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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1559: Inter-Process Communication

Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.

Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows Dynamic Data Exchange or Component Object Model. Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.[1] Higher level execution mediums, such as those of Command and Scripting Interpreters, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model to facilitate remote IPC execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1559TechniqueObject v1.4Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Inter-Process Communication (IPC) is normal operating-system and application plumbing, so abuse of it can look like legitimate software behavior. Its business significance is that local code or command execution may occur through trusted process-to-process mechanisms rather than obvious standalone executables. For leaders, this is a coverage question: can the SOC and endpoint controls explain when IPC behavior is expected versus suspicious across Windows, macOS, and Linux?

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an execution-risk and visibility-control issue, not just a malware signature problem. Ask whether critical endpoints and servers have telemetry for process relationships, privileged process activity, and OS-specific IPC mechanisms such as Windows COM/DDE, macOS XPC services, and Linux sockets or pipes. The relationship context also makes this relevant to secure software design, privileged account governance, endpoint behavior prevention, feature reduction, sandboxing, and secure configuration evidence for audits and incident readiness.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists T1559 under Execution for Linux, macOS, and Windows. The most useful validation path is OS-specific: review Windows COM and DDE exposure via the listed sub-techniques, macOS XPC service and privileged helper activity, and Linux sockets/pipes used for process communication. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for the parent technique, detection engineering should use the related DET0493 strategy and local baselines to identify abnormal parent/child process relationships, unusual IPC-triggered execution, unexpected privileged context, and IPC activity chained with command/scripting interpreters or remote services.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation, parent/child lineage, command-line, user, integrity/privilege context, and process ancestry
  • EDR or OS audit events for process-to-process communication, API behavior, service/helper invocation, and suspicious execution chains
  • Windows telemetry relevant to COM objects, DDE activity, DLL/EXE server activation, and related process launches
  • macOS logs and endpoint telemetry for XPC service communication, privileged helper tools, and root-running service activity
  • Linux audit and system telemetry for sockets, pipes, process execution, user context, and service interactions

Detection direction

  • Start with baselining: IPC is common, so detections should focus on abnormal process relationships, unexpected caller/callee combinations, unusual privilege transitions, and execution from applications that do not normally initiate commands.
  • Map coverage separately for the sub-techniques: T1559.001 Component Object Model, T1559.002 Dynamic Data Exchange, and T1559.003 XPC Services; do not assume one analytic covers all IPC abuse.
  • Tune for chains involving command and scripting interpreters or remote services where IPC may be the execution bridge, as described by ATT&CK.
  • Validate that telemetry exists on all listed platforms; many blind spots come from macOS/Linux IPC activity being less consistently logged than Windows process creation.
  • Use relationship context from campaigns and software only as prioritization input for threat-informed testing, not as proof of current exposure or active exploitation in the environment.

Mitigation priorities

  • Apply least privilege and privileged account management so IPC-triggered execution has limited authority and is attributable.
  • Reduce attack surface by disabling or removing unnecessary software features, legacy components, or IPC-exposed functionality where business use does not require them.
  • Use secure software configuration and application developer guidance to harden applications that expose IPC interfaces or privileged helper functions.
  • Deploy behavior prevention on endpoints where it can restrict suspicious process behavior and IPC-linked execution patterns.
  • Use application isolation or sandboxing for higher-risk applications so abuse of IPC is less likely to affect the broader host or sensitive resources.
Additional notes and limits

This parent technique is broad by design. Its best operational value comes from decomposing it into OS-specific mechanisms and validating whether detection logic can distinguish normal application IPC from execution abuse. The supplied relationships show multiple mitigations and many campaigns/software entries using the behavior, which supports prioritizing threat-informed coverage reviews without making environment-specific assumptions.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1559 in the supplied fields. The take therefore avoids claiming guaranteed detections and relies on the listed platforms, sub-techniques, mitigation relationships, and DET0493 relationship for defensive direction. Local baselines, application inventories, and endpoint logging configuration are required to determine actual coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Inter-Process Communication

Adversaries may abuse inter-process communication (IPC) mechanisms for local code or command execution. IPC is typically used by processes to share data, communicate with each other, or synchronize execution. IPC is also commonly used to avoid situations such as deadlocks, which occurs when processes are stuck in a cyclic waiting pattern.

