T1409: Stored Application Data
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.[1]
Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:
* An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device
Security context for executives and security teams
T1409: Stored Application Data describes Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: * An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device
Executive priority
T1409: Stored Application Data is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1409: Stored Application Data by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1409: Stored Application Data appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Stored Application Data
Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.[1]
Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:
* An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
S0399: Pallas
Pallas is mobile surveillanceware that was custom-developed by Dark Caracal.[1]
S1079: BOULDSPY
S0509: FakeSpy
S0405: Exodus
S0485: Mandrake
Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.
Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]
S0408: FlexiSpy
S1062: S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.[1][2]
S0316: Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. [1] [2] The iOS version is tracked separately under Pegasus for iOS.
S0295: RCSAndroid
RCSAndroid is Android malware. [1]
S1067: FluBot
FluBot is a multi-purpose mobile banking malware that was first observed in Spain in late 2020. It primarily spread through European countries using a variety of SMS phishing messages in multiple languages.[1][2] An international law enforcement operation of 11 countries eventually disrupted the spread of FluBot.[3]
S1185: LightSpy
First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]
S1128: HilalRAT
C0054: Operation Triangulation
Operation Triangulation is a mobile campaign targeting iOS devices.[1] The unidentified actors used zero-click exploits in iMessage attachments to gain Initial Access, then executed exploits and validators, such as Binary Validator before finally executing the TriangleDB implant.
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 3.1 | Current bundle | 9008e947ce53… | ||
| 19.2 | 3.1 | Older bundle | 9008e947ce53… | ||
| 19.1 | 3.1 | Older bundle | 9008e947ce53… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SWB Exodus March 2019
Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAUT-0Open source URL
- [3]mitre-attackT1409Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
