S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP
CHIMNEYSWEEP is a backdoor malware that was deployed during HomeLand Justice along with ROADSWEEP ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP describes [CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) is a backdoor malware that was deployed during [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) along with [ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)
Executive priority
S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CHIMNEYSWEEP
CHIMNEYSWEEP is a backdoor malware that was deployed during HomeLand Justice along with ROADSWEEP ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can store captured screenshots to disk including to a covert store named `APPX.%x%x%x%x%x.tmp` where `%x` is a random value.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | CHIMNEYSWEEP can execute a task which leads to execution if it finds a process name containing “creensaver.”[1] |
| Enterprise | T1218.003 | CMSTPSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use CMSTP.exe to install a malicious Microsoft Connection Manager Profile.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP has executed a script named cln.vbs on compromised hosts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use a custom Base64 alphabet to encode an API decryption key.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | CHIMNEYSWEEP can download additional files from C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | CHIMNEYSWEEP can monitor for removable drives.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can send `HTTP GET` requests to C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use Windows APIs including `LoadLibrary` and `GetProcAddress`.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.009 | Embedded PayloadsSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can extract RC4 encrypted embedded payloads for privilege escalation.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary PaddingSub-technique | The CHIMNEYSWEEP installer has been padded with null bytes to inflate its size.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to enumerate directories for files that match a set list.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | CHIMNEYSWEEP can capture content from the clipboard.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | CHIMNEYSWEEP can collect files from compromised hosts.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use an embedded RC4 key to decrypt Windows API function strings.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use the Windows `SilentCleanup` scheduled task to enable payload execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | CHIMNEYSWEEP can upload collected files to the command-and-control server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can invoke the PowerShell command `[Reflection.Assembly]::LoadFile(\"%s\")\n$i=\"\"\n$r=[%s]::%s(\"%s\",[ref] $i)\necho $r,$i\n` to execute secondary payloads.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1132.002 | Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use a custom Base64 alphabet for encoding C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | CHIMNEYSWEEP has included the victim's computer name and username in C2 messages sent to actor-owned infrastructure.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | CHIMNEYSWEEP can check if a process name contains “creensaver.”[1] |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to support keylogging.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP is capable of checking whether a compromised device is running DeepFreeze by Faronics.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | CHIMNEYSWEEP can reboot or shutdown the targeted system or logoff the current user.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use `LoadLibrary` and `GetProcAddress` to resolve Windows API function strings at run time.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | CHIMNEYSWEEP has the ability to use use Telegram channels to return a list of commands to be executed, to download additional payloads, or to create a reverse shell.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | CHIMNEYSWEEP can capture screenshots on targeted systems using a timer and either upload them or store them to disk.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can make use of the Windows `SilentCleanup` scheduled task to execute its payload with elevated privileges.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP can time stomp its executable, previously dating it between 2010 to 2021.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | CHIMNEYSWEEP can use the Windows Registry Environment key to change the `%windir%` variable to point to `c:\Windows` to enable payload execution.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | CHIMNEYSWEEP has been dropped by a self-extracting archive signed with a valid digital certificate.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0038: HomeLand Justice
HomeLand Justice was a disruptive cyber campaign conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. The activity combined ransomware, wiper malware, and data leak operations. Initial access for HomeLand Justice was established as early as May 2021, and threat actors moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the destructive phase of the operation. Responsibility was claimed by the "HomeLand Justice" front, which framed the campaign as retaliation against the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group with a presence in Albania. Multiple Iran-nexus groups are assessed to have participated in the campaign, including HEXANE who probed victim infrastructure.[1][2][3] A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics following public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.[3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 20.0 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 1120bf286eda… | ||
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 1120bf286eda… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 1120bf286eda… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022
Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1149Open source URL
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