Adversaries may abuse IPC to execute arbitrary code or commands. IPC mechanisms may differ depending on OS, but typically exists in a form accessible through programming languages/libraries or native interfaces such as Windows Dynamic Data Exchange or Component Object Model. Linux environments support several different IPC mechanisms, two of which being sockets and pipes.[1] Higher level execution mediums, such as those of Command and Scripting Interpreters, may also leverage underlying IPC mechanisms. Adversaries may also use Remote Services such as Distributed Component Object Model to facilitate remote IPC execution.[2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

3 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1559.003XPC ServicesSub-techniqueXPC Services subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1559.002Dynamic Data ExchangeSub-techniqueDynamic Data Exchange subtechnique of this object.
EnterpriseT1559.001Component Object ModelSub-techniqueComponent Object Model subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1229: Havoc

Havoc is an open-source post-exploitation command and control (C2) framework first released on GitHub in October 2022 by C5pider (Paul Ungur), who continues to maintain and develop it with community contributors. Havoc provides a wide range of offensive security capabilities and has been adopted by multiple threat actors to establish and maintain control over compromised systems.

LinuxmacOSWindows
MalwareEnterprise

S1200: StealBit

StealBit is a data exfiltration tool that is developed and maintained by the operators of the the LockBit Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) and offered to affiliates to exfiltrate data from compromised systems for double extortion purposes.[1][2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1130: Raspberry Robin

Raspberry Robin is initial access malware first identified in September 2021, and active through early 2024. The malware is notable for spreading via infected USB devices containing a malicious LNK object that, on execution, retrieves remote hosted payloads for installation. Raspberry Robin has been widely used against various industries and geographies, and as a precursor to information stealer, ransomware, and other payloads such as SocGholish, Cobalt Strike, IcedID, and Bumblebee.[1][2][3] The DLL componenet in the Raspberry Robin infection chain is also referred to as "Roshtyak."[4] The name "Raspberry Robin" is used to refer to both the malware as well as the threat actor associated with its use, although the Raspberry Robin operators are also tracked as Storm-0856 by some vendors.[5]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0022: Uroburos

Uroburos is a sophisticated cyber espionage tool written in C that has been used by units within Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) associated with the Turla toolset to collect intelligence on sensitive targets worldwide. Uroburos has several variants and has undergone nearly constant upgrade since its initial development in 2003 to keep it viable after public disclosures. Uroburos is typically deployed to external-facing nodes on a targeted network and has the ability to leverage additional tools and TTPs to further exploit an internal network. Uroburos has interoperable implants for Windows, Linux, and macOS, employs a high level of stealth in communications and architecture, and can easily incorporate new or replacement components.[1][2]

LinuxWindowsmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S1172: OilBooster

OilBooster is a downloader written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute files and for exfiltration.[1]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S1244: Medusa Ransomware

Medusa Ransomware has been utilized in attacks since at least 2021. Medusa Ransomware has been known to be utilized in conjunction with living off the land techniques and remote management software. Medusa Ransomware has been used in campaigns associated with “double extortion” ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Medusa Ransomware software was initially a closed ransomware variant which later evolved to a Ransomware as a Service (RaaS). Medusa Ransomware has impacted victims from a diverse range of sectors within a multitude of countries, and it is assessed Medusa Ransomware is used in an opportunistic manner.[1][2][3][4]

MalwareEnterprise

S9024: SPAWNCHIMERA

SPAWNCHIMERA is a backdoor that supports command and control and can inject malicious components into native processes.[1][2][3] SPAWNCHIMERA It incorporates capabilities from multiple tools within the SPAWN malware family, including SPAWNANT, SPAWNMOLE, and SPAWNSNAIL.[4][2][3] SPAWNCHIMERA was first reported in April 2024.[2] SPAWNCHIMERA has been observed in activity attributed to People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored threat actors, including UNC5221..[4][5][2][6]

LinuxNetwork Devices
MalwareEnterprise

S1078: RotaJakiro

RotaJakiro is a 64-bit Linux backdoor used by APT32. First seen in 2018, it uses a plugin architecture to extend capabilities. RotaJakiro can determine it's permission level and execute according to access type (`root` or `user`).[1][2]

Linux
CampaignEnterprise

C0057: 3CX Supply Chain Attack

The 3CX Supply Chain Attack was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version of the X_Trader trading software from Trading Technologies. This provided UNC4736, a threat cluster associated with AppleJeus, access to the 3CX environment. From there UNC4736 compromised the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX desktop application to their customers.[1] While 3CX serves more than 600,000 customers and 12 million users, only a subset of systems were affected. Subsequent targeting focused on victims in the defense and cryptocurrency sectors, where attackers deployed secondary payloads such as Gopuram for credential theft and persistence.[2] The campaign began in late 2022 and was disrupted after security vendors publicly reported the compromise in March 2023.[3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f7de1021ceed8a9b...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.4Current bundlef7de1021ceed…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Linux IPC

