S1100: Ninja

S1100: Ninja describes [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by [ToddyCat](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1022) to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by [ToddyCat](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1022) and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. [Ninja](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1100) has been ...

Executive priority

S1100: Ninja is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S1100: Ninja by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S1100: Ninja appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Ninja

Ninja is a malware developed in C++ that has been used by ToddyCat to penetrate networks and control remote systems since at least 2020. Ninja is possibly part of a post exploitation toolkit exclusively used by ToddyCat and allows multiple operators to work simultaneously on the same machine. Ninja has been used against government and military entities in Europe and Asia and observed in specific infection chains being deployed by Samurai.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques28 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1027.013	Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique	The Ninja payload is XOR encrypted and compressed.CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023 Ninja has also XORed its configuration data with a constant value of `0xAA`.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1095	Non-Application Layer Protocol	Ninja can forward TCP packets between the C2 and a remote host.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	Ninja has used legitimate looking filenames for its loader including update.dll and x64.dll.CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1016	System Network Configuration Discovery	Ninja can enumerate the IP address on compromised systems.[1]
Enterprise	T1566.003	Spearphishing via ServiceSub-technique	Ninja has been distributed to victims via the messaging app Telegram.[1]
Enterprise	T1204.002	Malicious FileSub-technique	Ninja has gained execution through victims opening malicious executable files embedded in zip archives.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	Ninja has the ability to enumerate directory content.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	The Ninja loader can call Windows APIs for discovery, process injection, and payload decryption.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1573.001	Symmetric CryptographySub-technique	Ninja can XOR and AES encrypt C2 messages.[1]
Enterprise	T1029	Scheduled Transfer	Ninja can configure its agent to work only in specific time frames.[1]
Enterprise	T1574.001	DLLSub-technique	Ninja loaders can be side-loaded with legitimate and signed executables including the VLC.exe media player.CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1082	System Information Discovery	Ninja can obtain the computer name and information on the OS from targeted hosts.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	The Ninja loader component can decrypt and decompress the payload.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1001	Data Obfuscation	Ninja has the ability to modify headers and URL paths to hide malicious traffic in HTTP requests.[1]
Enterprise	T1090.003	Multi-hop ProxySub-technique	Ninja has the ability to use a proxy chain with up to 255 hops when using TCP.[1]
Enterprise	T1480.001	Environmental KeyingSub-technique	Ninja can store its final payload in the Registry under `$HKLM\SOFTWARE\Classes\Interface\` encrypted with a dynamically generated key based on the drive’s serial number.[1]
Enterprise	T1090.001	Internal ProxySub-technique	Ninja can proxy C2 communications including to and from internal agents without internet connectivity.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1680	Local Storage Discovery	Ninja can obtain information on physical drives from targeted hosts.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1218.011	Rundll32Sub-technique	Ninja loader components can be executed through rundll32.exe.CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1055	Process Injection	Ninja has the ability to inject an agent module into a new process and arbitrary shellcode into running processes.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1543.003	Windows ServiceSub-technique	Ninja can create the services `httpsvc` and `w3esvc` for persistence .[1]
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	Ninja can enumerate processes on a targeted host.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1001.003	Protocol or Service ImpersonationSub-technique	Ninja has the ability to mimic legitimate services with customized HTTP URL paths and headers to hide malicious traffic.[1]
Enterprise	T1071.001	Web ProtocolsSub-technique	Ninja can use HTTP for C2 communications.[1]
Enterprise	T1027.015	CompressionSub-technique	Ninja has compressed its data with the LZSS algorithm.[1]CitationKaspersky ToddyCat Check Logs October 2023
Enterprise	T1070.006	TimestompSub-technique	Ninja can change or create the last access or write times.[1]
Enterprise	T1559	Inter-Process Communication	Ninja can use pipes to redirect the standard input and the standard output.[1]
Enterprise	T1132.002	Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique	Ninja can encode C2 communications with a base64 algorithm using a custom alphabet.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1022: ToddyCat

ToddyCat is a sophisticated threat group that has been active since at least 2020 using custom loaders and malware in multi-stage infection chains against government and military targets across Europe and Asia.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.1
Created: Jan 11, 2024, 18:40 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 22, 2025, 02:17 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 6f9565ea5e9a83c6...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Oct 22, 2025, 02:17 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`6f9565ea5e9a…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.1	Oct 22, 2025, 02:17 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`6f9565ea5e9a…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
Kaspersky ToddyCat June 2022
Dedola, G. (2022, June 21). APT ToddyCat. Retrieved January 3, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
mitre-attackS1100
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use