T1409: Stored Application Data
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.CitationSWB Exodus March 2019
Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:
* An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device
Security context for executives and security teams
T1409: Stored Application Data describes Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: * An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device
Executive priority
T1409: Stored Application Data is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1409: Stored Application Data by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1409: Stored Application Data appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Stored Application Data
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.CitationSWB Exodus March 2019
Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:
* An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
All related ATT&CK context
No relationships are available in the current normalized data for this object.
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
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