G0081: Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0081: Tropic Trooper describes [Tropic Trooper](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081) is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. [Tropic Trooper](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0081) focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020)
Executive priority
G0081: Tropic Trooper is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0081: Tropic Trooper by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0081: Tropic Trooper appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Tropic Trooper
Tropic Trooper is an unaffiliated threat group that has led targeted campaigns against targets in Taiwan, the Philippines, and Hong Kong. Tropic Trooper focuses on targeting government, healthcare, transportation, and high-tech industries and has been active since 2011.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has installed a service pointing to a malicious DLL dropped to disk.CitationPWC KeyBoys Feb 2017 |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has deleted dropper files on an infected system using command scripts.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | Tropic Trooper sent spearphishing emails that contained malicious Microsoft Office and fake installer file attachments.[2]CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015CitationCitizenLab Tropic Trooper Aug 2018CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020[3] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Tropic Trooper has used a delivered trojan to download additional files.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | Tropic Trooper is capable of enumerating the running processes on the system using |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has lured victims into executing malware via malicious e-mail attachments.CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1573 | Encrypted Channel | Tropic Trooper has encrypted traffic with the C2 to prevent network detection.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has used HTTP in communication with the C2.CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020[3] |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has created a hidden directory under |
| Enterprise | T1221 | Template Injection | Tropic Trooper delivered malicious documents with the XLSX extension, typically used by OpenXML documents, but the file itself was actually an OLE (XLS) document.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | Tropic Trooper used |
| Enterprise | T1046 | Network Service Discovery | Tropic Trooper used |
| Enterprise | T1016 | System Network Configuration Discovery | Tropic Trooper has used scripts to collect the host's network topology.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1052.001 | Exfiltration over USBSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has exfiltrated data using USB storage devices.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has created shortcuts in the Startup folder to establish persistence.CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020[3] |
| Enterprise | T1505.003 | Web ShellSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has started a web service in the target host and wait for the adversary to connect, acting as a web shell.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1573.002 | Asymmetric CryptographySub-technique | Tropic Trooper has used SSL to connect to C2 servers.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has used Windows command scripts.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | Tropic Trooper has used multiple Windows APIs including HttpInitialize, HttpCreateHttpHandle, and HttpAddUrl.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has been known to side-load DLLs using a valid version of a Windows Address Book and Windows Defender executable with one of their tools.CitationCitizenLab KeyBoy Nov 2016CitationAnomali Pirate Panda April 2020 |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | Tropic Trooper has monitored files' modified time.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has encrypted configuration files.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1036.005 | Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has hidden payloads in Flash directories and fake installer files.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1132.001 | Standard EncodingSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has used base64 encoding to hide command strings delivered from the C2.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local AccountsSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has used known administrator account credentials to execute the backdoor directly.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1680 | Local Storage Discovery | Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s system volume information.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015[3] |
| Enterprise | T1547.004 | Winlogon Helper DLLSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has created the Registry key |
| Enterprise | T1203 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Tropic Trooper has executed commands through Microsoft security vulnerabilities, including CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2012-0158.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1071.004 | DNSSub-technique | Tropic Trooper's backdoor has communicated to the C2 over the DNS protocol.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1119 | Automated Collection | Tropic Trooper has collected information automatically using the adversary's USBferry attack.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1055.001 | Dynamic-link Library InjectionSub-technique | Tropic Trooper has injected a DLL backdoor into dllhost.exe and svchost.exe.[1][3] |
| Enterprise | T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | Tropic Trooper has used a copy function to automatically exfiltrate sensitive data from air-gapped systems using USB storage.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1135 | Network Share Discovery | Tropic Trooper used |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | Tropic Trooper has detected a target system’s OS version.CitationTrendMicro TropicTrooper 2015[3] |
| Enterprise | T1518.001 | Security Software DiscoverySub-technique | Tropic Trooper can search for anti-virus software running on the system.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | Tropic Trooper used shellcode with an XOR algorithm to decrypt a payload. Tropic Trooper also decrypted image files which contained a payload.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1049 | System Network Connections Discovery | Tropic Trooper has tested if the localhost network is available and other connection capability on an infected system using command scripts.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1027.003 | SteganographySub-technique | Tropic Trooper has used JPG files with encrypted payloads to mask their backdoor routines and evade detection.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1518 | Software Discovery | Tropic Trooper's backdoor could list the infected system's installed software.[3] |
| Enterprise | T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | Tropic Trooper has attempted to transfer USBferry from an infected USB device by copying an Autorun function to the target machine.[3] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0452: USBferry
USBferry is an information stealing malware and has been used by Tropic Trooper in targeted attacks against Taiwanese and Philippine air-gapped military environments. USBferry shares an overlapping codebase with YAHOYAH, though it has several features which makes it a distinct piece of malware.[1]
S0596: ShadowPad
S0012: PoisonIvy
S0190: BITSAdmin
S0388: YAHOYAH
YAHOYAH is a Trojan used by Tropic Trooper as a second-stage backdoor.[1]
S0387: KeyBoy
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.6 | Current bundle | 8295ca476355… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.6 | Older bundle | 4dc7c4354ca7… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018
Horejsi, J., et al. (2018, March 14). Tropic Trooper’s New Strategy. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
Open source URL - [2]Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016
Ray, V. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved November 9, 2018.
Open source URL - [3]TrendMicro Tropic Trooper May 2020
Chen, J.. (2020, May 12). Tropic Trooper’s Back: USBferry Attack Targets Air gapped Environments. Retrieved May 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]Crowdstrike Pirate Panda April 2020
Busselen, M. (2020, April 7). On-demand Webcast: CrowdStrike Experts on COVID-19 Cybersecurity Challenges and Recommendations. Retrieved May 20, 2020.
Open source URL - [5]KeyBoy
(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)
- [6]Pirate Panda
(Citation: Crowdstrike Pirate Panda April 2020)
- [7]Tropic Trooper
(Citation: TrendMicro Tropic Trooper Mar 2018)(Citation: Unit 42 Tropic Trooper Nov 2016)
- [8]mitre-attackG0081Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.
