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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1637.001: Domain Generation Algorithms

Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for uses such as command and control communication or malicious application distribution.[1]

DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there could potentially be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.

MobileT1637.001Sub-techniqueObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

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Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Domain Generation Algorithms

Adversaries may use Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to procedurally generate domain names for uses such as command and control communication or malicious application distribution.[1]

DGAs increase the difficulty for defenders to block, track, or take over the command and control channel, as there could potentially be thousands of domains that malware can check for instructions.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
MobileT1520Domain Generation AlgorithmsDomain Generation Algorithms revoked by this object.
MobileT1637Dynamic ResolutionThis object subtechnique of Dynamic Resolution.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareMobile

S0411: Rotexy

Rotexy is an Android banking malware that has evolved over several years. It was originally an SMS spyware Trojan first spotted in October 2014, and since then has evolved to contain more features, including ransomware functionality.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S0485: Mandrake

Mandrake is a sophisticated Android espionage platform that has been active in the wild since at least 2016. Mandrake is very actively maintained, with sophisticated features and attacks that are executed with surgical precision.

Mandrake has gone undetected for several years by providing legitimate, ad-free applications with social media and real reviews to back the apps. The malware is only activated when the operators issue a specific command.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1055: SharkBot

SharkBot is a banking malware, first discovered in October 2021, that tries to initiate money transfers directly from compromised devices by abusing Accessibility Services.[1]

Android
MalwareMobile

S1067: FluBot

FluBot is a multi-purpose mobile banking malware that was first observed in Spain in late 2020. It primarily spread through European countries using a variety of SMS phishing messages in multiple languages.[1][2] An international law enforcement operation of 11 countries eventually disrupted the spread of FluBot.[3]

Android
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
424dad63184682b5...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.1Current bundle424dad631846…
19.11.1Older bundle424dad631846…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    securelist rotexy 2018

    T. Shishkova, L. Pikman. (2018, November 22). The Rotexy mobile Trojan – banker and ransomware. Retrieved September 23, 2019.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Data Driven Security DGA

    Jacobs, J. (2014, October 2). Building a DGA Classifier: Part 2, Feature Engineering. Retrieved February 18, 2019.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attackT1637.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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