  • Enforce user account management and least privilege so ordinary users cannot create or modify service persistence paths unnecessarily.
  • Restrict file and directory permissions on systemd service locations, generator locations, and related configuration so only authorized administrators or processes can write there.
  • Apply privileged account management: limit root or administrative access, monitor privileged changes, and require accountability for service modifications.
  • Limit unauthorized software installation and unapproved service deployment on Linux hosts, especially servers supporting critical workloads.
  • Maintain change control and configuration baselines for systemd units so incident responders can distinguish approved services from persistence artifacts.
Analyst notes and limits

This is a Linux sub-technique under Create or Modify System Process. The relationship set broadens defensive relevance: it is used by multiple listed groups and software, including Linux backdoors and cloud/container-associated activity, and appears in a campaign involving a Ukrainian electric utility. Those relationships support prioritizing Linux service telemetry in enterprise, cloud-hosted Linux, and cyber-physical support environments, but local asset criticality and exposure must drive final priority.

MITRE did not provide official detection text for this object. The supplied data does not prove active exploitation in any specific environment, does not guarantee detection coverage, and does not identify exact local file paths beyond the systemd directories described in the official text. Organizations must validate paths, service baselines, logging depth, and administrative workflows for their own Linux distributions and deployments.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Systemd Service

Adversaries may create or modify systemd services to repeatedly execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Systemd is a system and service manager commonly used for managing background daemon processes (also known as services) and other system resources.[1] Systemd is the default initialization (init) system on many Linux distributions replacing legacy init systems, including SysVinit and Upstart, while remaining backwards compatible.

Systemd utilizes unit configuration files with the `.service` file extension to encode information about a service's process. By default, system level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/system` directory of the root owned directories (`/`). User level unit files are stored in the `/systemd/user` directories of the user owned directories (`$HOME`).[2]

Inside the `.service` unit files, the following directives are used to execute commands:[3]

* `ExecStart`, `ExecStartPre`, and `ExecStartPost` directives execute when a service is started manually by `systemctl` or on system start if the service is set to automatically start. * `ExecReload` directive executes when a service restarts. * `ExecStop`, `ExecStopPre`, and `ExecStopPost` directives execute when a service is stopped.

Adversaries have created new service files, altered the commands a `.service` file’s directive executes, and modified the user directive a `.service` file executes as, which could result in privilege escalation. Adversaries may also place symbolic links in these directories, enabling systemd to find these payloads regardless of where they reside on the filesystem.[4][5][6]

The `.service` file’s User directive can be used to run service as a specific user, which could result in privilege escalation based on specific user/group permissions.

Systemd services can be created via systemd generators, which support the dynamic generation of unit files. Systemd generators are small executables that run during boot or configuration reloads to dynamically create or modify systemd unit files by converting non-native configurations into services, symlinks, or drop-ins (i.e., Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts).[7][8]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1543 Create or Modify System Process This object subtechnique of Create or Modify System Process.
Enterprise T1501 Systemd Service Systemd Service revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0139: TeamTNT

TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

Group Enterprise

G1015: Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]

Group Enterprise

G0106: Rocke

Rocke is an alleged Chinese-speaking adversary whose primary objective appeared to be cryptojacking, or stealing victim system resources for the purposes of mining cryptocurrency. The name Rocke comes from the email address "rocke@live.cn" used to create the wallet which held collected cryptocurrency. Researchers have detected overlaps between Rocke and the Iron Cybercrime Group, though this attribution has not been confirmed.[1]

Malware Enterprise

S9008: Shai-Hulud

Shai-Hulud is a supply chain worm, first reported in September 2025, that spreads through code repositories, including GitHub and NPM packages. It exploits CI/CD pipeline dependencies to propagate to victims and poisons the supply chain by publishing malicious packages. Once inside a victim environment, Shai-Hulud steals credentials and access tokens from compromised repository accounts and exfiltrates them to attacker-controlled servers via encoded GitHub Actions workflows.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]

LinuxSaaSWindows
Tool Enterprise

S0192: Pupy

Pupy is an open source, cross-platform (Windows, Linux, OSX, Android) remote administration and post-exploitation tool. [1] It is written in Python and can be generated as a payload in several different ways (Windows exe, Python file, PowerShell oneliner/file, Linux elf, APK, Rubber Ducky, etc.). [1] Pupy is publicly available on GitHub. [1]

LinuxWindowsmacOS
Malware Enterprise

S1078: RotaJakiro

RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).[1][2]

Linux
Malware Enterprise

S0601: Hildegard

Hildegard is malware that targets misconfigured kubelets for initial access and runs cryptocurrency miner operations. The malware was first observed in January 2021. The TeamTNT activity group is believed to be behind Hildegard. [1]

