T1530: Data from Cloud Storage
Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.
In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories).
Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.[1][2][3] There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.
This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.[4][5][6][7]
Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Data from Cloud Storage matters because many organizations place regulated, customer, operational, and business-critical files in IaaS object stores and SaaS document platforms. The practical risk is often not malware; it is exposed storage, overly broad permissions, weak account control, or leaked credentials allowing direct collection through cloud APIs or backend storage paths.
Executive priority
Treat this as a cloud governance and incident-readiness priority. Leaders should ask whether sensitive cloud storage is inventoried, access is least-privilege, public or anonymous access is prevented, MFA is enforced for relevant accounts, and audit evidence can prove who accessed what data. This technique is material for compliance, breach notification decisions, ransomware/extortion readiness, and cyber-physical resilience where cloud storage supports operational or energy-sector workflows.
Technical view
For SOC, cloud security, and IR teams, validate visibility across IaaS, Office Suite, and SaaS storage. ATT&CK provides no official detection text, but the related DET0484 strategy indicates value in looking for multi-platform cloud storage exfiltration behavior chains. Prioritize monitoring of cloud API access to object storage, SaaS file access/download activity, permission changes, anonymous or public exposure, and use of credentials or tokens that may have been leaked from repositories, logs, or other sources. Relationship context also shows this behavior associated with cloud and identity tooling such as AADInternals, Pacu, Peirates, and TruffleHog, so detections should consider both storage access and preceding credential or cloud-enumeration activity.
Likely telemetry
- Cloud provider audit logs for object access, listing, download, permission changes, and API calls
- SaaS audit logs for document access, file download, sharing, export, and administrative changes
- Identity provider authentication logs, MFA events, token usage, and anomalous account access
- Cloud storage configuration state, including public access, anonymous access, bucket/container permissions, and broad group access
- Secrets-discovery or repository scanning findings involving credentials, API keys, or encryption keys
Detection direction
- First confirm that audit logging is enabled and retained for each relevant IaaS, Office Suite, and SaaS storage platform; without logs, this technique may leave little defensible evidence.
- Tune detections around unusual storage enumeration, bulk reads/downloads, access from unexpected identities or locations, and sudden permission changes that make storage public or broadly accessible.
- Correlate storage access with identity events such as new sessions, MFA failures or bypass-relevant patterns, token use, and recently changed account privileges.
- Use the related DET0484 concept as a validation target: look for chains that span credential discovery, cloud API use, storage access, and possible large-scale collection rather than single isolated events.
- Reduce false positives by baselining legitimate backup, analytics, migration, and administrative workflows that regularly read large volumes of cloud data.
Mitigation priorities
- Inventory cloud storage locations across IaaS, Office Suite, and SaaS platforms and classify sensitive data so controls can be prioritized.
- Apply User Account Management and least privilege: remove unnecessary users, stale accounts, broad groups, and excessive storage permissions.
- Restrict file, directory, bucket, container, and SaaS sharing permissions, especially public, anonymous, or organization-wide access where not explicitly required.
- Enforce MFA for accounts that can access or administer sensitive cloud storage.
- Audit configurations and access activity regularly, retaining evidence needed for investigation and compliance review.
Analyst notes and limits
ATT&CK maps this technique to the Collection tactic and platforms IaaS, Office Suite, and SaaS. The object highlights common storage examples including Amazon S3, Azure Storage, Google Cloud Storage, OneDrive, Google Drive, Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox. It also references incidents involving exposed PII, medical records, card-related exposure, and extortion-related transfer behavior. Relationships to groups, campaigns, and tools should be used for threat-informed prioritization and hunting context, not as proof of local compromise.
The official ATT&CK object does not provide a detection section, so detection guidance depends on platform audit capability, local storage architecture, identity telemetry, and known business workflows. The supplied relationships identify mitigations and related detections/tools/groups, but do not provide enough detail to claim guaranteed coverage, active exploitation, or specific customer exposure.
Data from Cloud Storage
Adversaries may access data from cloud storage.
