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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1686.002: Network Device Firewall

Adversaries may disable network device-based firewall mechanisms entirely or add, delete, or modify particular rules in order to bypass controls limiting network usage.

Adversaries may obtain access to devices such as routers, switches, or other perimeter/network devices and change access control lists (ACLs), security zones, or policy rules to permit otherwise blocked traffic. For example, adversaries may add new network firewall rules to allow access to all internal network subnets without restrictions. Allowing access to internal network subsets may enable unrestricted inbound/outbound connectivity or open paths for command and control and lateral movement.

Adversaries may obtain access to network device management interfaces via Valid Accounts or by exploiting vulnerabilities. In some cases, threat actors may target firewalls and other network infrastructure that are exposed to the internet by leveraging weaknesses in public-facing applications (Exploit Public-Facing Application).[1]

Adversaries may also modify host networking configurations that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as adjusting interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.

EnterpriseT1686.002Sub-techniqueObject v1.0 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

This behavior matters because the firewall policy on routers, switches, and perimeter devices is often a business control, not just a network setting. If an adversary can disable or change network-device firewall rules, they may open paths that were intentionally blocked for command and control, lateral movement, or unrestricted internal access. The practical question for leaders is whether firewall changes are governed, logged, reviewed, and tied to accountable administrative identities.

Executive priority

Prioritize this where network devices protect critical internal segments, internet-facing services, remote access paths, financial systems, or operational environments. The ATT&CK relationships show relevance to network-device malware and campaigns involving energy infrastructure, so resilience depends on proving that administrative access, patching, and audit evidence around firewall policy changes are mature enough for incident response and compliance review.

Technical view

T1686.002 is a defense-impairment sub-technique for Network Devices under Disable or Modify System Firewall. SOC and IR teams should validate whether changes to ACLs, security zones, policy rules, and related network configuration parameters can be attributed to a specific account/session and compared against approved baselines. Because MITRE provides no official detection text, use the related detection strategy DET0306 as direction: detect unauthorized network firewall rule modification, especially after Valid Accounts activity or exploitation of exposed management/public-facing interfaces.

Likely telemetry

  • Network device configuration change logs and syslog events
  • Administrator authentication, authorization, and session records for network device management interfaces
  • Firewall/ACL/security zone/policy rule snapshots and configuration diffs
  • Configuration backup history and change-control records
  • Network flow or traffic metadata showing newly permitted inbound, outbound, or internal paths

Detection direction

  • Baseline approved firewall policies and alert on additions, deletions, disables, or broadening of ACLs, zones, or rules outside expected change windows.
  • Correlate policy changes with administrative logins, account privilege changes, and management-interface access source addresses.
  • Tune for legitimate network operations activity: maintenance windows and emergency changes can look similar unless tied to authorization evidence.
  • Review whether network devices forward sufficient logs to central monitoring; local-only logs are a major blind spot during compromise.
  • Use relationship context to include network-device-focused malware and campaign reporting in threat intelligence reviews, without assuming those actors are present locally.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with User Account Management: restrict network-device administrative privileges to required personnel and enforce least privilege for firewall policy modification.
  • Implement Audit controls: record and systematically review user behavior, device activity, and configuration state so unauthorized changes can be reconstructed.
  • Maintain Update Software processes for network device firmware/software, especially where management or public-facing interfaces may be exposed to known vulnerabilities such as the referenced CVE example.
  • Operationalize regular configuration review so firewall rules that allow broad internal access or unrestricted inbound/outbound connectivity are challenged and documented.
Analyst notes and limits

This object replaces the revoked T1562.013 naming and is now modeled as T1686.002 under defense impairment. Supplied relationships include use by C0063, APT38, Grandoreiro, and Cyclops Blink, plus mitigations M1018, M1047, and M1051. The most defensible coverage measure is not a single alert, but the ability to prove who changed network firewall policy, what changed, when it changed, and whether the change was authorized.

MITRE did not provide official detection logic for this object, and the supplied fields do not identify specific products, commands, or guaranteed indicators. Local device models, logging configuration, management-plane exposure, and change-management data are required to determine actual coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Network Device Firewall

Adversaries may disable network device-based firewall mechanisms entirely or add, delete, or modify particular rules in order to bypass controls limiting network usage.

Adversaries may obtain access to devices such as routers, switches, or other perimeter/network devices and change access control lists (ACLs), security zones, or policy rules to permit otherwise blocked traffic. For example, adversaries may add new network firewall rules to allow access to all internal network subnets without restrictions. Allowing access to internal network subsets may enable unrestricted inbound/outbound connectivity or open paths for command and control and lateral movement.

Adversaries may obtain access to network device management interfaces via Valid Accounts or by exploiting vulnerabilities. In some cases, threat actors may target firewalls and other network infrastructure that are exposed to the internet by leveraging weaknesses in public-facing applications (Exploit Public-Facing Application).[1]

Adversaries may also modify host networking configurations that indirectly manipulate system firewalls, such as adjusting interface bandwidth or network connection request thresholds.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1686 Disable or Modify System Firewall This object subtechnique of Disable or Modify System Firewall.
Enterprise T1562.013 Disable or Modify Network Device Firewall Sub-technique Disable or Modify Network Device Firewall revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0082: APT38

APT38 is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that specializes in financial cyber operations; it has been attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau.[1] Active since at least 2014, APT38 has targeted banks, financial institutions, casinos, cryptocurrency exchanges, SWIFT system endpoints, and ATMs in at least 38 countries worldwide. Significant operations include the 2016 Bank of Bangladesh heist, during which APT38 stole $81 million, as well as attacks against Bancomext [2] and Banco de Chile [2]; some of their attacks have been destructive.[1][2][3][4]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

