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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups

An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain.

On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.[1][2] On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.[3]

For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage Remote Desktop Protocol to log into the endpoints in the future.[4] Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user groups to gain future persistence on the network.[5] On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage Sudo and Sudo Caching for elevated privileges.

In Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.[6]

EnterpriseT1098.007Sub-techniqueObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups describes An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain. On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.(Citation: Microsoft Net Localgroup)(Citation: Microsoft Net Group) On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.(Citation: Linux Usermod) For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows device...

Executive priority

T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (Windows, macOS, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1098.007: Additional Local or Domain Groups appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Additional Local or Domain Groups

An adversary may add additional local or domain groups to an adversary-controlled account to maintain persistent access to a system or domain.

On Windows, accounts may use the `net localgroup` and `net group` commands to add existing users to local and domain groups.[1][2] On Linux, adversaries may use the `usermod` command for the same purpose.[3]

For example, accounts may be added to the local administrators group on Windows devices to maintain elevated privileges. They may also be added to the Remote Desktop Users group, which allows them to leverage Remote Desktop Protocol to log into the endpoints in the future.[4] Adversaries may also add accounts to VPN user groups to gain future persistence on the network.[5] On Linux, accounts may be added to the sudoers group, allowing them to persistently leverage Sudo and Sudo Caching for elevated privileges.

In Windows environments, machine accounts may also be added to domain groups. This allows the local SYSTEM account to gain privileges on the domain.[6]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1098Account ManipulationThis object subtechnique of Account Manipulation.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0022: APT3

APT3 is a China-based threat group that researchers have attributed to China's Ministry of State Security.[1][2] This group is responsible for the campaigns known as Operation Clandestine Fox, Operation Clandestine Wolf, and Operation Double Tap.[1][3] As of June 2015, the group appears to have shifted from targeting primarily US victims to primarily political organizations in Hong Kong.[4]

GroupEnterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G0096: APT41

APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0035: Dragonfly

Dragonfly is a cyber espionage group that has been attributed to Russia's Federal Security Service (FSB) Center 16.[1][2] Active since at least 2010, Dragonfly has targeted defense and aviation companies, government entities, companies related to industrial control systems, and critical infrastructure sectors worldwide through supply chain, spearphishing, and drive-by compromise attacks.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9]

GroupEnterprise

G1023: APT5

APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

GroupEnterprise

G0059: Magic Hound

Magic Hound is an Iranian-sponsored threat group that conducts long term, resource-intensive cyber espionage operations, likely on behalf of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. They have targeted European, U.S., and Middle Eastern government and military personnel, academics, journalists, and organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO), via complex social engineering campaigns since at least 2014.[1][2][3][4][5]

GroupEnterprise

G1016: FIN13

FIN13 is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. FIN13 achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.[1][2]

MalwareEnterprise

S1111: DarkGate

DarkGate first emerged in 2018 and has evolved into an initial access and data gathering tool associated with various criminal cyber operations. Written in Delphi and named "DarkGate" by its author, DarkGate is associated with credential theft, cryptomining, cryptotheft, and pre-ransomware actions.[1] DarkGate use increased significantly starting in 2022 and is under active development by its author, who provides it as a Malware-as-a-Service offering.[2]

Windows
MalwareEnterprise

S0649: SMOKEDHAM

SMOKEDHAM is a Powershell-based .NET backdoor that was first reported in May 2021; it has been used by at least one ransomware-as-a-service affiliate.[1][2]

Windows
ToolEnterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
422a0212861fdec1...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle422a0212861f…
19.11.1Older bundle422a0212861f…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Microsoft Net Localgroup

    Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Net Localgroup. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Microsoft Net Group

    Microsoft. (2016, August 31). Net group. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Linux Usermod

    Man7. (n.d.). Usermod. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft RDP Logons

    Microsoft. (2017, April 9). Allow log on through Remote Desktop Services. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Cyber Security News

    Kaaviya. (n.d.). SuperBlack Actors Exploiting Two Fortinet Vulnerabilities to Deploy Ransomware. Retrieved September 22, 2025.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    RootDSE AD Detection 2022

    Scarred Monk. (2022, May 6). Real-time detection scenarios in Active Directory environments. Retrieved August 5, 2024.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    mitre-attackT1098.007
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.