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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1666: Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy

Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses.

IaaS environments often group resources into a hierarchy, enabling improved resource management and application of policies to relevant groups. Hierarchical structures differ among cloud providers. For example, in AWS environments, multiple accounts can be grouped under a single organization, while in Azure environments, multiple subscriptions can be grouped under a single management group.[1][2]

Adversaries may add, delete, or otherwise modify resource groups within an IaaS hierarchy. For example, in Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources. They may also engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.[3][4]

In AWS environments, adversaries with appropriate permissions in a given account may call the `LeaveOrganization` API, causing the account to be severed from the AWS Organization to which it was tied and removing any Service Control Policies, guardrails, or restrictions imposed upon it by its former Organization. Alternatively, adversaries may call the `CreateAccount` API in order to create a new account within an AWS Organization. This account will use the same payment methods registered to the payment account but may not be subject to existing detections or Service Control Policies.[5]

EnterpriseT1666TechniqueObject v2.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy matters because changes to cloud account, subscription, organization, or management-group structure can move activity outside the guardrails defenders rely on. In IaaS, an attacker with sufficient privileges may create or transfer subscriptions/accounts, remove an account from an organization, or otherwise alter hierarchy so existing policies, logging assumptions, and detections no longer apply.

Executive priority

Treat cloud hierarchy changes as high-value governance events, not routine administration only. Leaders should ask who can create, transfer, detach, or reorganize cloud accounts/subscriptions; whether those actions require approval; and whether audit evidence proves that guardrails, payment exposure, and logging remain intact after hierarchy changes. This is especially relevant to cloud security, IAM governance, incident response scoping, and compliance readiness.

Technical view

This enterprise ATT&CK technique applies to IaaS and is mapped to defense impairment. SOC and cloud security teams should validate monitoring for hierarchy-modifying actions such as AWS CreateAccount and LeaveOrganization, Azure subscription creation or transfer, and changes to management groups, resource groups, service control policies, guardrails, or equivalent provider hierarchy controls. Because ATT&CK does not provide official detection text for this object, local detection engineering should be based on cloud control-plane audit evidence, privileged identity context, approval workflows, and relationship-driven guidance from DET0155 where available.

Likely telemetry

  • Cloud control-plane audit logs for organization, account, subscription, tenant, management-group, and resource-group changes
  • AWS organization/account API activity, including CreateAccount and LeaveOrganization where applicable
  • Azure subscription creation, transfer, and management-group change records where applicable
  • IAM and privileged administrator activity, especially actions by Global Administrator or equivalent cloud admin roles
  • Policy and guardrail configuration changes, including service control policies or provider-equivalent restrictions

Detection direction

  • Alert or review rare hierarchy changes, especially account/subscription creation, subscription transfer, account detachment, and changes that remove policy inheritance or guardrails.
  • Correlate hierarchy changes with privileged identity activity and recent account lifecycle events; false positives may include approved cloud restructuring, mergers, landing-zone changes, or platform engineering work.
  • Validate that detections still work for newly created accounts or subscriptions; a common blind spot is assuming inherited logging, service control policies, or management-group policies automatically apply.
  • Use allowlists cautiously for cloud administrators, because the technique depends on appropriate permissions and may involve compromised privileged accounts.
  • Confirm that DET0155 or any local detection strategy is implemented against actual provider audit sources rather than only inventory snapshots.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize user account management: restrict who can create, transfer, detach, or reorganize IaaS accounts/subscriptions and enforce least privilege for cloud hierarchy administration.
  • Maintain auditing for hierarchy, policy, billing, and privileged identity events, and periodically test that logs are generated for new or moved accounts/subscriptions.
  • Harden software and cloud configuration so new accounts/subscriptions inherit required guardrails, logging, and policy baselines before production use.
  • Require documented approval and review for hierarchy changes that affect policy inheritance, payment responsibility, or tenant/account ownership.
  • During incident response, include cloud hierarchy review in scoping to identify accounts or subscriptions that may have been moved outside normal monitoring.
Analyst notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object describes defense impairment through IaaS hierarchy modification and provides AWS and Azure examples. The relationship context identifies mitigations for User Account Management, Audit, and Software Configuration, plus a related detection strategy DET0155. Practical coverage depends on each organization’s cloud provider, hierarchy model, administrative roles, and logging configuration.

Official ATT&CK detection text is not provided for T1666, so this take cannot assert a specific detection method or guaranteed coverage. The object supports IaaS, AWS, and Azure examples, but local validation is required for provider-specific event names, policy inheritance behavior, and legitimate administrative workflows.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Modify Cloud Resource Hierarchy

Adversaries may attempt to modify hierarchical structures in infrastructure-as-a-service (IaaS) environments in order to evade defenses.

IaaS environments often group resources into a hierarchy, enabling improved resource management and application of policies to relevant groups. Hierarchical structures differ among cloud providers. For example, in AWS environments, multiple accounts can be grouped under a single organization, while in Azure environments, multiple subscriptions can be grouped under a single management group.[1][2]

Adversaries may add, delete, or otherwise modify resource groups within an IaaS hierarchy. For example, in Azure environments, an adversary who has gained access to a Global Administrator account may create new subscriptions in which to deploy resources. They may also engage in subscription hijacking by transferring an existing pay-as-you-go subscription from a victim tenant to an adversary-controlled tenant. This will allow the adversary to use the victim’s compute resources without generating logs on the victim tenant.[3][4]

In AWS environments, adversaries with appropriate permissions in a given account may call the `LeaveOrganization` API, causing the account to be severed from the AWS Organization to which it was tied and removing any Service Control Policies, guardrails, or restrictions imposed upon it by its former Organization. Alternatively, adversaries may call the `CreateAccount` API in order to create a new account within an AWS Organization. This account will use the same payment methods registered to the payment account but may not be subject to existing detections or Service Control Policies.[5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

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Change history

Object version and sync metadata

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ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
a274632eaeb7a52d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle a274632eaeb7…
Raw source

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Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    AWS Organizations

    AWS. (n.d.). Terminology and concepts for AWS Organizations. Retrieved September 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Azure Resources

    Microsoft Azure. (2024, May 31). Organize your Azure resources effectively. Retrieved September 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft Peach Sandstorm 2023

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence. (2023, September 14). Peach Sandstorm password spray campaigns enable intelligence collection at high-value targets. Retrieved September 18, 2023.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft Subscription Hijacking 2022

    Dor Edry. (2022, August 24). Hunt for compromised Azure subscriptions using Microsoft Defender for Cloud Apps. Retrieved September 5, 2023.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    AWS re Inforce Trust Mod

    AWS re Inforce. (2024, June). Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attack T1666
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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