Malware Enterprise

S0531: Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.[1][2]

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks

2025 Poland Wiper Attacks is a Russian state-sponsored campaign that conducted destructive cyberattacks against Polish energy infrastructure in December 2025. Targets included more than 30 wind and photovoltaic farms, a combined heat and power (CHP) plant, and a manufacturing sector company. The attacks on the distributed energy resources (DER) disrupted communications between affected facilities and the distribution system operator, but did not impact electricity generation or heat supply. Across the campaign, threat actors deployed two previously undocumented wiper tools, DynoWiper, a Windows-based wiper and LazyWiper, a PowerShell wiper, distributed via malicious Group Policy Objects. At the CHP plant, threat actors had maintained access since at least March 2025, using that foothold to obtain credentials and move laterally before attempting wiper deployment. Some reporting has assessed the activity to be consistent with Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) threat activity group Dragonfly, also tracked as STATIC TUNDRA, while other reporting attributes the destructive wiper activities to the Russian General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) threat activity group ELECTRUM, also tracked as Sandworm Team.[1][2][3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · Mitigation M1051: Update Software Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1047: Audit Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1018: User Account Management Enterprise detects · Detection Strategy DET0306: Detection of Unauthorized Network Firewall Rule Modification Enterprise uses · Group G0082: APT38 Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1686: Disable or Modify System Firewall Enterprise revoked by · Technique T1562.013: Disable or Modify Network Device Firewall Enterprise uses · Malware S0531: Grandoreiro Enterprise uses · Malware S0687: Cyclops Blink Enterprise uses · Campaign C0063: 2025 Poland Wiper Attacks Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1051: Update Software

Software updates ensure systems are protected against known vulnerabilities by applying patches and upgrades provided by vendors. Regular updates reduce the attack surface and prevent adversaries from exploiting known security gaps. This includes patching operating systems, applications, drivers, and firmware. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Regular Operating System Updates

- Implementation: Apply the latest Windows security updates monthly using WSUS (Windows Server Update Services) or a similar patch management solution. Configure systems to check for updates automatically and schedule reboots during maintenance windows. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of OS vulnerabilities such as privilege escalation or remote code execution.

Application Patching

- Implementation: Monitor Apache's update release notes for security patches addressing vulnerabilities. Schedule updates for off-peak hours to avoid downtime while maintaining security compliance. - Use Case: Prevents exploitation of web application vulnerabilities, such as those leading to unauthorized access or data breaches.

Firmware Updates

- Implementation: Regularly check the vendor’s website for firmware updates addressing vulnerabilities. Plan for update deployment during scheduled maintenance to minimize business disruption. - Use Case: Protects against vulnerabilities that adversaries could exploit to gain access to network devices or inject malicious traffic.

Emergency Patch Deployment

- Implementation: Use the emergency patch deployment feature of the organization's patch management tool to apply updates to all affected Exchange servers within 24 hours. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of exploitation by rapidly addressing critical vulnerabilities.

Centralized Patch Management

- Implementation: Implement a centralized patch management system, such as SCCM or ManageEngine, to automate and track patch deployment across all environments. Generate regular compliance reports to ensure all systems are updated. - Use Case: Streamlines patching processes and ensures no critical systems are missed.

*Tools for Implementation*

Patch Management Tools:

- WSUS: Manage and deploy Microsoft updates across the organization. - ManageEngine Patch Manager Plus: Automate patch deployment for OS and third-party apps. - Ansible: Automate updates across multiple platforms, including Linux and Windows.

Vulnerability Scanning Tools:

- OpenVAS: Open-source vulnerability scanning to identify missing patches.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1047: Audit

Auditing is the process of recording activity and systematically reviewing and analyzing the activity and system configurations. The primary purpose of auditing is to detect anomalies and identify potential threats or weaknesses in the environment. Proper auditing configurations can also help to meet compliance requirements. The process of auditing encompasses regular analysis of user behaviors and system logs in support of proactive security measures.

Auditing is applicable to all systems used within an organization, from the front door of a building to accessing a file on a fileserver. It is considered more critical for regulated industries such as, healthcare, finance and government where compliance requirements demand stringent tracking of user and system activates.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

System Audit:

- Use Case: Regularly assess system configurations to ensure compliance with organizational security policies. - Implementation: Use tools to scan for deviations from established benchmarks.

Permission Audits:

- Use Case: Review file and folder permissions to minimize the risk of unauthorized access or privilege escalation. - Implementation: Run access reviews to identify users or groups with excessive permissions.

Software Audits:

- Use Case: Identify outdated, unsupported, or insecure software that could serve as an attack vector. - Implementation: Use inventory and vulnerability scanning tools to detect outdated versions and recommend secure alternatives.

Configuration Audits:

- Use Case: Evaluate system and network configurations to ensure secure settings (e.g., disabled SMBv1, enabled MFA). - Implementation: Implement automated configuration scanning tools like SCAP (Security Content Automation Protocol) to identify non-compliant systems.

Network Audits:

- Use Case: Examine network traffic, firewall rules, and endpoint communications to identify unauthorized or insecure connections. - Implementation: Utilize tools such as Wireshark, or Zeek to monitor and log suspicious network behavior.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0f47c766c11a3e8f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 1.0 Current bundle 0f47c766c11a…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CVE-2024-55591 Detail

    NIST NVD. (2025, January 22). Retrieved September 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attack T1686.002
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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