G0136: IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.[1][2][3]
Security context for executives and security teams
G0136: IndigoZebra describes [IndigoZebra](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0136) is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
Executive priority
G0136: IndigoZebra is an official MITRE ATT&CK group. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate G0136: IndigoZebra by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether G0136: IndigoZebra appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
IndigoZebra
IndigoZebra is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has been targeting Central Asian governments since at least 2014.[1][2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1583.001 | DomainsSub-technique | IndigoZebra has established domains, some of which were designed to look like official government domains, for their operations.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1588.002 | ToolSub-technique | IndigoZebra has acquired open source tools such as NBTscan and Meterpreter for their operations.[2][3] |
| Enterprise | T1583.006 | Web ServicesSub-technique | IndigoZebra created Dropbox accounts for their operations.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1586.002 | Email AccountsSub-technique | IndigoZebra has compromised legitimate email accounts to use in their spearphishing operations.[2] |
| Enterprise | T1566.001 | Spearphishing AttachmentSub-technique | IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious password-protected RAR attachments.[1][2] |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | IndigoZebra sent spearphishing emails containing malicious attachments that urged recipients to review modifications in the file which would trigger the attack.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | IndigoZebra has downloaded additional files and tools from its C2 server.[2] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0653: xCaon
S0651: BoxCaon
BoxCaon is a Windows backdoor that was used by IndigoZebra in a 2021 spearphishing campaign against Afghan government officials. BoxCaon's name stems from similarities shared with the malware family xCaon.[1]
S0012: PoisonIvy
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b438ad5083e7… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | 5c5a342ca13e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021
Lakshmanan, R.. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT Hacking Campaign Targets the Afghan Government. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021
CheckPoint Research. (2021, July 1). IndigoZebra APT continues to attack Central Asia with evolving tools. Retrieved September 24, 2021.
Open source URL - [3]Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017
Kaspersky Lab's Global Research & Analysis Team. (2017, August 8). APT Trends report Q2 2017. Retrieved February 15, 2018.
Open source URL - [4]IndigoZebra
(Citation: HackerNews IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Checkpoint IndigoZebra July 2021)(Citation: Securelist APT Trends Q2 2017)
- [5]mitre-attackG0136Open source URL
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