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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1409: Stored Application Data

Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.[1]

Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:

* An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device

MobileT1409TechniqueObject v3.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1409: Stored Application Data describes Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.(Citation: SWB Exodus March 2019) Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios: * An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device

Executive priority

T1409: Stored Application Data is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1409: Stored Application Data by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1409: Stored Application Data appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Stored Application Data

Adversaries may try to access and collect application data resident on the device. Adversaries often target popular applications, such as Facebook, WeChat, and Gmail.[1]

Due to mobile OS sandboxing, this technique is only possible in three scenarios:

* An application stores files in unprotected external storage * An application stores files in its internal storage directory with insecure permissions (e.g. 777) * The adversary gains root permissions on the device

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupMobile

G0034: Sandworm Team

Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]

In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]

MalwareMobile

S1079: BOULDSPY

BOULDSPY is an Android malware, detected in early 2023, with surveillance and remote-control capabilities. Analysis of exfiltrated C2 data suggests that BOULDSPY primarily targeted minority groups in Iran.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0509: FakeSpy

FakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0405: Exodus

Exodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0485: Mandrake

Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.

Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]

Android
ToolMobile

S0408: FlexiSpy

FlexiSpy is sophisticated surveillanceware for iOS and Android. Publicly-available, comprehensive analysis has only been found for the Android version.[1][2]

FlexiSpy markets itself as a parental control and employee monitoring application.[3]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1062: S.O.V.A.

S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.[1][2]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1067: FluBot

FluBot is a multi-purpose mobile banking malware that was first observed in Spain in late 2020. It primarily spread through European countries using a variety of SMS phishing messages in multiple languages.[1][2] An international law enforcement operation of 11 countries eventually disrupted the spread of FluBot.[3]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1185: LightSpy

First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]

AndroidWindowsiOS
MalwareMobile

S1128: HilalRAT

HilalRAT is a remote access-capable Android malware, developed and used by UNC788.[1] HilalRAT is capable of collecting data, such as device location, call logs, etc., and is capable of executing actions, such as activating a device's camera and microphone.[1]

Android
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
3.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
9008e947ce5379f9...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.03.1Current bundle9008e947ce53…
19.23.1Older bundle9008e947ce53…
19.13.1Older bundle9008e947ce53…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    SWB Exodus March 2019

    Security Without Borders. (2019, March 29). Exodus: New Android Spyware Made in Italy. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAUT-0
    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackT1409
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.