    N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019

    Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017

    Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017

    Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017

    Dormann, W. (2017, October 20). Disable DDEAUTO for Outlook, Word, OneNote, and Excel versions 2010, 2013, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017

    Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Havoc Framework Documentation

    Ungur, P. (n.d.). HAVOC. Retrieved August 4, 2025.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Cybereason StealBit Exfiltration Tool

    Cybereason Global SOC Team. (n.d.). THREAT ANALYSIS REPORT: Inside the LockBit Arsenal - The StealBit Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved January 29, 2025.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022

    Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Volexity UPSTYLE 2024

    Volexity Threat Research. (2024, April 12). Zero-Day Exploitation of Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400). Retrieved November 20, 2024.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018

    Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Mandiant 3cx UNC4736 2023

    Jeff Johnson, Fred Plan, Adrian Sanchez, Renato Fontana, Jake Nicastro, Dimiter Andonov, Marius Fodoreanu, Daniel Scott. (2023, April 20). 3CX Software Supply Chain Compromise Initiated by a Prior Software Supply Chain Compromise; Suspected North Korean Actor Responsible. Retrieved August 25, 2025.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022

    Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024

    Lin, M. et al. (2024, February 27). Cutting Edge, Part 3: Investigating Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Exploitation and Persistence Attempts. Retrieved March 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023

    FBI et al. (2023, May 9). Hunting Russian Intelligence “Snake” Malware. Retrieved June 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Microsoft Protected View

    Microsoft. (n.d.). What is Protected View?. Retrieved November 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Accenture HyperStack October 2020

    Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023

    Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024

    Vlad Pasca. (2024, January 1). A Deep Dive into Medusa Ransomware. Retrieved October 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024

    Matt Lin, Austin Larsen, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Josh Murchie, Lukasz Lamparski, Joseph Pisano, Ryan Hall, Ron Craft, Shawn Crew, Billy Wong, Tyler McLellan. (2024, April 4). Cutting Edge, Part 4: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Post-Exploitation Lateral Movement Case Studies. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025

    Yuma Masubuchi. (2025, February 20). SPAWNCHIMERA Malware: The Chimera Spawning from Ivanti Connect Secure Vulnerability. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022

    Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Microsoft System Wide Com Keys

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security. Retrieved November 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Microsoft COM ACL

    Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    Microsoft ASR Nov 2017

    Brower, N. & D'Souza-Wiltshire, I. (2017, November 9). Enable Attack surface reduction. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis

    Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    ESET Turla Lunar toolset May 2024

    Jurčacko, F. (2024, May 15). To the Moon and back(doors): Lunar landing in diplomatic missions. Retrieved June 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022

    Dedola, G. (2022, June 21). APT ToddyCat. Retrieved January 3, 2024.

    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    Palo Alto Unit42 STATELY TAURUS TONESHELL September 2023

    Lior Rochberger, Tom Fakterman, Robert Falcone. (2023, September 22). Cyberespionage Attacks Against Southeast Asian Government Linked to Stately Taurus, Aka Mustang Panda. Retrieved September 9, 2025.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    2025_IBM_PUBLOAD_TONESHELL_HIUPAN_CLAIMLOADER_MUSTANG PANDA

    Golo Muhr, Joshua Chung. (2025, May 15). Hive0154 targeting US, Philippines, Pakistan and Taiwan in suspected espionage campaign. Retrieved August 4, 2025.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019

    Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    Fireeye Hunting COM June 2019

    Hamilton, C. (2019, June 4). Hunting COM Objects. Retrieved June 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    Linux IPC

    N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Linux IPC

    N/A. (2021, April 1). Inter Process Communication (IPC). Retrieved March 11, 2022.

