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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1555.005: Password Managers

Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.[1] Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.[1]

Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.[2][3] Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via Exploitation for Credential Access.[4] Adversaries may also try brute forcing via Password Guessing to obtain the master password of a password manager.[5]

EnterpriseT1555.005Sub-techniqueObject v1.1 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Password managers reduce password reuse risk, but they also become high-value credential stores. This technique matters because an adversary who reaches a user workstation may try to steal the password manager master password, extract plaintext credentials from memory after the vault is unlocked, access vault database files on disk, or guess the master password. For leaders, the issue is not whether password managers are good practice; it is whether endpoint, identity, patching, configuration, and user processes protect the vault as a critical credential asset.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a credential-access risk affecting Linux, macOS, and Windows environments. The business decision is whether the organization can prove that password manager use is governed, configured securely, patched, and monitored, especially for privileged users and teams with access to sensitive systems. This also supports audit and incident response readiness: if a password manager is suspected to be accessed, responders need evidence to determine whether master passwords, stored credentials, or vault files may have been exposed.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1555.005, but the relationship context includes detection strategy DET0597, Detect Unauthorized Access to Password Managers. SOC and detection engineering teams should validate coverage around password manager process access, abnormal memory access or dumping behavior, unexpected access to password manager database files, and repeated master-password guessing behavior where logs are available. Because this is a sub-technique of Credentials from Password Stores, triage should connect endpoint evidence with broader credential-access activity and downstream identity use. Related software and actor relationships show use across Windows, macOS, and cross-platform malware contexts, so coverage should not be limited to one operating system where password managers are deployed.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and parent-child process activity involving password manager applications
  • Endpoint file access telemetry for password manager vault or database files stored on disk
  • EDR or operating system telemetry for suspicious memory access, memory scraping, or dump creation targeting password manager processes
  • Authentication or application logs showing repeated master-password attempts, where the password manager provides such logging
  • Software and vulnerability inventory for password manager versions and known relevant vulnerabilities

Detection direction

  • Inventory approved password managers and expected processes first; detections are weak without knowing what is normal in the environment.
  • Tune alerts for unusual processes accessing password manager memory or vault files, while accounting for legitimate backup, sync, security, or administrative tools that may touch the same data.
  • Review whether endpoint controls can see memory access and file access on Linux, macOS, and Windows; many environments collect process starts but not the evidence needed to confirm vault targeting.
  • Correlate suspected password manager access with credential-access techniques referenced by ATT&CK, including exploitation for credential access and password guessing.
  • Use DET0597 as the ATT&CK-linked detection strategy reference, but validate locally because the ATT&CK object itself does not provide official detection logic.

Mitigation priorities

  • Treat password manager deployment as a managed security control: define approved products, ownership, configuration baselines, and privileged-user requirements.
  • Apply M1051 Update Software to keep password managers and supporting platforms patched, including remediation of known vulnerabilities relevant to credential exposure.
  • Apply M1054 Software Configuration to harden password manager settings according to vendor and organizational policy.
  • Apply M1027 Password Policies to strengthen master-password requirements and reduce password reuse risk.
  • Apply M1018 User Account Management to limit stored credential exposure through least privilege, account lifecycle controls, and appropriate access scoping.
Analyst notes and limits

This object is T1555.005 Password Managers, a credential-access sub-technique under T1555 Credentials from Password Stores. ATT&CK relationships include mitigations for user training, user account management, password policies, software updates, and software configuration, plus multiple groups, a campaign, and software entries that use the technique. Those relationships support defensive prioritization but should not be read as proof of current targeting against any specific organization.

