G0135: BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. BackdoorDiplomacy has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0135: BackdoorDiplomacy describes [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. [BackdoorDiplomacy](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0135) has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.(Citation: ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021)
Executive priority
G0135: BackdoorDiplomacy is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0135: BackdoorDiplomacy by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0135: BackdoorDiplomacy appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
BackdoorDiplomacy
BackdoorDiplomacy is a cyber espionage threat group that has been active since at least 2017. BackdoorDiplomacy has targeted Ministries of Foreign Affairs and telecommunication companies in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | BackdoorDiplomacy has obfuscated tools and malware it uses with VMProtect.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has used web shells to establish an initial foothold and for lateral movement within a victim's system.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | BackdoorDiplomacy has exploited CVE-2020-5902, an F5 BIP-IP vulnerability, to drop a Linux backdoor. BackdoorDiplomacy has also exploited mis-configured Plesk servers.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has obtained a variety of open-source reconnaissance and red team tools for discovery and lateral movement.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has dropped implants in folders named for legitimate software.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has dropped legitimate software onto a compromised host and used it to execute malicious DLLs.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | BackdoorDiplomacy has downloaded additional files and tools onto a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has copied files of interest to the main drive's recycle bin.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | BackdoorDiplomacy has used SMBTouch, a vulnerability scanner, to determine whether a target is vulnerable to EternalBlue malware.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | BackdoorDiplomacy has used NetCat and PortQry to enumerate network connections and display the status of related TCP and UDP ports.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | BackdoorDiplomacy has used an executable to detect removable media, such as USB flash drives.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | BackdoorDiplomacy has used EarthWorm for network tunneling with a SOCKS5 server and port transfer functionalities.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has executed DLL search order hijacking.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1588.001 | MalwareSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has obtained and used leaked malware, including DoublePulsar, EternalBlue, EternalRocks, and EternalSynergy, in its operations.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.004 | Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique | BackdoorDiplomacy has disguised their backdoor droppers with naming conventions designed to blend into normal operations.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0647: Turian
Turian is a backdoor that has been used by BackdoorDiplomacy to target Ministries of Foreign Affairs, telecommunication companies, and charities in Africa, Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. First reported in 2021, Turian is likely related to Quarian, an older backdoor that was last observed being used in 2013 against diplomatic targets in Syria and the United States.[1]
S0020: China Chopper
S0002: Mimikatz
S0590: NBTscan
S0262: QuasarRAT
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 2ef46f5dfb7d… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | d4d11aef9c4f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET BackdoorDiplomacy Jun 2021
Adam Burgher. (2021, June 10). BackdoorDiplomacy: Upgrading from Quarian to Turian. Retrieved September 1, 2021
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackG0135Open source URL
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