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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0032: gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0032MalwareObject v3.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0032: gh0st RAT describes [gh0st RAT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0032) is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.(Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)

Executive priority

S0032: gh0st RAT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0032: gh0st RAT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0032: gh0st RAT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

gh0st RAT

gh0st RAT is a remote access tool (RAT). The source code is public and it has been used by multiple groups.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

24 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1129Shared Modules

gh0st RAT can load DLLs into memory.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1112Modify Registry

gh0st RAT has altered the InstallTime subkey.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1105Ingress Tool Transfer

gh0st RAT can download files to the victim’s machine.[3]CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1685.005Clear Windows Event LogsSub-technique

gh0st RAT is able to wipe event logs.[1]CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

gh0st RAT can inject malicious code into process created by the “Command_Create&Inject” function.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1218.011Rundll32Sub-technique

A gh0st RAT variant has used rundll32 for execution.[2]

EnterpriseT1569.002Service ExecutionSub-technique

gh0st RAT can execute its service if the Service key exists. If the key does not exist, gh0st RAT will create and run the service.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1574.001DLLSub-technique

A gh0st RAT variant has used DLL side-loading.[2]

EnterpriseT1059Command and Scripting Interpreter

gh0st RAT is able to open a remote shell to execute commands.[1][3]

EnterpriseT1012Query Registry

gh0st RAT has checked for the existence of a Service key to determine if it has already been installed on the system.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

gh0st RAT has decrypted and loaded the gh0st RAT DLL into memory, once the initial dropper executable is launched.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1573.001Symmetric CryptographySub-technique

gh0st RAT uses RC4 and XOR to encrypt C2 traffic.[3]

EnterpriseT1095Non-Application Layer Protocol

gh0st RAT has used an encrypted protocol within TCP segments to communicate with the C2.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1106Native API

gh0st RAT has used the `InterlockedExchange`, `SeShutdownPrivilege`, and `ExitWindowsEx` Windows API functions.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

gh0st RAT has the capability to list processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1543.003Windows ServiceSub-technique

gh0st RAT can create a new service to establish persistence.[3]CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

gh0st RAT has added a Registry Run key to establish persistence.[3]CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

gh0st RAT has gathered system architecture, processor, OS configuration, and installed hardware information.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

gh0st RAT has the capability to to delete files.[1]CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1113Screen Capture

gh0st RAT can capture the victim’s screen remotely.[3]

EnterpriseT1568.001Fast Flux DNSSub-technique

gh0st RAT operators have used dynamic DNS to mask the true location of their C2 behind rapidly changing IP addresses.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1056.001KeyloggingSub-technique

gh0st RAT has a keylogger.CitationAlintanahin 2014CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1132.001Standard EncodingSub-technique

gh0st RAT has used Zlib to compress C2 communications data before encrypting it.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

EnterpriseT1573Encrypted Channel

gh0st RAT has encrypted TCP communications to evade detection.CitationGh0stRAT ATT March 2019

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0094: Kimsuky

Kimsuky is a Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK)-based cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2012. The group initially targeted South Korean government agencies, think tanks, and subject-matter experts in various fields. Its operations expanded to include the United Nations and organizations in the government, education, business services, and manufacturing sectors across the United States, Japan, Russia, and Europe. Kimsuky has focused collection on foreign policy and national security issues tied to the Korean Peninsula, nuclear policy, and sanctions. Kimsuky operations have overlapped with those of other North Korean state-sponsored cyber espionage actors as a result of ad hoc collaborations or other limited resource sharing.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Kimsuky was assessed to be responsible for the 2014 Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co. compromise; other notable campaigns include Operation STOLEN PENCIL (2018), Operation Kabar Cobra (2019), and Operation Smoke Screen (2019).[7][8][9] In 2023, Kimsuky was observed using commercial large language models (LLMs) to assist with vulnerability research, scripting, social engineering and reconnaissance.[10]

DPRK threat actor cluster boundaries overlap in open source reporting, with some security researchers consolidating all attributed North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under Lazarus Group, rather than tracking operationally distinct subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G0096: APT41

