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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1422.001: Internet Connection Discovery

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using `adb shell netstat` for Android.[1]

Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the mobile devices are capable of communicating with adversary-owned C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.

MobileT1422.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1422.001: Internet Connection Discovery describes Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using `adb shell netstat` for Android.(Citation: adb_commands) Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the mobile devices are capable of communicating with adversary-owned C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.

Executive priority

T1422.001: Internet Connection Discovery is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1422.001: Internet Connection Discovery by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (discovery), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Endpoint process, command-line, and script execution logs

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1422.001: Internet Connection Discovery appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Internet Connection Discovery

Adversaries may check for Internet connectivity on compromised systems. This may be performed during automated discovery and can be accomplished in numerous ways such as using `adb shell netstat` for Android.[1]

Adversaries may use the results and responses from these requests to determine if the mobile devices are capable of communicating with adversary-owned C2 servers before attempting to connect to them. The results may also be used to identify routes, redirectors, and proxy servers.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1422System Network Configuration DiscoveryThis object subtechnique of System Network Configuration Discovery.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareMobile

S0427: TrickMo

TrickMo a 2FA bypass mobile banking trojan, most likely being distributed by TrickBot. TrickMo has been primarily targeting users located in Germany.[1]

TrickMo is designed to steal transaction authorization numbers (TANs), which are typically used as one-time passwords.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1061: AbstractEmu

AbstractEmu is mobile malware that was first seen in Google Play and other third-party stores in October 2021. It was discovered in 19 Android applications, of which at least 7 abused known Android exploits for obtaining root permissions. AbstractEmu was observed primarily impacting users in the United States, however victims are believed to be across a total of 17 countries.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0405: Exodus

Exodus is Android spyware deployed in two distinct stages named Exodus One (dropper) and Exodus Two (payload).[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0425: Corona Updates

Corona Updates is Android spyware that took advantage of the Coronavirus pandemic. The campaign distributing this spyware is tracked as Project Spy. Multiple variants of this spyware have been discovered to have been hosted on the Google Play Store.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0407: Monokle

Monokle is targeted, sophisticated mobile surveillanceware. It is developed for Android, but there are some code artifacts that suggests an iOS version may be in development.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1093: FlyTrap

FlyTrap is an Android trojan, first detected in March 2021, that uses social engineering tactics to compromise Facebook accounts. FlyTrap was initially detected through infected apps on the Google Play store, and is believed to have impacted over 10,000 victims across at least 140 countries.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0509: FakeSpy

FakeSpy is Android spyware that has been operated by the Chinese threat actor behind the Roaming Mantis campaigns.[1]

Android
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

mitigates · MitigationM1009: Encrypt Network TrafficMobileuses · MalwareS0529: CarbonStealMobileuses · MalwareS1077: HornbillMobileuses · MalwareS0427: TrickMoMobileuses · MalwareS0463: INSOMNIAMobileuses · MalwareS1061: AbstractEmuMobileuses · MalwareS0405: ExodusMobileuses · MalwareS0425: Corona UpdatesMobileuses · MalwareS0407: MonokleMobileuses · MalwareS1093: FlyTrapMobileuses · MalwareS0509: FakeSpyMobileuses · MalwareS0316: Pegasus for AndroidMobileuses · MalwareS0326: RedDropMobileuses · MalwareS1079: BOULDSPYMobileuses · MalwareS0540: AsacubMobileuses · MalwareS0478: EventBotMobileuses · MalwareS0522: ExobotMobileuses · MalwareS0545: TERRACOTTAMobileuses · MalwareS0506: ViperRATMobileuses · MalwareS1056: TianySpyMobilesubtechnique of · TechniqueT1422: System Network Configuration DiscoveryMobiledetects · Detection StrategyDET0708: Detection of Internet Connection DiscoveryMobile
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

MitigationMobile

M1009: Encrypt Network Traffic

Application developers should encrypt all of their application network traffic using the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to ensure protection of sensitive data and deter network-based attacks. If desired, application developers could perform message-based encryption of data before passing it for TLS encryption.

iOS's App Transport Security feature can be used to help ensure that all application network traffic is appropriately protected. Apple intends to mandate use of App Transport Security [1] for all apps in the Apple App Store unless appropriate justification is given.

Android's Network Security Configuration feature similarly can be used by app developers to help ensure that all of their application network traffic is appropriately protected [2].

Use of Virtual Private Network (VPN) tunnels, e.g. using the IPsec protocol, can help mitigate some types of network attacks as well.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
10524059214e6013...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.0Current bundle10524059214e…
19.11.0Older bundle10524059214e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    adb_commands

    Pulimet. (2017, September 11). AdbCommands. Retrieved December 14, 2023.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    mitre-attackT1422.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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