T1636.001: Calendar Entries
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `EventKit` framework.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access Calendar Entries without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Security context for executives and security teams
T1636.001: Calendar Entries describes Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `EventKit` framework. If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access [Calendar Entries](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1636/001) without the user’s knowledge or approval.
Executive priority
T1636.001: Calendar Entries is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1636.001: Calendar Entries by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1636.001: Calendar Entries appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Calendar Entries
Adversaries may utilize standard operating system APIs to gather calendar entry data. On Android, this can be accomplished using the Calendar Content Provider. On iOS, this can be accomplished using the `EventKit` framework.
If the device has been jailbroken or rooted, an adversary may be able to access Calendar Entries without the user’s knowledge or approval.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1435 | Access Calendar Entries | Access Calendar Entries revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1636 | Protected User Data | This object subtechnique of Protected User Data. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0328: Stealth Mango
Stealth Mango is Android malware that has reportedly been used to successfully compromise the mobile devices of government officials, members of the military, medical professionals, and civilians. The iOS malware known as Tangelo is believed to be from the same developer. [1]
S0405: Exodus
S0407: Monokle
S0316: Pegasus for Android
Pegasus for Android is the Android version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. [1] [2] The iOS version is tracked separately under Pegasus for iOS.
S1082: Sunbird
S0408: FlexiSpy
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | 2fb6a4bde838… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | 2fb6a4bde838… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-13Open source URL
- [2]mitre-attackT1636.001Open source URL
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