S1172: OilBooster
OilBooster is a downloader written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute files and for exfiltration.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1172: OilBooster describes [OilBooster](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1172) is a downloader written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ that has been used by [OilRig](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0049) since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute files and for exfiltration.(Citation: ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023)
Executive priority
S1172: OilBooster is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1172: OilBooster by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1172: OilBooster appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
OilBooster
OilBooster is a downloader written in Microsoft Visual C/C++ that has been used by OilRig since at least 2022 including against target organizations in Israel to download and execute files and for exfiltration.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | OilBooster can use an actor-controlled OneDrive account for C2 communication and exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | OilBooster can identify the compromised system's hostname which is used to create a unique identifier.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud StorageSub-technique | OilBooster can exfiltrate files to an actor-controlled OneDrive account via the Microsoft Graph API.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1564.003 | Hidden WindowSub-technique | OilBooster can hide its console window upon execution through the `ShowWindow` API. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | OilBooster has the ability to execute shell commands and exfiltrate the results.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102.002 | Bidirectional CommunicationSub-technique | OilBooster uses the Microsoft Graph API to connect to an actor-controlled OneDrive account to download and execute files and shell commands, and to create directories to share exfiltrated data.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1559 | Inter-Process Communication | OilBooster can read the results of command line execution via an unnamed pipe connected to the process.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | OilBooster can download and execute files from an actor-controlled OneDrive account.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | OilBooster can send HTTP `GET`, `POST`, `PUT`, and `DELETE` requests to the Microsoft Graph API over port 443 for C2 communication.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | OilBooster can identify the compromised system's username which is then used as part of a unique identifier.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | OilBooster can stage files in the `tempFiles` directory for exfiltration.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1008 | Fallback Channels | OilBooster can use a backup channel to request a new refresh token from its C2 server after 10 consecutive unsuccessful connections to the primary OneDrive C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | OilBooster can use the OpenSSL library to encrypt C2 communications.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | OilBooster can Base64-decode and XOR-decrypt C2 commands taken from JSON files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | OilBooster has used the `ShowWindow` and `CreateProcessW` APIs.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0049: OilRig
OilRig is a suspected Iranian threat group that has targeted Middle Eastern and international victims since at least 2014. The group has targeted a variety of sectors, including financial, government, energy, chemical, and telecommunications. It appears the group carries out supply chain attacks, leveraging the trust relationship between organizations to attack their primary targets. The group works on behalf of the Iranian government based on infrastructure details that contain references to Iran, use of Iranian infrastructure, and targeting that aligns with nation-state interests.[1][2][3][4][5][6][7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 47e296c22354… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 47e296c22354… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]ESET OilRig Downloaders DEC 2023
Hromcova, Z. and Burgher, A. (2023, December 14). OilRig’s persistent attacks using cloud service-powered downloaders. Retrieved November 26, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1172Open source URL
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