APT41 is a threat group that researchers have assessed as Chinese state-sponsored espionage group that also conducts financially-motivated operations. Active since at least 2012, APT41 has been observed targeting various industries, including but not limited to healthcare, telecom, technology, finance, education, retail and video game industries in 14 countries.[1] Notable behaviors include using a wide range of malware and tools to complete mission objectives. APT41 overlaps at least partially with public reporting on groups including BARIUM and Winnti Group.[2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0026: APT18

APT18 is a threat group that has operated since at least 2009 and has targeted a range of industries, including technology, manufacturing, human rights groups, government, and medical. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0138: Andariel

Andariel is a North Korean state-sponsored threat group that has been active since at least 2009. Andariel has primarily focused its operations--which have included destructive attacks--against South Korean government agencies, military organizations, and a variety of domestic companies; they have also conducted cyber financial operations against ATMs, banks, and cryptocurrency exchanges. Andariel's notable activity includes Operation Black Mine, Operation GoldenAxe, and Campaign Rifle.[1][2][3][4][5]

Andariel is considered a sub-set of Lazarus Group, and has been attributed to North Korea's Reconnaissance General Bureau.[6]

North Korean group definitions are known to have significant overlap, and some security researchers report all North Korean state-sponsored cyber activity under the name Lazarus Group instead of tracking clusters or subgroups.

GroupEnterprise

G0126: Higaisa

Higaisa is a threat group suspected to have South Korean origins. Higaisa has targeted government, public, and trade organizations in North Korea; however, they have also carried out attacks in China, Japan, Russia, Poland, and other nations. Higaisa was first disclosed in early 2019 but is assessed to have operated as early as 2009.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0062: TA459

TA459 is a threat group believed to operate out of China that has targeted countries including Russia, Belarus, Mongolia, and others. [1]

GroupEnterprise

G0065: Leviathan

Leviathan is a Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been attributed to the Ministry of State Security's (MSS) Hainan State Security Department and an affiliated front company.[1] Active since at least 2009, Leviathan has targeted the following sectors: academia, aerospace/aviation, biomedical, defense industrial base, government, healthcare, manufacturing, maritime, and transportation across the US, Canada, Australia, Europe, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia.[1][2][3][4]

GroupEnterprise

G0001: Axiom

Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G1023: APT5

APT5 is a China-based espionage actor that has been active since at least 2007 primarily targeting the telecommunications, aerospace, and defense industries throughout the U.S., Europe, and Asia. APT5 has displayed advanced tradecraft and significant interest in compromising networking devices and their underlying software including through the use of zero-day exploits.[1][2][3][4][5][6]

GroupEnterprise

G0027: Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

CampaignEnterprise

C0016: Operation Dust Storm

Operation Dust Storm was a long-standing persistent cyber espionage campaign that targeted multiple industries in Japan, South Korea, the United States, Europe, and several Southeast Asian countries. By 2015, the Operation Dust Storm threat actors shifted from government and defense-related intelligence targets to Japanese companies or Japanese subdivisions of larger foreign organizations supporting Japan's critical infrastructure, including electricity generation, oil and natural gas, finance, transportation, and construction.[1]

Operation Dust Storm threat actors also began to use Android backdoors in their operations by 2015, with all identified victims at the time residing in Japan or South Korea.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
3.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
d294bc20a2108b1f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.23.3Current bundled294bc20a210…
19.13.3Older bundled294bc20a210…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    FireEye Hacking Team

    FireEye Threat Intelligence. (2015, July 13). Demonstrating Hustle, Chinese APT Groups Quickly Use Zero-Day Vulnerability (CVE-2015-5119) Following Hacking Team Leak. Retrieved January 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Arbor Musical Chairs Feb 2018

    Sabo, S. (2018, February 15). Musical Chairs Playing Tetris. Retrieved February 19, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018

    Pantazopoulos, N. (2018, April 17). Decoding network data from a Gh0st RAT variant. Retrieved November 2, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Novetta-Axiom

    Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Moudoor

    (Citation: Novetta-Axiom)

  6. [6]
    Mydoor

    (Citation: Novetta-Axiom)

  7. [7]
    gh0st RAT

    (Citation: FireEye Hacking Team)(Citation: Nccgroup Gh0st April 2018)

  8. [8]
    mitre-attackS0032
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.