The official ATT&CK detection field is not provided, so detection recommendations are derived from the technique description, platforms, tactics, and supplied relationships. Local product capabilities, password manager architecture, operating system logging, and endpoint telemetry will determine actual coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Password Managers

Adversaries may acquire user credentials from third-party password managers.[1] Password managers are applications designed to store user credentials, normally in an encrypted database. Credentials are typically accessible after a user provides a master password that unlocks the database. After the database is unlocked, these credentials may be copied to memory. These databases can be stored as files on disk.[1]

Adversaries may acquire user credentials from password managers by extracting the master password and/or plain-text credentials from memory.[2][3] Adversaries may extract credentials from memory via Exploitation for Credential Access.[4] Adversaries may also try brute forcing via Password Guessing to obtain the master password of a password manager.[5]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1555 Credentials from Password Stores This object subtechnique of Credentials from Password Stores.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0027: Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G0117: Fox Kitten

Fox Kitten is threat actor with a suspected nexus to the Iranian government that has been active since at least 2017 against entities in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, Australia, and North America. Fox Kitten has targeted multiple industrial verticals including oil and gas, technology, government, defense, healthcare, manufacturing, and engineering.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G1048: UNC3886

UNC3886 is a China-nexus cyberespionage group that has been active since at least 2022, targeting defense, technology, and telecommunication organizations located in the United States and the Asia-Pacific-Japan (APJ) regions. UNC3886 has displayed a deep understanding of edge devices and virtualization technologies through the exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities and the use of novel malware families and utilities.[1][2]

Group Enterprise

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G1015: Scattered Spider

Scattered Spider is a native English-speaking cybercriminal group active since at least 2022. [1] [2] The group initially targeted customer relationship management (CRM) providers, business process outsourcing (BPO) firms, and telecommunications and technology companies before expanding in 2023 to gaming, hospitality, retail, managed service provider (MSP), manufacturing, and financial sectors. [2] Scattered Spider relies heavily on social engineering, including impersonating IT and help-desk staff, to gain initial access, bypass multi-factor authentication (MFA), and compromise enterprise networks. The group has adapted its tooling to evade endpoint detection and response (EDR) defenses and used ransomware for financial gain. [3] [4] [5] Scattered Spider had expanded into hybrid cloud and identity environments, using help-desk impersonation and MFA bypass to obtain administrator access in Okta, AWS, and Office 365. [6]

Group Enterprise

G1004: LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.[1][2][3]

Malware Enterprise

S0266: TrickBot

TrickBot is a Trojan spyware program written in C++ that first emerged in September 2016 as a possible successor to Dyre. TrickBot was developed and initially used by Wizard Spider for targeting banking sites in North America, Australia, and throughout Europe; it has since been used against all sectors worldwide as part of "big game hunting" ransomware campaigns.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1245: InvisibleFerret

InvisibleFerret is a modular python malware that is leveraged for data exfiltration and remote access capabilities.[1][2][3] InvisibleFerret consists of four modules: main, payload, browser, and AnyDesk.[1] InvisibleFerret malware has been leveraged by North Korea-affiliated threat actors identified as DeceptiveDevelopment or Contagious Interview since 2023.[4][2][3][5] InvisibleFerret has historically been introduced to the victim environment through the use of the BeaverTail malware.[6][1][2][3][5]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Campaign Enterprise

C0014: Operation Wocao

Operation Wocao was a cyber espionage campaign that targeted organizations around the world, including in Brazil, China, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The suspected China-based actors compromised government organizations and managed service providers, as well as aviation, construction, energy, finance, health care, insurance, offshore engineering, software development, and transportation companies.[1]

Security researchers assessed the Operation Wocao actors used similar TTPs and tools as APT20, suggesting a possible overlap. Operation Wocao was named after an observed command line entry by one of the threat actors, possibly out of frustration from losing webshell access.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
aa1f0fea1c0c687c...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.1 Current bundle aa1f0fea1c0c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    ise Password Manager February 2019

    ise. (2019, February 19). Password Managers: Under the Hood of Secrets Management. Retrieved January 22, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FoxIT Wocao December 2019

    Dantzig, M. v., Schamper, E. (2019, December 19). Operation Wocao: Shining a light on one of China’s hidden hacking groups. Retrieved October 8, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Github KeeThief

    Lee, C., Schoreder, W. (n.d.). KeeThief. Retrieved February 8, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    NVD CVE-2019-3610

    National Vulnerability Database. (2019, October 9). CVE-2019-3610 Detail. Retrieved April 14, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Cyberreason Anchor December 2019

    Dahan, A. et al. (2019, December 11). DROPPING ANCHOR: FROM A TRICKBOT INFECTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE ANCHOR MALWARE. Retrieved September 10, 2020.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    mitre-attack T1555.005
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.