S1191: Megazord
Security context for executives and security teams
S1191: Megazord describes [Megazord](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1191) is a Rust-based variant of [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1129) ransomware that has been in use since at least August 2023 to target Windows environments. [Megazord](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1191) has been attributed to the [Akira](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G1024) group based on overlapping infrastructure though is possibly not exclusive to the group.(Citation: CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024)(Citation: Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024)(C...
Executive priority
S1191: Megazord is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S1191: Megazord by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S1191: Megazord appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Megazord
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1489 | Service Stop | |
| Enterprise | T1654 | Log Enumeration | |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | |
| Enterprise | T1083 | File and Directory Discovery |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G1024: Akira
Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.[1] Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.[1][2] Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.[3][4][5]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | eff199b0c818… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | eff199b0c818… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CISA Akira Ransomware APR 2024
CISA et al. (2024, April 18). #StopRansomware: Akira Ransomware. Retrieved December 10, 2024.
Open source URL - [2]Cisco Akira Ransomware OCT 2024
Nutland, J. and Szeliga, M. (2024, October 21). Akira ransomware continues to evolve. Retrieved December 10, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]Palo Alto Howling Scorpius DEC 2024
Zemah, Y. (2024, December 2). Threat Assessment: Howling Scorpius (Akira Ransomware). Retrieved January 8, 2025.
Open source URL - [4]mitre-attackS1191Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.