T1429: Audio Capture
Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.
Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.
On Android devices, applications must hold the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission to access the microphone or the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output.[1] However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission, adversaries may pass the `MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL` constant to `MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput`, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.[2]
On iOS devices, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file to access the microphone.[3]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1429: Audio Capture describes Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information. Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user. On Android devices, applications must hold the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission to access the microphone or the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission to access audio outp...
Executive priority
T1429: Audio Capture is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1429: Audio Capture by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1429: Audio Capture appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Audio Capture
Adversaries may capture audio to collect information by leveraging standard operating system APIs of a mobile device. Examples of audio information adversaries may target include user conversations, surroundings, phone calls, or other sensitive information.
Android and iOS, by default, require that applications request device microphone access from the user.
On Android devices, applications must hold the `RECORD_AUDIO` permission to access the microphone or the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission to access audio output. Because Android does not allow third-party applications to hold the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission by default, only privileged applications, such as those distributed by Google or the device vendor, can access audio output.[1] However, adversaries may be able to gain this access after successfully elevating their privileges. With the `CAPTURE_AUDIO_OUTPUT` permission, adversaries may pass the `MediaRecorder.AudioSource.VOICE_CALL` constant to `MediaRecorder.setAudioOutput`, allowing capture of both voice call uplink and downlink.[2]
On iOS devices, applications must include the `NSMicrophoneUsageDescription` key in their `Info.plist` file to access the microphone.[3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0112: Windshift
S0327: Skygofree
S9005: DocSwap
DocSwap is an Android malware first identified in 2025, and attributed to Kimsuky. DocSwap’s name is a combination of its Korean name “문서열람 인증 앱” (Document Viewing Authentication App) and a phishing page masquerading as CoinSwap at the C2 address. Based on DocSwap’s name and Korean-language strings, DocSwap potentially targets mobile device users in South Korea. Several variants of DocSwap exist; one of the latest samples indicates that the adversary added a native decryption function that decrypts an internal APK.[1][2]
S0316: Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. [1] [2] The iOS version is tracked separately under Pegasus for iOS.
S0295: RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid is Android malware. [1]
S0507: eSurv
S1079: BOULDSPY
S0318: XLoader for Android
XLoader for Android is a malicious Android app first observed targeting Japan, Korea, China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in 2018. It has more recently been observed targeting South Korean users as a pornography application.[1][2] It is tracked separately from the XLoader for iOS.
S1082: Sunbird
S0408: FlexiSpy
S0489: WolfRAT
S0328: Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer. [1]
S0535: Golden Cup
Golden Cup is Android spyware that has been used to target World Cup fans.[1]
C0033: C0033
C0033 was a PROMETHIUM campaign during which they used StrongPity to target Android users. C0033 was the first publicly documented mobile campaign for PROMETHIUM, who previously used Windows-based techniques.[1]
C0054: Operation Triangulation
Operation Triangulation is a mobile campaign targeting iOS devices.[1] The unidentified actors used zero-click exploits in iMessage attachments to gain Initial Access, then executed exploits and validators, such as Binary Validator before finally executing the TriangleDB implant.
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 3.1 | Current bundle | 6289c736e9f9… | ||
| 19.2 | 3.1 | Older bundle | 6289c736e9f9… | ||
| 19.1 | 3.1 | Older bundle | 6289c736e9f9… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Android Permissions
Google. (2021, August 11). Manifest.permission. Retrieved September 22, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Manifest.permission
Android Developers. (2022, March 17). Voice Call. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]Requesting Auth-Media Capture
Apple Developers. (n.d.). Requesting Authorization for Media Capture on iOS. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]Android Privacy Indicators
Google. (n.d.). Privacy Indicators. Retrieved April 20, 2022.
Open source URL - [5]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-19Open source URL
- [6]iOS Mic Spyware
ZecOps Research Team. (2021, November 4). How iOS Malware Can Spy on Users Silently. Retrieved April 1, 2022.
Open source URL - [7]mitre-attackT1429Open source URL
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