S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP
MITRE ATT&CK S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP Malware details for Windows, with detection guidance, relationships and mapped CVEs.
Security context for executives and security teams
S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP describes [CHIMNEYSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1149) is a backdoor malware that was deployed during [HomeLand Justice](https://attack.mitre.org/campaigns/C0038) along with [ROADSWEEP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1150) ransomware, and has been used to target Farsi and Arabic speakers since at least 2012.(Citation: Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022)
Executive priority
S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1149: CHIMNEYSWEEP appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
CHIMNEYSWEEP
No official description is available in the imported ATT&CK source object.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | This object uses Local Data Staging. |
| Enterprise | T1480 | Execution Guardrails | This object uses Execution Guardrails. |
| Enterprise | T1218.003 | CMSTPSub-technique | This object uses CMSTP. |
| Enterprise | T1059.005 | Visual BasicSub-technique | This object uses Visual Basic. |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | This object uses Obfuscated Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | This object uses Ingress Tool Transfer. |
| Enterprise | T1120 | Peripheral Device Discovery | This object uses Peripheral Device Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | This object uses Web Protocols. |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | This object uses Native API. |
| Enterprise | T1027.009 | Embedded PayloadsSub-technique | This object uses Embedded Payloads. |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary PaddingSub-technique | This object uses Binary Padding. |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | This object uses File and Directory Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1115 | Clipboard Data | This object uses Clipboard Data. |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | This object uses Data from Local System. |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | This object uses Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information. |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | This object uses Scheduled Task. |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | This object uses Exfiltration Over C2 Channel. |
| Enterprise | T1059.001 | PowerShellSub-technique | This object uses PowerShell. |
| Enterprise | T1132.002 | Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique | This object uses Non-Standard Encoding. |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | This object uses System Owner/User Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | This object uses Process Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1056.001 | KeyloggingSub-technique | This object uses Keylogging. |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | This object uses Security Software Discovery. |
| Enterprise | T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | This object uses System Shutdown/Reboot. |
| Enterprise | T1027.007 | Dynamic API ResolutionSub-technique | This object uses Dynamic API Resolution. |
| Enterprise | T1102 | Web Service | This object uses Web Service. |
| Enterprise | T1113 | Screen Capture | This object uses Screen Capture. |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | This object uses Bypass User Account Control. |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | This object uses Timestomp. |
| Enterprise | T1112 | Modify Registry | This object uses Modify Registry. |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | This object uses Code Signing. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
C0038: HomeLand Justice
HomeLand Justice was a disruptive cyber campaign conducted by Iranian state-affiliated actors against Albanian government networks in July and September 2022. The activity combined ransomware, wiper malware, and data leak operations. Initial access for HomeLand Justice was established as early as May 2021, and threat actors moved laterally, exfiltrated sensitive information, and maintained persistence for approximately 14 months prior to the destructive phase of the operation. Responsibility was claimed by the "HomeLand Justice" front, which framed the campaign as retaliation against the Mujahedeen-e Khalq (MEK), an Iranian opposition group with a presence in Albania. Multiple Iran-nexus groups are assessed to have participated in the campaign, including HEXANE who probed victim infrastructure.[1][2][3] A second wave of attacks was launched in September 2022 using similar tactics following public attribution of the previous activity to Iran and the severing of diplomatic ties between Iran and Albania.[3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | 1120bf286eda… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 1120bf286eda… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Mandiant ROADSWEEP August 2022
Jenkins, L. at al. (2022, August 4). ROADSWEEP Ransomware - Likely Iranian Threat Actor Conducts Politically Motivated Disruptive Activity Against Albanian Government Organizations. Retrieved August 6, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS1149Open source URL
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