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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0001: Axiom

Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseG0001GroupObject v2.0Modified
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Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

G0001: Axiom describes [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) and [Winnti Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0044) but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti April 2013)(Citation: Kaspersky Winnti...

Executive priority

G0001: Axiom is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate G0001: Axiom by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata

Detection direction

  • Validate whether G0001: Axiom appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Axiom

Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

16 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Axiom has collected data from a compromised network.[4]

EnterpriseT1560Archive Collected Data

Axiom has compressed and encrypted data prior to exfiltration.[4]

EnterpriseT1584.005BotnetSub-technique

Axiom has used large groups of compromised machines for use as proxy nodes.[4]

EnterpriseT1189Drive-by Compromise

Axiom has used watering hole attacks to gain access.[5]

EnterpriseT1553Subvert Trust Controls

Axiom has used digital certificates to deliver malware.[4]

EnterpriseT1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolSub-technique

Axiom has used RDP during operations.[4]

EnterpriseT1583.002DNS ServerSub-technique

Axiom has acquired dynamic DNS services for use in the targeting of intended victims.[4]

EnterpriseT1203Exploitation for Client Execution

Axiom has used exploits for multiple vulnerabilities including CVE-2014-0322, CVE-2012-4792, CVE-2012-1889, and CVE-2013-3893.[5]

EnterpriseT1078Valid Accounts

Axiom has used previously compromised administrative accounts to escalate privileges.[4]

EnterpriseT1583.003Virtual Private ServerSub-technique

Axiom has used VPS hosting providers in targeting of intended victims.[4]

EnterpriseT1563.002RDP HijackingSub-technique

Axiom has targeted victims with remote administration tools including RDP.[4]

EnterpriseT1546.008Accessibility FeaturesSub-technique

Axiom actors have been known to use the Sticky Keys replacement within RDP sessions to obtain persistence.[4]

EnterpriseT1566Phishing

Axiom has used spear phishing to initially compromise victims.[5][4]

EnterpriseT1190Exploit Public-Facing Application

Axiom has been observed using SQL injection to gain access to systems.[4][5]

EnterpriseT1001.002SteganographySub-technique

Axiom has used steganography to hide its C2 communications.[4]

EnterpriseT1003OS Credential Dumping

Axiom has been known to dump credentials.[4]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S0412: ZxShell

ZxShell is a remote administration tool and backdoor that can be downloaded from the Internet, particularly from Chinese hacker websites. It has been used since at least 2004.[1][2]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1005: Data from Local SystemEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0412: ZxShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1560: Archive Collected DataEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1584.005: BotnetEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1189: Drive-by CompromiseEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0032: gh0st RATEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0672: ZoxEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0013: PlugXEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1553: Subvert Trust ControlsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.001: Remote Desktop ProtocolEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.002: DNS ServerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1203: Exploitation for Client ExecutionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078: Valid AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1583.003: Virtual Private ServerEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1563.002: RDP HijackingEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0009: HikitEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0012: PoisonIvyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1546.008: Accessibility FeaturesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1566: PhishingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1190: Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0021: DerusbiEnterpriseuses · MalwareS0203: HydraqEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1001.002: SteganographyEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1003: OS Credential DumpingEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
b2ac762711721f28...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.22.0Current bundleb2ac76271172…
19.12.0Older bundlefff1b950ef2e…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky Winnti April 2013

    Kaspersky Lab's Global Research and Analysis Team. (2013, April 11). Winnti. More than just a game. Retrieved February 8, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Kaspersky Winnti June 2015

    Tarakanov, D. (2015, June 22). Games are over: Winnti is now targeting pharmaceutical companies. Retrieved January 14, 2016.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Novetta Winnti April 2015

    Novetta Threat Research Group. (2015, April 7). Winnti Analysis. Retrieved February 8, 2017.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Novetta-Axiom

    Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Cisco Group 72

    Esler, J., Lee, M., and Williams, C. (2014, October 14). Threat Spotlight: Group 72. Retrieved January 14, 2016.

  6. [6]
    Axiom

    (Citation: Novetta-Axiom)

  7. [7]
    Group 72

    (Citation: Cisco Group 72)

  8. [8]
    mitre-attackG0001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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