    Open source URL
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    mitre-attackT1559
    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    mitre-attackT1559
    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    mitre-attackT1559
    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    BleepingComputer DDE Disabled in Word Dec 2017

    Cimpanu, C. (2017, December 15). Microsoft Disables DDE Feature in Word to Prevent Further Malware Attacks. Retrieved December 19, 2017.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017

    Dormann, W. (2017, October 20). Disable DDEAUTO for Outlook, Word, OneNote, and Excel versions 2010, 2013, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    Microsoft ADV170021 Dec 2017

    Microsoft. (2017, December 12). ADV170021 - Microsoft Office Defense in Depth Update. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    Microsoft DDE Advisory Nov 2017

    Microsoft. (2017, November 8). Microsoft Security Advisory 4053440 - Securely opening Microsoft Office documents that contain Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) fields. Retrieved November 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    Havoc Framework Documentation

    Ungur, P. (n.d.). HAVOC. Retrieved August 4, 2025.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    Cybereason StealBit Exfiltration Tool

    Cybereason Global SOC Team. (n.d.). THREAT ANALYSIS REPORT: Inside the LockBit Arsenal - The StealBit Exfiltration Tool. Retrieved January 29, 2025.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    TrendMicro RaspberryRobin 2022

    Christopher So. (2022, December 20). Raspberry Robin Malware Targets Telecom, Governments. Retrieved May 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    Volexity UPSTYLE 2024

    Volexity Threat Research. (2024, April 12). Zero-Day Exploitation of Unauthenticated Remote Code Execution Vulnerability in GlobalProtect (CVE-2024-3400). Retrieved November 20, 2024.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018

    Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017

    Dormann, W. (2017, October 20). Disable DDEAUTO for Outlook, Word, OneNote, and Excel versions 2010, 2013, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    GitHub Disable DDEAUTO Oct 2017

    Dormann, W. (2017, October 20). Disable DDEAUTO for Outlook, Word, OneNote, and Excel versions 2010, 2013, 2016. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    Mandiant 3cx UNC4736 2023

    Jeff Johnson, Fred Plan, Adrian Sanchez, Renato Fontana, Jake Nicastro, Dimiter Andonov, Marius Fodoreanu, Daniel Scott. (2023, April 20). 3CX Software Supply Chain Compromise Initiated by a Prior Software Supply Chain Compromise; Suspected North Korean Actor Responsible. Retrieved August 25, 2025.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022

    Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024

    Lin, M. et al. (2024, February 27). Cutting Edge, Part 3: Investigating Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Exploitation and Persistence Attempts. Retrieved March 1, 2024.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    Joint Cybersecurity Advisory AA23-129A Snake Malware May 2023

    FBI et al. (2023, May 9). Hunting Russian Intelligence “Snake” Malware. Retrieved June 8, 2023.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    Microsoft Protected View

    Microsoft. (n.d.). What is Protected View?. Retrieved November 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    Accenture HyperStack October 2020

    Accenture. (2020, October). Turla uses HyperStack, Carbon, and Kazuar to compromise government entity. Retrieved December 2, 2020.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023

    Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    Security Scorecard Medusa Ransomware January 2024

    Vlad Pasca. (2024, January 1). A Deep Dive into Medusa Ransomware. Retrieved October 15, 2025.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    Google UNC5221 BRICKSTORM SPAWNCHIMERA April 2024

    Matt Lin, Austin Larsen, John Wolfram, Ashley Pearson, Josh Murchie, Lukasz Lamparski, Joseph Pisano, Ryan Hall, Ron Craft, Shawn Crew, Billy Wong, Tyler McLellan. (2024, April 4). Cutting Edge, Part 4: Ivanti Connect Secure VPN Post-Exploitation Lateral Movement Case Studies. Retrieved April 16, 2026.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    JPCERT SPAWNCHIMERA Ivanti February 2025

    Yuma Masubuchi. (2025, February 20). SPAWNCHIMERA Malware: The Chimera Spawning from Ivanti Connect Secure Vulnerability. Retrieved April 17, 2026.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022

    Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    Microsoft COM ACL

    Microsoft. (n.d.). DCOM Security Enhancements in Windows XP Service Pack 2 and Windows Server 2003 Service Pack 1. Retrieved November 22, 2017.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    Microsoft Process Wide Com Keys

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Setting Process-Wide Security Through the Registry. Retrieved November 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    Microsoft System Wide Com Keys

    Microsoft. (n.d.). Registry Values for System-Wide Security. Retrieved November 21, 2017.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018

    Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  65. [65]
    Enigma Reviving DDE Jan 2018

    Nelson, M. (2018, January 29). Reviving DDE: Using OneNote and Excel for Code Execution. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  66. [66]
    Microsoft ASR Nov 2017

    Brower, N. & D'Souza-Wiltshire, I. (2017, November 9). Enable Attack surface reduction. Retrieved February 3, 2018.

    Open source URL
  67. [67]
    RotaJakiro 2021 netlab360 analysis

    Alex Turing, Hui Wang. (2021, April 28). RotaJakiro: A long live secret backdoor with 0 VT detection. Retrieved June 14, 2023.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.