S0562: SUNSPOT

S0562: SUNSPOT describes [SUNSPOT](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0562) is an implant that injected the [SUNBURST](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0559) backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by [APT29](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0016) since at least February 2020.(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)

Executive priority

S0562: SUNSPOT is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0562: SUNSPOT by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

Validate whether S0562: SUNSPOT appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.

Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

SUNSPOT

SUNSPOT is an implant that injected the SUNBURST backdoor into the SolarWinds Orion software update framework. It was used by APT29 since at least February 2020.[1]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques12 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1057	Process Discovery	SUNSPOT monitored running processes for instances of `MsBuild.exe` by hashing the name of each running process and comparing it to the corresponding value `0x53D525`. It also extracted command-line arguments and individual arguments from the running `MsBuild.exe` process to identify the directory path of the Orion software Visual Studio solution.[1]
Enterprise	T1134	Access Token Manipulation	SUNSPOT modified its security token to grants itself debugging privileges by adding `SeDebugPrivilege`.[1]
Enterprise	T1070.004	File DeletionSub-technique	Following the successful injection of SUNBURST, SUNSPOT deleted a temporary file it created named `InventoryManager.bk` after restoring the original SolarWinds Orion source code to the software library.[1]
Enterprise	T1027	Obfuscated Files or Information	SUNSPOT encrypted log entries it collected with the stream cipher RC4 using a hard-coded key. It also uses AES128-CBC encrypted blobs for SUNBURST source code and data extracted from the SolarWinds Orion process.[1]
Enterprise	T1565.001	Stored Data ManipulationSub-technique	SUNSPOT created a copy of the SolarWinds Orion software source file with a `.bk` extension to backup the original content, wrote SUNBURST using the same filename but with a `.tmp` extension, and then moved SUNBURST using `MoveFileEx` to the original filename with a `.cs` extension so it could be compiled within Orion software.[1]
Enterprise	T1083	File and Directory Discovery	SUNSPOT enumerated the Orion software Visual Studio solution directory path.[1]
Enterprise	T1480	Execution Guardrails	SUNSPOT only replaces SolarWinds Orion source code if the MD5 checksums of both the original source code file and backdoored replacement source code match hardcoded values.[1]
Enterprise	T1195.002	Compromise Software Supply ChainSub-technique	SUNSPOT malware was designed and used to insert SUNBURST into software builds of the SolarWinds Orion IT management product.[1]
Enterprise	T1106	Native API	SUNSPOT used Windows API functions such as `MoveFileEx` and `NtQueryInformationProcess` as part of the SUNBURST injection process.[1]
Enterprise	T1480.002	Mutual ExclusionSub-technique	SUNSPOT creates a mutex using the hard-coded value ` {12d61a41-4b74-7610-a4d8-3028d2f56395}` to ensure that only one instance of itself is running.[1]
Enterprise	T1140	Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information	SUNSPOT decrypts SUNBURST, which was stored in AES128-CBC encrypted blobs.[1]
Enterprise	T1036.005	Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique	SUNSPOT was identified on disk with a filename of `taskhostsvc.exe` and it created an encrypted log file at `C:\Windows\Temp\vmware-vmdmp.log`.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0016: APT29

APT29 is threat group that has been attributed to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR).[1][2] They have operated since at least 2008, often targeting government networks in Europe and NATO member countries, research institutes, and think tanks. APT29 reportedly compromised the Democratic National Committee starting in the summer of 2015.[3][4][5][6]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to the SVR; public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[7][8] Industry reporting also referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, StellarParticle, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[9][10][11][12][13][14]

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.2
Object version: 1.2
Created: Jan 12, 2021, 16:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 9ffa29e2f9fac675...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.2	Aug 6, 2026, 02:58 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`9ffa29e2f9fa…`
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Apr 16, 2025, 20:38 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Older bundle	`9ffa29e2f9fa…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021
CrowdStrike Intelligence Team. (2021, January 11). SUNSPOT: An Implant in the Build Process. Retrieved January 11, 2021.
Open source URL
[2]
SUNSPOT
(Citation: CrowdStrike SUNSPOT Implant January 2021)
[3]
mitre-attackS0562
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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