T1645: Compromise Client Software Binary
Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators.
Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those binaries are executed. For example, malware may come with a pre-compiled malicious binary intended to overwrite the genuine one on the device. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by the system or user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the device.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1645: Compromise Client Software Binary describes Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators. Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those binaries are executed. For example, malware may come with a pre-compiled malicious binary intended to overwrite the genuine one on the device. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by the system or user, th...
Executive priority
T1645: Compromise Client Software Binary is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1645: Compromise Client Software Binary by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1645: Compromise Client Software Binary appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Compromise Client Software Binary
Adversaries may modify system software binaries to establish persistent access to devices. System software binaries are used by the underlying operating system and users over adb or terminal emulators.
Adversaries may make modifications to client software binaries to carry out malicious tasks when those binaries are executed. For example, malware may come with a pre-compiled malicious binary intended to overwrite the genuine one on the device. Since these binaries may be routinely executed by the system or user, the adversary can leverage this for persistent access to the device.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0289: Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS is the iOS version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. It has been advertised and sold to target high-value victims.[1][2] The Android version is tracked separately under Pegasus for Android.
S0550: DoubleAgent
DoubleAgent is a family of RAT malware dating back to 2013, known to target groups with contentious relationships with the Chinese government.[1]
S0407: Monokle
S0324: SpyDealer
S0316: Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. [1] [2] The iOS version is tracked separately under Pegasus for iOS.
S0294: ShiftyBug
S0655: BusyGasper
BusyGasper is Android spyware that has been in use since May 2016. There have been less than 10 victims, all who appear to be located in Russia, that were all infected via physical access to the device.[1]
S0293: BrainTest
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | f7d7e2b660c4… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | f7d7e2b660c4… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Android-VerifiedBoot
Android. (n.d.). Verified Boot. Retrieved December 21, 2016.
Open source URL - [2]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-27Open source URL
- [3]mitre-attackT1645Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.