LinuxContainersIaaS
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

detects · Detection Strategy DET0253: Detection of Systemd Service Creation or Modification on Linux Enterprise uses · Malware S9008: Shai-Hulud Enterprise uses · Group G0139: TeamTNT Enterprise uses · Malware S1198: Gomir Enterprise uses · Campaign C0034: 2022 Ukraine Electric Power Attack Enterprise uses · Malware S1222: RIFLESPINE Enterprise uses · Tool S0192: Pupy Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1018: User Account Management Enterprise uses · Group G1015: Scattered Spider Enterprise uses · Malware S0410: Fysbis Enterprise uses · Malware S1078: RotaJakiro Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1543: Create or Modify System Process Enterprise uses · Malware S0663: SysUpdate Enterprise uses · Malware S0401: Exaramel for Linux Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions Enterprise revoked by · Technique T1501: Systemd Service Enterprise uses · Group G0106: Rocke Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1026: Privileged Account Management Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1033: Limit Software Installation Enterprise uses · Malware S0601: Hildegard Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions:

- Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles.

Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.

Harden File Shares:

- Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows.

Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access.

On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf`

File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):

- Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.

Audit File System Access:

- Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.

Restrict Startup Directories:

- Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`.

Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`.

- On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1033: Limit Software Installation

Prevent users or groups from installing unauthorized or unapproved software to reduce the risk of introducing malicious or vulnerable applications. This can be achieved through allowlists, software restriction policies, endpoint management tools, and least privilege access principles. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Application Whitelisting

- Implement Microsoft AppLocker or Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) to create and enforce allowlists for approved software. - Whitelist applications based on file hash, path, or digital signatures.

Restrict User Permissions

- Remove local administrator rights for all non-IT users. - Use Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) to restrict installation permissions to privileged accounts only.

Software Restriction Policies (SRP)

- Use GPO to configure SRP to deny execution of binaries from directories such as `%AppData%`, `%Temp%`, and external drives. - Restrict specific file types (`.exe`, `.bat`, `.msi`, `.js`, `.vbs`) to trusted directories only.

Endpoint Management Solutions

- Deploy tools like Microsoft Intune, SCCM, or Jamf for centralized software management. - Maintain a list of approved software, versions, and updates across the enterprise.

Monitor Software Installation Events

- Enable logging of software installation events and monitor Windows Event ID 4688 and Event ID 11707 for software installs. - Use SIEM or EDR tools to alert on attempts to install unapproved software.

Implement Software Inventory Management

- Use tools like OSQuery or Wazuh to scan for unauthorized software on endpoints and servers. - Conduct regular audits to detect and remove unapproved software.

*Tools for Implementation*

Application Whitelisting:

- Microsoft AppLocker - Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC)

Endpoint Management:

- Microsoft Intune - SCCM (System Center Configuration Manager) - Jamf Pro (macOS) - Puppet or Ansible for automation

Software Restriction Policies:

- Group Policy Object (GPO) - Microsoft Software Restriction Policies (SRP)

Monitoring and Logging:

- Splunk - OSQuery - Wazuh (open-source SIEM and XDR) - EDRs

Inventory Management and Auditing:

- OSQuery - Wazuh

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.6
Created
Modified
Raw hash
06b426dabc0e510c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.6 Current bundle 06b426dabc0e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Linux man-pages: systemd January 2014

    Linux man-pages. (2014, January). systemd(1) - Linux manual page. Retrieved April 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    lambert systemd 2022

    Tony Lambert. (2022, November 13). ATT&CK T1501: Understanding systemd service persistence. Retrieved March 20, 2023.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    freedesktop systemd.service

    Free Desktop. (n.d.). systemd.service — Service unit configuration. Retrieved March 20, 2023.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Anomali Rocke March 2019

    Anomali Labs. (2019, March 15). Rocke Evolves Its Arsenal With a New Malware Family Written in Golang. Retrieved April 24, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    airwalk backdoor unix systems

    airwalk. (2023, January 1). A guide to backdooring Unix systems. Retrieved May 31, 2023.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Rapid7 Service Persistence 22JUNE2016

    Rapid7. (2016, June 22). Service Persistence. Retrieved April 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Elastic Security Labs Linux Persistence 2024

    Ruben Groenewoud. (2024, August 20). Linux Detection Engineering - A primer on persistence mechanisms. Retrieved March 18, 2025.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Pepe Berba Systemd 2022

    Pepe Berba. (2022, February 7). Hunting for Persistence in Linux (Part 5): Systemd Generators. Retrieved April 8, 2025.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Berba hunting linux systemd

    Pepe Berba. (2022, January 30). Hunting for Persistence in Linux (Part 3): Systemd, Timers, and Cron. Retrieved March 20, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    mitre-attack T1543.002
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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