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MITRE ATT&CK® Tool

S1050: PcShare

PcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.[1][2]

EnterpriseS1050ToolObject v1.1Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S1050: PcShare describes [PcShare](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1050) is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.(Citation: Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020)(Citation: GitHub PcShare 2014)

Executive priority

S1050: PcShare is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1050: PcShare by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S1050: PcShare appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

PcShare

PcShare is an open source remote access tool that has been modified and used by Chinese threat actors, most notably during the FunnyDream campaign since late 2018.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

21 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

PcShare has been named `wuauclt.exe` to appear as the legitimate Windows Update AutoUpdate Client.[1]

EnterpriseT1071.001Web ProtocolsSub-technique

PcShare has used HTTP for C2 communication.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

PcShare can obtain a list of running processes on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

PcShare can take screen shots of a compromised machine.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

PcShare can obtain the proxy settings of a compromised machine using `InternetQueryOptionA` and its IP address by running `nslookup myip.opendns.comresolver1.opendns.com\r\n`.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.015CompressionSub-technique

PcShare has been compressed with LZW algorithm.[1]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

PcShare can execute `cmd` commands on a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique

PcShare has been encrypted with XOR using different 32-long Base16 strings.[1]

EnterpriseT1546.015Component Object Model HijackingSub-technique

PcShare has created the `HKCU\\Software\\Classes\\CLSID\\{42aedc87-2188-41fd-b9a3-0c966feabec1}\\InprocServer32` Registry key for persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

PcShare has the ability to capture keystrokes.[1]

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

PcShare can collect files and information from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

PcShare has used `rundll32.exe` for execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

PcShare has decrypted its strings by applying a XOR operation and a decompression using a custom implemented LZM algorithm.[1]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

PcShare can search the registry files of a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

PcShare has deleted its files and components from a compromised host.[1]

EnterpriseT1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel

PcShare can upload files and information from a compromised host to its C2 servers.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.001Invalid Code SignatureSub-technique

PcShare has used an invalid certificate in attempt to appear legitimate.[1]

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

PcShare can delete its persistence mechanisms from the registry.[1]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

PcShare has used a variety of Windows API functions.[1]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

The PcShare payload has been injected into the `logagent.exe` and `rdpclip.exe` processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1125Video Capture

PcShare can capture camera video as part of its collection process.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1023: APT5

APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

CampaignEnterprise

C0007: FunnyDream

FunnyDream was a suspected Chinese cyber espionage campaign that targeted government and foreign organizations in Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, Vietnam, and other parts of Southeast Asia. Security researchers linked the FunnyDream campaign to possible Chinese-speaking threat actors through the use of the Chinoxy backdoor and noted infrastructure overlap with the TAG-16 threat group.[1][2][3]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · CampaignC0007: FunnyDreamEnterpriseuses · GroupG1023: APT5Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1071.001: Web ProtocolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1113: Screen CaptureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.015: CompressionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1027.013: Encrypted/Encoded FileEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.015: Component Object Model HijackingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1056.001: KeyloggingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1218.011: Rundll32Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1140: Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1012: Query RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1070.004: File DeletionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1041: Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.001: Invalid Code SignatureEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1112: Modify RegistryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1125: Video CaptureEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f611f683b40cf0b6...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundlef611f683b40c…
19.11.1Older bundlef611f683b40c…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Bitdefender FunnyDream Campaign November 2020

    Vrabie, V. (2020, November). Dissecting a Chinese APT Targeting South Eastern Asian Government Institutions. Retrieved September 19, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    GitHub PcShare 2014

    LiveMirror. (2014, September 17). PcShare. Retrieved October 11, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackS1050
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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