T1575: Native API
Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.
The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.[1]
Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.[2]
Security context for executives and security teams
Native API matters because Android apps can move sensitive or malicious logic into native C/C++ code through the NDK and JNI, making behavior harder to review than ordinary Android SDK or Java-layer activity. For leaders, the practical issue is not that native code is inherently bad; it is that mobile app vetting, SOC triage, and incident response may miss risky behavior if they only inspect higher-level app logic.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where Android devices are part of executive, workforce, regulated, or operational workflows. The ATT&CK relationships tie this technique to multiple Android malware families, including banking trojans, surveillanceware, ad fraud, backdoors, and cloaking-heavy malware, so mobile security programs should be able to prove how they review apps that use native code and how they respond when such apps appear on managed devices. This is also useful audit evidence for mobile application governance and BYOD/managed-device risk decisions.
Technical view
For SOC, detection engineering, and IR teams, validate Android-focused coverage for apps that include native functions invoked through JNI or NDK-built components. Because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for T1575, coverage should be tested through app-vetting outputs, mobile device telemetry, and any available detection strategy content for DET0717. Treat native API usage as a risk signal requiring context, not a standalone malicious indicator, because legitimate Android applications also use native code for performance or compatibility.
Likely telemetry
- Android application inventory and package metadata from managed devices
- Mobile app-vetting or static-analysis results identifying NDK/JNI/native-library use
- Runtime execution telemetry showing app behavior below the normal Android SDK layer, where available
- Mobile threat defense, EDR, or malware alerts associated with suspicious Android applications
- Application install source, signing, version, and update history
Detection direction
- Confirm whether mobile app-vetting tools inspect native code paths rather than only Java or manifest-level behavior.
- Tune detections so native API usage increases scrutiny but does not automatically create high-severity alerts without suspicious behavior or app-risk context.
- Review DET0717, where available, to understand what it actually detects and what telemetry it requires.
- Correlate native-code findings with app provenance, requested capabilities, unusual runtime behavior, and known malicious software relationships such as Bread, CarbonSteal, Asacub, HenBox, TERRACOTTA, CHEMISTGAMES, Chameleon, LightSpy, GodFather, and DocSwap.
- Document blind spots where Android devices are unmanaged, app vetting is not enforced, or native components cannot be analyzed by existing tools.
Mitigation priorities
- Require review of Android applications that use NDK/JNI native code, especially before approving apps for managed or sensitive-user devices.
- Maintain an approved application inventory and investigate unexpected apps or updates that introduce native components.
- Use mobile security controls and incident response procedures that can collect app packages and device context for deeper analysis.
- Apply risk-based restrictions for untrusted or unreviewed applications on devices used for privileged, executive, financial, or regulated workflows.
- Capture evidence of app review, mobile policy enforcement, and exception handling for compliance and governance needs.
Additional notes and limits
The object is an Android mobile ATT&CK technique with no specified tactics and no official detection text. Its significance is supported by ATT&CK relationships to multiple malware/software entries and one detection strategy, but local defensive value depends on whether the organization manages Android devices and performs meaningful mobile app analysis.
This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK fields, external references, and relationships. It does not establish current exploitation, customer exposure, attribution, or guaranteed detection coverage. One related campaign, Operation Triangulation, is described as iOS-focused while the technique platform is Android, so platform-specific conclusions should rely on the official technique platform and local evidence.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Native API
Adversaries may use Android’s Native Development Kit (NDK) to write native functions that can achieve execution of binaries or functions. Like system calls on a traditional desktop operating system, native code achieves execution on a lower level than normal Android SDK calls.
The NDK allows developers to write native code in C or C++ that is compiled directly to machine code, avoiding all intermediate languages and steps in compilation that higher level languages, like Java, typically have. The Java Native Interface (JNI) is the component that allows Java functions in the Android app to call functions in a native library.[1]
Adversaries may also choose to use native functions to execute malicious code since native actions are typically much more difficult to analyze than standard, non-native behaviors.[2]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Groups, software, and campaigns
S1083: Chameleon
Chameleon is an Android banking trojan that can leverage Android’s Accessibility Services to perform malicious activities. Believed to have been first active in January 2023, Chameleon has been observed targeting users in Australia and Poland by masquerading as official applications. A new variant of Chameleon has expanded its targets to include Android users in the United Kingdom and Italy.[1][2]
S0545: TERRACOTTA
TERRACOTTA is an ad fraud botnet that has been capable of generating over 2 billion fraudulent requests per week.[1]
S9005: DocSwap
DocSwap is an Android malware first identified in 2025, and attributed to Kimsuky. DocSwap’s name is a combination of its Korean name “문서열람 인증 앱” (Document Viewing Authentication App) and a phishing page masquerading as CoinSwap at the C2 address. Based on DocSwap’s name and Korean-language strings, DocSwap potentially targets mobile device users in South Korea. Several variants of DocSwap exist; one of the latest samples indicates that the adversary added a native decryption function that decrypts an internal APK.[1][2]
S0544: HenBox
S1231: GodFather
GodFather is an Android banking malware that uses virtualization to mimic legitimate applications and abuses accessibility services and other permissions to evade detection and exfiltrate sensitive data. First identified in 2020, GodFather targets nearly 500 banking applications, cryptocurrency wallets, and exchanges worldwide; however, its virtualization-based attacks have primarily focused on several Turkish financial institutions. This capability enables threat actors to steal banking credentials and other sensitive account information. [1][2]
S0540: Asacub
S0529: CarbonSteal
CarbonSteal is one of a family of four surveillanceware tools that share a common C2 infrastructure. CarbonSteal primarily deals with audio surveillance. [1]
S0555: CHEMISTGAMES
CHEMISTGAMES is a modular backdoor that has been deployed by Sandworm Team.[1]
S0432: Bread
Bread was a large-scale billing fraud malware family known for employing many different cloaking and obfuscation techniques in an attempt to continuously evade Google Play Store’s malware detection. 1,700 unique Bread apps were detected and removed from the Google Play Store before being downloaded by users.[1]
S1185: LightSpy
First observed in 2018, LightSpy is a modular malware family that initially targeted iOS devices in Southern Asia before expanding to Android and macOS platforms. It consists of a downloader, a main executable that manages network communications, and functionality-specific modules, typically implemented as `.dylib` files (iOS, macOS) or `.apk` files (Android). LightSpy can collect VoIP call recordings, SMS messages, and credential stores, which are then exfiltrated to a command and control (C2) server.[1]
C0054: Operation Triangulation
Operation Triangulation is a mobile campaign targeting iOS devices.[1] The unidentified actors used zero-click exploits in iMessage attachments to gain Initial Access, then executed exploits and validators, such as Binary Validator before finally executing the TriangleDB implant.
