T1547.014: Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.[1] These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.[2][3][4][5][6]
Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1547.014: Active Setup describes Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.(Citation: Klein Active Setup 2010) These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level. Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsof...
Executive priority
T1547.014: Active Setup is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1547.014: Active Setup by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Identity, privilege, and authentication events
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1547.014: Active Setup appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Active Setup
Adversaries may achieve persistence by adding a Registry key to the Active Setup of the local machine. Active Setup is a Windows mechanism that is used to execute programs when a user logs in. The value stored in the Registry key will be executed after a user logs into the computer.[1] These programs will be executed under the context of the user and will have the account's associated permissions level.
Adversaries may abuse Active Setup by creating a key under HKLM\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Active Setup\Installed Components\ and setting a malicious value for StubPath. This value will serve as the program that will be executed when a user logs into the computer.[2][3][4][5][6]
Adversaries can abuse these components to execute malware, such as remote access tools, to maintain persistence through system reboots. Adversaries may also use Masquerading to make the Registry entries look as if they are associated with legitimate programs.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1547 | Boot or Logon Autostart Execution | This object subtechnique of Boot or Logon Autostart Execution. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0012: PoisonIvy
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | d4c5c14e8e44… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | d4c5c14e8e44… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Klein Active Setup 2010
Klein, H. (2010, April 22). Active Setup Explained. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Mandiant Glyer APT 2010
Glyer, C. (2010). Examples of Recent APT Persistence Mechanism. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [3]Citizenlab Packrat 2015
Scott-Railton, J., et al. (2015, December 8). Packrat. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [4]FireEye CFR Watering Hole 2012
Kindlund, D. (2012, December 30). CFR Watering Hole Attack Details. Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]SECURELIST Bright Star 2015
Baumgartner, K., Guerrero-Saade, J. (2015, March 4). Who’s Really Spreading through the Bright Star?. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [6]paloalto Tropic Trooper 2016
Ray, V., et al. (2016, November 22). Tropic Trooper Targets Taiwanese Government and Fossil Fuel Provider With Poison Ivy. Retrieved December 18, 2020.
Open source URL - [7]TechNet Autoruns
Russinovich, M. (2016, January 4). Autoruns for Windows v13.51. Retrieved June 6, 2016.
Open source URL - [8]mitre-attackT1547.014Open source URL
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