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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1213.002: Sharepoint

Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:

* Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials) * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources

EnterpriseT1213.002Sub-techniqueObject v1.1Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

SharePoint is often where organizations centralize the information an intruder wants after gaining access: policies, architecture diagrams, network links, project schedules, code snippets, and sometimes development credentials. The business risk is not just document theft; it is that ordinary collaboration content can help an adversary understand the environment, identify sensitive systems, and plan follow-on activity using legitimate access patterns.

Executive priority

Treat SharePoint as a high-value information repository, not just a productivity platform. Leaders should ask whether sensitive technical documentation and credentials are governed, whether least-privilege access is enforced, and whether audit evidence exists to show who accessed or mined critical sites. This is especially relevant for IAM governance, compliance readiness, incident scoping, and prioritizing controls around collaboration platforms that may expose operational or cyber-physical documentation.

Technical view

T1213.002 is a collection sub-technique under Data from Information Repositories and applies to Office Suite and Windows contexts. ATT&CK provides no official detection text, but the related detection strategy DET0500 points defenders toward abnormal SharePoint data mining by privileged or rare users. SOC and IR teams should validate SharePoint audit logging, user access patterns, unusual bulk viewing or downloading, rare-user access to sensitive sites, and access to content categories called out by ATT&CK such as network diagrams, system documentation, links to internal resources, source code snippets, and credentials.

Likely telemetry

  • SharePoint site collection audit logs and audit settings
  • User and account access records for SharePoint sites and document libraries
  • File access, view, download, modification, and sharing events where available
  • Privileged-user and rare-user activity against sensitive SharePoint locations
  • Access to documents containing technical diagrams, procedures, internal links, source snippets, or credential-like material

Detection direction

  • Validate that SharePoint auditing is enabled for sensitive site collections and that logs are retained long enough to support incident response and compliance evidence.
  • Tune for abnormal data mining patterns, especially privileged accounts or users who rarely access a site but suddenly enumerate, view, or download many files.
  • Prioritize detections around sensitive repositories containing architecture, network, system, project, source-code, or credential-related information.
  • Correlate SharePoint activity with user role, account status, and access history to reduce false positives from legitimate administrators, project transitions, audits, or migrations.
  • Use relationship context carefully: ATT&CK lists multiple groups, a campaign, and tools associated with this technique, but local detection should be behavior-led rather than attribution-led.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with auditing: ensure SharePoint activity logging is configured, reviewed, and usable for investigation.
  • Apply user account management and least privilege so users only retain access to repositories required for their role.
  • Review sensitive SharePoint content for credentials, source snippets, internal links, and technical documentation that should be restricted or removed.
  • Use user training to reduce unsafe storage and sharing of sensitive operational, technical, or credential material in collaboration spaces.
  • Periodically test whether SOC and IR teams can answer: which user accessed which sensitive SharePoint content, when, from what account context, and whether that access was expected.
Additional notes and limits

This object has no official ATT&CK detection guidance, so the take relies on the official description, the Microsoft SharePoint logging reference, mitigation relationships, and DET0500’s named detection strategy. Relationship context includes use by C0027, Ke3chang, APT28, Chimera, HAFNIUM, LAPSUS$, Akira, VOID MANTICORE, and software such as spwebmember and TruffleHog; this supports prioritizing SharePoint mining as a broadly relevant behavior, not making any claim about current activity in a specific environment.

Local SharePoint architecture, licensing, audit configuration, retention, permissions model, and content classification are required to determine actual exposure and coverage. ATT&CK does not provide detailed detection logic for this object, and the supplied fields do not support claims of guaranteed detection, active exploitation, or organization-specific impact.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Sharepoint

Adversaries may leverage the SharePoint repository as a source to mine valuable information. SharePoint will often contain useful information for an adversary to learn about the structure and functionality of the internal network and systems. For example, the following is a list of example information that may hold potential value to an adversary and may also be found on SharePoint:

* Policies, procedures, and standards * Physical / logical network diagrams * System architecture diagrams * Technical system documentation * Testing / development credentials (i.e., Unsecured Credentials) * Work / project schedules * Source code snippets * Links to network shares and other internal resources

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1213Data from Information RepositoriesThis object subtechnique of Data from Information Repositories.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G1024: Akira

Akira is a ransomware variant and ransomware deployment entity active since at least March 2023.[1] Akira uses compromised credentials to access single-factor external access mechanisms such as VPNs for initial access, then various publicly-available tools and techniques for lateral movement.[1][2] Akira operations are associated with "double extortion" ransomware activity, where data is exfiltrated from victim environments prior to encryption, with threats to publish files if a ransom is not paid. Technical analysis of Akira ransomware indicates variants capable of targeting Windows or VMWare ESXi hypervisors and multiple overlaps with Conti ransomware.[3][4][5]

GroupEnterprise

G0125: HAFNIUM

HAFNIUM is a likely state-sponsored cyber espionage group operating out of China that has been active since at least January 2021. HAFNIUM primarily targets entities in the US across a number of industry sectors, including infectious disease researchers, law firms, higher education institutions, defense contractors, policy think tanks, and NGOs. HAFNIUM has targeted remote management tools and cloud software for intial access and has demonstrated an ability to quickly operationalize exploits for identified vulnerabilities in edge devices.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G1004: LAPSUS$

