T1680: Local Storage Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access.
On ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as `esxcli` to list storage connected to the host as well as `.vmdk` files.[1][2]
On Windows systems, adversaries can use `wmic logicaldisk get` to find information about local network drives. They can also use `Get-PSDrive` in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as `GetDriveType`.[3][4]
Linux has commands such as `parted`, `lsblk`, `fdisk`, `lshw`, and `df` that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command `diskutil` on MacOS can be used to list disks while `system_profiler SPStorageDataType` can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as `describe volume` in AWS, `gcloud compute disks list` in GCP, and `az disk list` in Azure.[5][6][7]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Local Storage Discovery matters because it is often the adversary’s inventory step before deciding what to encrypt, move toward, or access directly. For executives and security leaders, the business issue is not the disk-listing command itself; it is whether the organization can see when servers, endpoints, ESXi hosts, or cloud accounts are being surveyed for storage that may contain critical data or virtual machines.
Executive priority
Prioritize this technique where storage availability and data recovery are business-critical: virtualization platforms, cloud block storage, file-heavy servers, and systems supporting regulated or operationally important data. Leaders should ask whether SOC and IR teams can distinguish normal administrative storage inventory from unusual discovery, especially in ESXi and IaaS environments where storage enumeration may precede ransomware-related encryption, lateral movement, or direct volume access. This also supports audit and resilience evidence: teams should be able to show logging, alert logic, and response playbooks for suspicious storage discovery across Windows, Linux, macOS, ESXi, and cloud control planes.
Technical view
ATT&CK lists this as a Discovery technique across ESXi, IaaS, Linux, macOS, and Windows. Validate visibility for local drive, disk, volume, partition, filesystem, and cloud disk enumeration. On endpoints and servers, detection engineering should focus on process and command-line telemetry for storage-discovery utilities and APIs referenced by ATT&CK, including Windows logical disk and PowerShell drive enumeration, Linux disk and filesystem listing utilities, macOS storage inventory commands, and ESXi hypervisor CLI activity. In cloud, validate audit logging for storage listing actions such as AWS volume description, GCP disk listing, and Azure disk listing. Relationship context shows this behavior is mapped to multiple ATT&CK campaigns, groups, and software, and DET0188 is a related detection strategy for drive enumeration and filesystem probing; use that context to test coverage without assuming any specific actor is present.
Likely telemetry
- Endpoint process creation and command-line logs for storage, drive, partition, and filesystem enumeration utilities
- PowerShell activity and script/block logging where available for drive discovery behavior
- Windows API or EDR-derived drive enumeration signals where available
- Linux and macOS shell command telemetry for disk, volume, mount, and filesystem listing
- ESXi shell or hypervisor CLI logs, especially storage and virtual disk inventory activity
Detection direction
- Baseline legitimate storage inventory activity by administrators, backup tooling, monitoring agents, and cloud automation to reduce false positives.
- Alert more strongly when storage discovery is performed by unusual users, unexpected processes, newly observed scripts, remote sessions, or accounts that do not normally manage storage.
- Correlate local storage enumeration with adjacent suspicious behavior, especially credential use, lateral movement attempts, direct volume access indicators, or rapid file/VM targeting patterns.
- For ESXi, confirm that hypervisor command activity and virtual disk inventory events are collected; many endpoint-centric SOC programs have weak visibility on virtualization hosts.
- For IaaS, confirm cloud audit logs capture disk and volume list/read operations and include identity, source, region/project/subscription, and API client context.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with visibility: ensure endpoint, server, ESXi, and cloud audit logging can capture storage enumeration with user and process context.
- Apply least privilege for storage administration in operating systems, hypervisors, and cloud accounts so routine users and workloads cannot broadly inventory disks or volumes without need.
- Harden and monitor privileged access paths used for storage management, including administrative shells, PowerShell, hypervisor CLI access, and cloud CLIs/APIs.
- Document approved administrative storage discovery workflows so the SOC has an allowlist baseline and can escalate deviations quickly.
- Integrate storage discovery alerts into ransomware and lateral-movement response playbooks, with emphasis on protecting backups, virtual machines, and critical data stores.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK object has broad platform coverage and useful examples, but no official detection guidance. The strongest defensive value comes from correlating otherwise common administrative commands or cloud API calls with identity, host, timing, and follow-on behavior. Relationship context indicates this technique is used by numerous ATT&CK-tracked campaigns, groups, and software, but that should be treated as prioritization context rather than evidence of a specific intrusion.
This take uses only the provided ATT&CK fields, references, and relationships. It does not establish active exploitation, actor attribution, customer exposure, or guaranteed detection coverage. Local baselines, logging configuration, EDR/cloud audit capabilities, and administrative workflows are required to determine actual risk and detection quality.
Local Storage Discovery
Adversaries may enumerate local drives, disks, and/or volumes and their attributes like total or free space and volume serial number. This can be done to prepare for ransomware-related encryption, to perform Lateral Movement, or as a precursor to Direct Volume Access.
On ESXi systems, adversaries may use Hypervisor CLI commands such as `esxcli` to list storage connected to the host as well as `.vmdk` files.[1][2]
On Windows systems, adversaries can use `wmic logicaldisk get` to find information about local network drives. They can also use `Get-PSDrive` in PowerShell to retrieve drives and may additionally use Windows API functions such as `GetDriveType`.[3][4]
Linux has commands such as `parted`, `lsblk`, `fdisk`, `lshw`, and `df` that can list information about disk partitions such as size, type, file system types, and free space. The command `diskutil` on MacOS can be used to list disks while `system_profiler SPStorageDataType` can additionally show information such as a volume’s mount path, file system, and the type of drive in the system.
Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) cloud providers also have commands for storage discovery such as `describe volume` in AWS, `gcloud compute disks list` in GCP, and `az disk list` in Azure.[5][6][7]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0139: TeamTNT
TeamTNT is a threat group that has primarily targeted cloud and containerized environments. The group as been active since at least October 2019 and has mainly focused its efforts on leveraging cloud and container resources to deploy cryptocurrency miners in victim environments.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9]
G1017: Volt Typhoon
Volt Typhoon is a People's Republic of China (PRC) state-sponsored actor that has been active since at least 2021, primarily targeting critical infrastructure organizations in the US and its territories including Guam. Volt Typhoon's targeting and pattern of behavior have been assessed as pre-positioning to enable lateral movement to operational technology (OT) assets for potential destructive or disruptive attacks. Volt Typhoon has emphasized stealth in operations using web shells, living-off-the-land (LOTL) binaries, hands on keyboard activities, and stolen credentials.[1][2][3][4]. The group has leveraged compromised SOHO routers to proxy command and control traffic and obscure its infrastructure, activity associated with the KV botnet.[5].
Reporting indicates a separate initial access cluster, SYLVANITE, has been observed exploiting internet-facing edge devices and transferring access to Volt Typhoon, also tracked as VOLTZITE, for follow-on operations. [6]
G0142: Confucius
Confucius is a cyber espionage group that has primarily targeted military personnel, high-profile personalities, business persons, and government organizations in South Asia since at least 2013. Security researchers have noted similarities between Confucius and Patchwork, particularly in their respective custom malware code and targets.[1][2][3]
G0081: Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
G0126: Higaisa
Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]
G0040: Patchwork
Patchwork is a cyber espionage group that was first observed in December 2015. While the group has not been definitively attributed, circumstantial evidence suggests the group may be a pro-Indian or Indian entity. Patchwork has been seen targeting industries related to diplomatic and government agencies. Much of the code used by this group was copied and pasted from online forums. Patchwork was also seen operating spearphishing campaigns targeting U.S. think tank groups in March and April of 2018.[1] [2][3][4]
G0114: Chimera
S0533: SLOTHFULMEDIA
SLOTHFULMEDIA is a remote access Trojan written in C++ that has been used by an unidentified "sophisticated cyber actor" since at least January 2017.[1][2] It has been used to target government organizations, defense contractors, universities, and energy companies in Russia, India, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Malaysia, Ukraine, and Eastern Europe.[3][4]
In October 2020, Kaspersky Labs assessed SLOTHFULMEDIA is part of an activity cluster it refers to as "IAmTheKing".[4] ESET also noted code similarity between SLOTHFULMEDIA and droppers used by a group it refers to as "PowerPool".[5]
S1151: ZeroCleare
S1049: SUGARUSH
S0625: Cuba
S0253: RunningRAT
RunningRAT is a remote access tool that appeared in operations surrounding the 2018 Pyeongchang Winter Olympics along with Gold Dragon and Brave Prince. [1]
S0678: Torisma
Torisma is a second stage implant designed for specialized monitoring that has been used by Lazarus Group. Torisma was discovered during an investigation into the 2020 Operation North Star campaign that targeted the defense sector.[1]
S0248: yty
S1048: macOS.OSAMiner
macOS.OSAMiner is a Monero mining trojan that was first observed in 2018; security researchers assessed macOS.OSAMiner may have been circulating since at least 2015. macOS.OSAMiner is known for embedding one run-only AppleScript into another, which helped the malware evade full analysis for five years due to a lack of Apple event (AEVT) analysis tools.[1][2]
S0564: BlackMould
BlackMould is a web shell based on China Chopper for servers running Microsoft IIS. First reported in December 2019, it has been used in malicious campaigns by GALLIUM against telecommunication providers.[1]
S0472: down_new
down_new is a downloader that has been used by BRONZE BUTLER since at least 2019.[1]
S0663: SysUpdate
SysUpdate is a backdoor written in C++ that has been used by Threat Group-3390 since at least 2020.[1]
S0630: Nebulae
C0017: C0017
C0017 was an APT41 campaign conducted between May 2021 and February 2022 that successfully compromised at least six U.S. state government networks through the exploitation of vulnerable Internet facing web applications. During C0017, APT41 was quick to adapt and use publicly-disclosed as well as zero-day vulnerabilities for initial access, and in at least two cases re-compromised victims following remediation efforts. The goals of C0017 are unknown, however APT41 was observed exfiltrating Personal Identifiable Information (PII).[1]
C0024: SolarWinds Compromise
The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]
In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Current bundle | ebd11aeba75b… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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[1]
TrendMicro
Mina Naiim. (2021, May 28). DarkSide on Linux: Virtual Machines Targeted. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Open source URL -
[2]
TrendMicro ESXI Ransomware
Junestherry Dela Cruz. (2022, January 24). Analysis and Impact of LockBit Ransomware’s First Linux and VMware ESXi Variant. Retrieved March 26, 2025.
Open source URL -
[3]
Trend Micro MUSTANG PANDA PUBLOAD HIUPAN SEPTEMBER 2024
Lenart Bermejo, Sunny Lu, Ted Lee. (2024, September 9). Earth Preta Evolves its Attacks with New Malware and Strategies. Retrieved August 4, 2025.
Open source URL -
[4]
Volexity
Ankur Saini, Charlie Gardner. (2023, June 28). Charming Kitten Updates POWERSTAR with an InterPlanetary Twist. Retrieved September 25, 2025.
Open source URL -
[5]
AWS docs describe volumes
AWS. (n.d.). describe-volumes. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL -
[6]
GCP gcloud compute disks list
Google Cloud. (n.d.). gcloud compute disks list. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL -
[7]
azure az disk
Azure. (n.d.). az disk. Retrieved October 20, 2025.
Open source URL -
[8]
mitre-attack T1680Open source URL
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