S0687: Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. Cyclops Blink is assessed to be a replacement for VPNFilter, a similar platform targeting network devices.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0687: Cyclops Blink describes [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by [Sandworm Team](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0034) since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. [Cyclops Blink](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0687) is assessed to be a replacement for [VPNFilter](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1010), a similar platform targeting network devices.(Citation: NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022)(C...
Executive priority
S0687: Cyclops Blink is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0687: Cyclops Blink by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Network Devices), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0687: Cyclops Blink appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Cyclops Blink
Cyclops Blink is a modular malware that has been used in widespread campaigns by Sandworm Team since at least 2019 to target Small/Home Office (SOHO) network devices, including WatchGuard and Asus. Cyclops Blink is assessed to be a replacement for VPNFilter, a similar platform targeting network devices.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Cyclops Blink can use various Linux API functions including those for execution and discovery.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | Cyclops Blink can encrypt C2 messages with AES-256-CBC sent underneath TLS. OpenSSL library functions are also used to encrypt each message using a randomly generated key and IV, which are then encrypted using a hard-coded RSA public key.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1070.006 | TimestompSub-technique | Cyclops Blink has the ability to use the Linux API function `utime` to change the timestamps of modified firmware update images.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Cyclops Blink can rename its running process to |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Cyclops Blink has the ability to query device information.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1542.002 | Component FirmwareSub-technique | Cyclops Blink has maintained persistence by patching legitimate device firmware when it is downloaded, including that of WatchGuard devices.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | Cyclops Blink can upload files from a compromised host.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Cyclops Blink can use the Linux API `statvfs` to enumerate the current working directory.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Cyclops Blink has the ability to upload exfiltrated files to a C2 server.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Cyclops Blink can enumerate the process it is currently running under.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Cyclops Blink can use the Linux API `if_nameindex` to gather network interface names.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1132.002 | Non-Standard EncodingSub-technique | Cyclops Blink can use a custom binary scheme to encode messages with specific commands and parameters to be executed.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1090.003 | Multi-hop ProxySub-technique | Cyclops Blink has used Tor nodes for C2 traffic.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1559 | Inter-Process Communication | Cyclops Blink has the ability to create a pipe to enable inter-process communication.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1686.002 | Network Device FirewallSub-technique | Cyclops Blink can modify the Linux iptables firewall to enable C2 communication on network devices via a stored list of port numbers.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Cyclops Blink has the ability to download files to target systems.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Cyclops Blink can download files via HTTP and HTTPS.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1037.004 | RC ScriptsSub-technique | Cyclops Blink has the ability to execute on device startup, using a modified RC script named S51armled.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Cyclops Blink can decrypt and parse instructions sent from C2.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | Cyclops Blink can use DNS over HTTPS (DoH) to resolve C2 nodes.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1571 | Non-Standard Port | Cyclops Blink can use non-standard ports for C2 not typically associated with HTTP or HTTPS traffic.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0034: Sandworm Team
Sandworm Team is a destructive threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) Main Center for Special Technologies (GTsST) military unit 74455.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2009.[3][4][5][6]
In October 2020, the US indicted six GRU Unit 74455 officers associated with Sandworm Team for the following cyber operations: the 2015 and 2016 attacks against Ukrainian electrical companies and government organizations, the 2017 worldwide NotPetya attack, targeting of the 2017 French presidential campaign, the 2018 Olympic Destroyer attack against the Winter Olympic Games, the 2018 operation against the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and attacks against the country of Georgia in 2018 and 2019.[1][2] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 26165, which is also referred to as APT28.[7]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | f4d8cfa42083… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | f4d8cfa42083… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NCSC Cyclops Blink February 2022
NCSC. (2022, February 23). Cyclops Blink Malware Analysis Report. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
Open source URL - [2]NCSC CISA Cyclops Blink Advisory February 2022
NCSC, CISA, FBI, NSA. (2022, February 23). New Sandworm malware Cyclops Blink replaces VPNFilter. Retrieved March 3, 2022.
Open source URL - [3]Trend Micro Cyclops Blink March 2022
Haquebord, F. et al. (2022, March 17). Cyclops Blink Sets Sights on Asus Routers. Retrieved March 17, 2022.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS0687Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.