Many IaaS providers offer solutions for online data object storage such as Amazon S3, Azure Storage, and Google Cloud Storage. Similarly, SaaS enterprise platforms such as Office 365 and Google Workspace provide cloud-based document storage to users through services such as OneDrive and Google Drive, while SaaS application providers such as Slack, Confluence, Salesforce, and Dropbox may provide cloud storage solutions as a peripheral or primary use case of their platform.
In some cases, as with IaaS-based cloud storage, there exists no overarching application (such as SQL or Elasticsearch) with which to interact with the stored objects: instead, data from these solutions is retrieved directly though the Cloud API. In SaaS applications, adversaries may be able to collect this data directly from APIs or backend cloud storage objects, rather than through their front-end application or interface (i.e., Data from Information Repositories).
Adversaries may collect sensitive data from these cloud storage solutions. Providers typically offer security guides to help end users configure systems, though misconfigurations are a common problem.[1][2][3] There have been numerous incidents where cloud storage has been improperly secured, typically by unintentionally allowing public access to unauthenticated users, overly-broad access by all users, or even access for any anonymous person outside the control of the Identity Access Management system without even needing basic user permissions.
This open access may expose various types of sensitive data, such as credit cards, personally identifiable information, or medical records.[4][5][6][7]
Adversaries may also obtain then abuse leaked credentials from source repositories, logs, or other means as a way to gain access to cloud storage objects.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0117: Fox Kitten
Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.[1][2][3][4]
G1053: Storm-0501
Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]
G1044: APT42
APT42 is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts cyber espionage and surveillance.[1] The group primarily focuses on targets in the Middle East region, but has targeted a variety of industries and countries since at least 2015.[1] APT42 starts cyber operations through spearphishing emails and/or the PINEFLOWER Android malware, then monitors and collects information from the compromised systems and devices.[1] Finally, APT42 exfiltrates data using native features and open-source tools.[2]
APT42 activities have been linked to Magic Hound by other commercial vendors. While there are behavior and software overlaps between Magic Hound and APT42, they appear to be distinct entities and are tracked as separate entities by their originating vendor.
G0125: HAFNIUM
HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]
G1015: Scattered Spider
Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]
S0683: Peirates
S1091: Pacu
Pacu is an open-source AWS exploitation framework. The tool is written in Python and publicly available on GitHub.[1]
S0677: AADInternals
AADInternals is a PowerShell-based framework for administering, enumerating, and exploiting Azure Active Directory. The tool is publicly available on GitHub.[1][2]
S9009: TruffleHog
TruffleHog is an open-source secrets-discovery tool that is used to search for credentials, API keys, and encryption keys across a variety of data sources and environments.[1][2] TruffleHog has the ability to discover credentials and secrets stored in code repositories, git history, CI/CD pipelines, among other common storage locations to include filesystems and cloud storage buckets.[1][3][2] TruffleHog was first released by its author in 2016.[2]
C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks
2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]
C0027: C0027
C0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.[1]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.2 | Current bundle | 491a6230c4c2… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
Amazon S3 Security, 2019
Amazon. (2019, May 17). How can I secure the files in my Amazon S3 bucket?. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[2]
Microsoft Azure Storage Security, 2019
Amlekar, M., Brooks, C., Claman, L., et. al.. (2019, March 20). Azure Storage security guide. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[3]
Google Cloud Storage Best Practices, 2019
Google. (2019, September 16). Best practices for Cloud Storage. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[4]
Trend Micro S3 Exposed PII, 2017
Trend Micro. (2017, November 6). A Misconfigured Amazon S3 Exposed Almost 50 Thousand PII in Australia. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[5]
Wired Magecart S3 Buckets, 2019
Barrett, B.. (2019, July 11). Hack Brief: A Card-Skimming Hacker Group Hit 17K Domains—and Counting. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[6]
HIPAA Journal S3 Breach, 2017
HIPAA Journal. (2017, October 11). 47GB of Medical Records and Test Results Found in Unsecured Amazon S3 Bucket. Retrieved October 4, 2019.
Open source URL -
[7]
Rclone-mega-extortion_05_2021
Justin Schoenfeld, Aaron Didier. (2021, May 4). Transferring leverage in a ransomware attack. Retrieved July 14, 2022.
Open source URL -
[8]
mitre-attack T1530Open source URL
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