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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1213.004: Customer Relationship Management Software

Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data.

Once adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized Phishing emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization’s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.[1][2][3]

CRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.

EnterpriseT1213.004Sub-techniqueObject v1.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

This technique matters because CRM systems concentrate customer identities, contact details, purchase history, and support interactions in one SaaS-accessible repository. If an adversary gains access, the business risk is not only data loss; the same customer data can enable more convincing phishing, SIM swapping, financial fraud, or follow-on targeting of customers and partner organizations.

Executive priority

Treat CRM access as a high-value data protection and resilience issue, not just an application-admin concern. Leaders should ask whether CRM user access is least-privilege, whether audit logs are retained and reviewed, whether abnormal data access can be detected, and whether incident response plans cover customer notification, extortion decision-making, and evidence preservation. The relationship to the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign reinforces that CRM compromise can become a material business, legal, and customer-trust event.

Technical view

This is a SaaS collection sub-technique under Data from Information Repositories. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into CRM authentication, user and admin actions, bulk record access, exports, API activity, sharing/configuration changes, and access from unusual locations or devices. MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, but the related detection strategy DET0550 points defenders toward suspicious access to CRM data in SaaS environments. Detection engineering should be tailored to the specific CRM instance and data model because stored information and logging vary by environment.

Likely telemetry

  • CRM audit logs for user, administrator, export, and data access activity
  • SaaS identity and authentication logs, including MFA events and session context
  • API access logs and integration/service-account activity
  • Records of bulk queries, reports, downloads, or exports involving customer data
  • Configuration and permission-change logs for roles, profiles, sharing, and external access

Detection direction

  • Confirm that CRM audit logging is enabled, retained, and available to the SOC or managed detection workflow.
  • Baseline normal CRM access by role, geography, volume, time of day, and integration account to reduce false positives.
  • Prioritize detections for unusual bulk access, export behavior, abnormal API usage, new or modified privileged access, and access inconsistent with the user’s business role.
  • Correlate CRM events with identity telemetry, especially suspicious authentication, MFA changes, session anomalies, and account lifecycle events.
  • Review relationship-driven context from DET0550 and the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign, but validate applicability to the local CRM platform and logging capabilities.

Mitigation priorities

  • Enforce user account management and least privilege for CRM users, administrators, integrations, and service accounts.
  • Audit CRM activity and configurations regularly, with evidence retained for compliance and incident response needs.
  • Review software configuration settings for CRM security controls, sharing rules, export permissions, API access, and administrative privileges.
  • Provide user training focused on phishing, vishing, social engineering, and reporting suspicious CRM-related requests or customer-data activity.
  • Include CRM data compromise scenarios in incident response playbooks, especially customer-data exposure, notification workflows, and evidence preservation.
Analyst notes and limits

The ATT&CK object is specific to CRM software such as Salesforce, Microsoft Dynamics 365, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot, with SaaS listed as the platform. The object is collection-focused and is a sub-technique of Data from Information Repositories. Related mitigations are User Training, User Account Management, Audit, and Software Configuration. Related campaign context is available for Salesforce Data Exfiltration, but local exposure depends on the organization’s CRM deployment, access model, and logging maturity.

Official MITRE detection guidance for this object is not provided. The supplied fields do not define exact log schemas, thresholds, or vendor-specific controls. Detection coverage and risk prioritization require local validation of CRM configuration, identity controls, audit retention, data sensitivity, and incident response obligations.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Customer Relationship Management Software

Adversaries may leverage Customer Relationship Management (CRM) software to mine valuable information. CRM software is used to assist organizations in tracking and managing customer interactions, as well as storing customer data.

Once adversaries gain access to a victim organization, they may mine CRM software for customer data. This may include personally identifiable information (PII) such as full names, emails, phone numbers, and addresses, as well as additional details such as purchase histories and IT support interactions. By collecting this data, an adversary may be able to send personalized Phishing emails, engage in SIM swapping, or otherwise target the organization’s customers in ways that enable financial gain or the compromise of additional organizations.[1][2][3]

CRM software may be hosted on-premises or in the cloud. Information stored in these solutions may vary based on the specific instance or environment. Examples of CRM software include Microsoft Dynamics 365, Salesforce, Zoho, Zendesk, and HubSpot.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1213 Data from Information Repositories This object subtechnique of Data from Information Repositories.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Campaign Enterprise

C0059: Salesforce Data Exfiltration

The Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign began in October 2024 with financially-motivated threat actor UNC6040 using Spearphishing Voice (vishing) to compromise corporate Salesforce instances for large-scale data theft and extortion. Following the initial data theft, victim organizations received extortion demands from a separate threat actor, UNC6240, who claimed to be the “ShinyHunters” group. The observed infrastructure and TTPs used during the Salesforce Data Exfiltration campaign overlap with those used by threat groups with suspected ties to the broader collective known as "The Com.” These overlaps could plausibly be the result of associated actors operating within the same communities and are not necessarily an indication of a direct operational relationship.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b6fbbd4a3b1057c4...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle b6fbbd4a3b10…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Bleeping Computer US Cellular Hack 2022

    Sergiu Gatlan. (2022, January 4). UScellular discloses data breach after billing system hack. Retrieved July 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Bleeping Computer Mint Mobile Hack 2021

    Lawrence Abrams. (2021, July 10). Mint Mobile hit by a data breach after numbers ported, data accessed. Retrieved July 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Bleeping Computer Bank Hack 2020

    Ionut Ilascu. (2020, January 16). Customer-Owned Bank Informs 100k of Breach Exposing Account Balance, PII. Retrieved July 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    mitre-attack T1213.004
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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