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 5dbaa699e30e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Google NDK Getting Started
Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness
M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]ThreatFabric_Chameleon_Dec2023
ThreatFabric. (2023, December 21). Android Banking Trojan Chameleon can now bypass any Biometric Authentication. Retrieved July 7, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]WhiteOps TERRACOTTA
Satori Threat Intelligence and Research Team. (2020, August). TERRACOTTA Android Malware: A Technical Study. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]EnkiWhiteHat_KimsukyDOCSWAP_Dec2025
EnkiWhiteHat. (2025, December 16). Kimsuky Distributing Malicious Mobile App via QR Code. Retrieved January 8, 2026.
Open source URL - [6]Palo Alto HenBox
A. Hinchliffe, M. Harbison, J. Miller-Osborn, et al. (2018, March 13). HenBox: The Chickens Come Home to Roost. Retrieved September 9, 2019.
Open source URL - [7]ZimperiumOrtegaPratapagiri_GodFather_Jun2025
Ortega, F. Pratapagiri, V. (2025, June 18). Your Mobile App, Their Playground: The Dark Side of Virtualization. Retrieved July 16, 2025.
Open source URL - [8]Securelist Asacub
T. Shishkova. (2018, August 28). The rise of mobile banker Asacub. Retrieved December 14, 2020.
Open source URL - [9]Lookout Uyghur Campaign
A. Kumar, K. Del Rosso, J. Albrecht, C. Hebeisen. (2020, June 1). Mobile APT Surveillance Campaigns Targeting Uyghurs - A collection of long-running Android tooling connected to a Chinese mAPT actor. Retrieved November 10, 2020.
Open source URL - [10]CYBERWARCON CHEMISTGAMES
B. Leonard, N. Mehta. (2019, November 21). The Secret Life of Sandworms. Retrieved December 31, 2020.
Open source URL - [11]SecureList OpTriangulation 23Oct2023
Kucherin, G., et al. (2023, October 23). The outstanding stealth of Operation Triangulation. Retrieved April 18, 2024.
Open source URL - [12]SecureList OpTriangulation Dec2023
Larin, B. (2023, December 27). Operation Triangulation: The last (hardware) mystery. Retrieved April 18, 2024.
Open source URL - [13]Google Bread
A. Guertin, V. Kotov, Android Security & Privacy Team. (2020, January 9). PHA Family Highlights: Bread (and Friends) . Retrieved April 27, 2020.
Open source URL - [14]Threatfabric LightSpy 2023
ThreatFabric. (2023, October 2). LightSpy mAPT Mobile Payment System Attack. Retrieved January 17, 2025.
Open source URL - [15]MelikovBlackBerry LightSpy 2024
Melikov, D. (2024, April 11). LightSpy Returns: Renewed Espionage Campaign Targets Southern Asia, Possibly India. Retrieved January 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [16]LinkedIn Dmitry LightSpy 2025
Dmitry Bestuzhev. (2025, April 7). The Coordinated Kill Switch: LightSpy's iOS Destructive Plugin Architecture Manages Device Disablement. Retrieved April 14, 2025.
Open source URL - [17]Threatfabric LightSpy 2024
ThreatFabric. (2024, October 29). LightSpy: Implant for iOS. Retrieved January 30, 2025.
Open source URL - [18]Google NDK Getting Started
Google. (2019, December 27). Getting Started with the NDK. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [19]MITRE App Vetting Effectiveness
M. Peck, C. Northern. (2016, August 22). Analyzing the Effectiveness of App Vetting Tools in the Enterprise. Retrieved April 28, 2020.
Open source URL - [20]mitre-attackT1575Open source URL
- [21]mitre-attackT1575Open source URL
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