LAPSUS$ is cyber criminal threat group that has been active since at least mid-2021. LAPSUS$ specializes in large-scale social engineering and extortion operations, including destructive attacks without the use of ransomware. The group has targeted organizations globally, including in the government, manufacturing, higher education, energy, healthcare, technology, telecommunications, and media sectors.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0114: Chimera

Chimera is a suspected China-based threat group that has been active since at least 2018 targeting the semiconductor industry in Taiwan as well as data from the airline industry.[1][2]

GroupEnterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

GroupEnterprise

G1055: VOID MANTICORE

VOID MANTICORE is a threat group assessed to operate on behalf of Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS).[1] Active since at least mid-2022, VOID MANTICORE has targeted government entities, critical infrastructure, and private sector organizations across Albania, Israel, and the United States.[1][2] VOID MANTICORE conducts destructive cyber operations, combining wiper attacks with hack-and-leak campaigns. The group has operated under multiple public-facing personas, including HomeLand Justice in operations against Albania, Karma and Karma Below in campaigns targeting Israeli organizations, and Handala Hack, its current primary persona, which has claimed activity against Israeli and U.S. entities, including a March 2026 attack against Stryker Corporation.[1][3] VOID MANTICORE has been observed collaborating with Scarred Manticore, which has been linked to initial access operations preceding VOID MANTICORE’s activity.[4]

GroupEnterprise

G0004: Ke3chang

Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.[1][2][3][4]

ToolEnterprise

S9009: TruffleHog

TruffleHog is an open-source secrets-discovery tool that is used to search for credentials, API keys, and encryption keys across a variety of data sources and environments.[1][2] TruffleHog has the ability to discover credentials and secrets stored in code repositories, git history, CI/CD pipelines, among other common storage locations to include filesystems and cloud storage buckets.[1][3][2] TruffleHog was first released by its author in 2016.[2]

IaaSLinuxSaaS
CampaignEnterprise

C0027: C0027

C0027 was a financially-motivated campaign linked to Scattered Spider that targeted telecommunications and business process outsourcing (BPO) companies from at least June through December of 2022. During C0027 Scattered Spider used various forms of social engineering, performed SIM swapping, and attempted to leverage access from victim environments to mobile carrier networks.[1]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.1
Created
Modified
Raw hash
f9918db27953660a...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.1Current bundlef9918db27953…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Secureworks GOLD SAHARA

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022

    MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    NCC Group LAPSUS Apr 2022

    Brown, D., et al. (2022, April 28). LAPSUS$: Recent techniques, tactics and procedures. Retrieved December 22, 2022.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong

    Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    NCC Group Chimera January 2021

    Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    RSAC 2015 Abu Dhabi Stefano Maccaglia

    Maccaglia, S. (2015, November 4). Evolving Threats: dissection of a CyberEspionage attack. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022

    Parisi, T. (2022, December 2). Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO Companies. Retrieved June 30, 2023.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026

    DOJ/FBI. (2026, March 19). Case 1:26-mj-00683-CDA: Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant: In the Matter of the Seizure of Domain Names Justicehomeland[.]org; karmabelow80[.]org; handala-hack[.]to; and handala-redwatned[.]to. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Microsoft SharePoint Logging

    Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    Microsoft SharePoint Logging

    Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Microsoft SharePoint Logging

    Microsoft. (2017, July 19). Configure audit settings for a site collection. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    mitre-attackT1213.002
    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    mitre-attackT1213.002
    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    mitre-attackT1213.002
    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Github TruffleSecurity Trufflehog April 2025

    Trufflesecurity. (2026, April 8). TruffleHog Enterprise. Retrieved April 15, 2026.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    Secureworks GOLD SAHARA

    Secureworks. (n.d.). GOLD SAHARA. Retrieved February 20, 2024.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Microsoft Silk Typhoon MAR 2025

    Microsoft Threat Intelligence . (2025, March 5). Silk Typhoon targeting IT supply chain. Retrieved March 20, 2025.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    MSTIC DEV-0537 Mar 2022

    MSTIC, DART, M365 Defender. (2022, March 24). DEV-0537 Criminal Actor Targeting Organizations for Data Exfiltration and Destruction. Retrieved May 17, 2022.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    NCC Group LAPSUS Apr 2022

    Brown, D., et al. (2022, April 28). LAPSUS$: Recent techniques, tactics and procedures. Retrieved December 22, 2022.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong

    Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    NCC Group Chimera January 2021

    Jansen, W . (2021, January 12). Abusing cloud services to fly under the radar. Retrieved September 12, 2024.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    RSAC 2015 Abu Dhabi Stefano Maccaglia

    Maccaglia, S. (2015, November 4). Evolving Threats: dissection of a CyberEspionage attack. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  25. [25]
    Crowdstrike TELCO BPO Campaign December 2022

    Parisi, T. (2022, December 2). Not a SIMulation: CrowdStrike Investigations Reveal Intrusion Campaign Targeting Telco and BPO Companies. Retrieved June 30, 2023.

    Open source URL
  26. [26]
    DOJ FBI Handala Hack March 2026

    DOJ/FBI. (2026, March 19). Case 1:26-mj-00683-CDA: Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant: In the Matter of the Seizure of Domain Names Justicehomeland[.]org; karmabelow80[.]org; handala-hack[.]to; and handala-redwatned[.]to. Retrieved April 20, 2026.

    Open source URL
  27. [27]
    NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong

    Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    NCC Group APT15 Alive and Strong

    Smallridge, R. (2018, March 10). APT15 is alive and strong: An analysis of RoyalCli and RoyalDNS. Retrieved April 4, 2018.

    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.