T1417.002: GUI Input Capture
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.[1]
There are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information.[2] Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked.[3]
Additionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.[4] Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include:
* Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.[1][5] Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.[6] * Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.[7][8][9] The `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.[10]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1417.002: GUI Input Capture describes Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users m...
Executive priority
T1417.002: GUI Input Capture is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1417.002: GUI Input Capture by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (credential-access, collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1417.002: GUI Input Capture appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
GUI Input Capture
Adversaries may mimic common operating system GUI components to prompt users for sensitive information with a seemingly legitimate prompt. The operating system and installed applications often have legitimate needs to prompt the user for sensitive information such as account credentials, bank account information, or Personally Identifiable Information (PII). Compared to traditional PCs, the constrained display size of mobile devices may impair the ability to provide users with contextual information, making users more susceptible to this technique’s use.[1]
There are several approaches adversaries may use to mimic this functionality. Adversaries may impersonate the identity of a legitimate application (e.g. use the same application name and/or icon) and, when installed on the device, may prompt the user for sensitive information.[2] Adversaries may also send fake device notifications to the user that may trigger the display of an input prompt when clicked.[3]
Additionally, adversaries may display a prompt on top of a running, legitimate application to trick users into entering sensitive information into a malicious application rather than the legitimate application. Typically, adversaries need to know when the targeted application and the individual activity within the targeted application is running in the foreground to display the prompt at the proper time. Adversaries can abuse Android’s accessibility features to determine which application is currently in the foreground.[4] Two known approaches to displaying a prompt include:
* Adversaries start a new activity on top of a running legitimate application.[1][5] Android 10 places new restrictions on the ability for an application to start a new activity on top of another application, which may make it more difficult for adversaries to utilize this technique.[6] * Adversaries create an application overlay window on top of a running legitimate application. Applications must hold the `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission to create overlay windows. This permission is handled differently than typical Android permissions and, at least under certain conditions, is automatically granted to applications installed from the Google Play Store.[7][8][9] The `SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW` permission and its associated ability to create application overlay windows are expected to be deprecated in a future release of Android in favor of a new API.[10]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1417 | Input Capture | This object subtechnique of Input Capture. |
| Mobile | T1411 | Input Prompt | Input Prompt revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0558: Tiktok Pro
Tiktok Pro is spyware that has been masquerading as the TikTok application.[1]
S1062: S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.[1][2]
S0399: Pallas
Pallas is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by Dark Caracal.[1]
S0297: XcodeGhost
XcodeGhost is iOS malware that infected at least 39 iOS apps in 2015 and potentially affected millions of users. [1] [2]
S0298: Xbot
S0545: TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA is an ad fraud botnet that has been capable of generating over 2 billion fraudulent requests per week.[1]
S1056: TianySpy
S0478: EventBot
EventBot is an Android banking trojan and information stealer that abuses Android’s accessibility service to steal data from various applications.[1] EventBot was designed to target over 200 different banking and financial applications, the majority of which are European bank and cryptocurrency exchange applications.[1]
S0301: Dendroid
S0539: Red Alert 2.0
Red Alert 2.0 is a banking trojan that masquerades as a VPN client.[1]
S1069: TangleBot
TangleBot is SMS malware that was initially observed in September 2021, primarily targeting mobile users in the United States and Canada. TangleBot has used SMS text message lures about COVID-19 regulations and vaccines to trick mobile users into downloading the malware, similar to FluBot Android malware campaigns.[1]
S0480: Cerberus
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 5b436a434c0e… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 5b436a434c0e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 5b436a434c0e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Felt-PhishingOnMobileDevices
A.P. Felt and D. Wagner. (2011, May 26). Phishing on Mobile Devices. Retrieved August 25, 2016.
- [2]eset-finance
Lukáš Štefanko. (2016, July 7). Fake finance apps on Google Play target users from around the world. Retrieved September 24, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]Group IB Gustuff Mar 2019
Group-IB. (2019, March 28). Group-IB uncovers Android Trojan named «Gustuff» capable of targeting more than 100 global banking apps, cryptocurrency and marketplace applications. Retrieved September 3, 2019.
Open source URL - [4]ThreatFabric Cerberus
ThreatFabric. (2019, August). Cerberus - A new banking Trojan from the underworld. Retrieved September 18, 2019.
Open source URL - [5]Hassell-ExploitingAndroid
R. Hassell. (2011, October 12-13). Exploiting Androids for Fun and Profit. Retrieved October 10, 2019.
Open source URL - [6]Android Background
Android Developers. (n.d.). Restrictions on starting activities from the background. Retrieved September 18, 2019.
Open source URL - [7]Cloak and Dagger
Fratantonio, Y., et al.. (2017). Cloak & Dagger. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL - [8]NowSecure Android Overlay
Ramirez, T.. (2017, May 25). ‘SAW’-ing through the UI: Android overlay malware and the System Alert Window permission explained. Retrieved September 18, 2019.
Open source URL - [9]Skycure-Accessibility
Yair Amit. (2016, March 3). “Accessibility Clickjacking” – The Next Evolution in Android Malware that Impacts More Than 500 Million Devices. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [10]XDA Bubbles
Rahman, M.. (2019, May 8). Bubbles in Android Q will fully replace the overlay API in a future Android version. Retrieved September 18, 2019.
Open source URL - [11]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-31Open source URL
- [12]mitre-attackT1417.002Open source URL
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