LiveActive security incident?Get immediate response
MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0399: Pallas

Pallas is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by Dark Caracal.[1]

MobileS0399MalwareObject v1.1Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0399: Pallas describes [Pallas](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0399) is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by [Dark Caracal](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0070).(Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)

Executive priority

S0399: Pallas is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0399: Pallas by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Android), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0399: Pallas appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Pallas

Pallas is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by Dark Caracal.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

14 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1409Stored Application Data

Pallas retrieves messages and decryption keys for popular messaging applications and other accounts stored on the device.[1]

MobileT1417.002GUI Input CaptureSub-technique

Pallas uses phishing popups to harvest user credentials.[1]

MobileT1418Software Discovery

Pallas retrieves a list of all applications installed on the device.[1]

MobileT1406Obfuscated Files or Information

Pallas stores domain information and URL paths as hardcoded AES-encrypted, base64-encoded strings.[1]

MobileT1636.002Call LogSub-technique

Pallas accesses and exfiltrates the call log.[1]

MobileT1421System Network Connections Discovery

Pallas gathers and exfiltrates data about nearby Wi-Fi access points.[1]

MobileT1630.002File DeletionSub-technique

Pallas has the ability to delete attacker-specified files from compromised devices.[1]

MobileT1636.003Contact ListSub-technique

Pallas accesses the device contact list.[1]

MobileT1426System Information Discovery

Pallas queries the device for metadata, such as device ID, OS version, and the number of cameras.[1]

MobileT1430Location Tracking

Pallas tracks the latitude and longitude coordinates of the infected device.[1]

MobileT1429Audio Capture

Pallas captures audio from the device microphone.[1]

MobileT1512Video Capture

Pallas can take pictures with both the front and rear-facing cameras.[1]

MobileT1636.004SMS MessagesSub-technique

Pallas captures and exfiltrates all SMS messages, including future messages as they are received.[1]

MobileT1646Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

Pallas exfiltrates data using HTTP.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · GroupG0070: Dark CaracalMobileuses · TechniqueT1409: Stored Application DataMobileuses · TechniqueT1417.002: GUI Input CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1418: Software DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1406: Obfuscated Files or InformationMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.002: Call LogMobileuses · TechniqueT1421: System Network Connections DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1630.002: File DeletionMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.003: Contact ListMobileuses · TechniqueT1426: System Information DiscoveryMobileuses · TechniqueT1430: Location TrackingMobileuses · TechniqueT1429: Audio CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1512: Video CaptureMobileuses · TechniqueT1636.004: SMS MessagesMobileuses · TechniqueT1646: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelMobile
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1d8f39569651515e...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle1d8f39569651…
19.11.1Older bundle1d8f39569651…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018

    Blaich, A., et al. (2018, January 18). Dark Caracal: Cyber-espionage at a Global Scale. Retrieved April 11, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Pallas

    (Citation: Lookout Dark Caracal Jan 2018)

  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS0399
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK siteOfficial STIX data repositoryMITRE ATT&CK terms of use