S0289: Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS is the iOS version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. It has been advertised and sold to target high-value victims.[1][2] The Android version is tracked separately under Pegasus for Android.
Security context for executives and security teams
S0289: Pegasus for iOS describes [Pegasus for iOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0289) is the iOS version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. It has been advertised and sold to target high-value victims.(Citation: Lookout-Pegasus)(Citation: PegasusCitizenLab) The Android version is tracked separately under [Pegasus for Android](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0316).
Executive priority
S0289: Pegasus for iOS is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0289: Pegasus for iOS by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0289: Pegasus for iOS appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Pegasus for iOS
Pegasus for iOS is the iOS version of malware that has reportedly been linked to the NSO Group. It has been advertised and sold to target high-value victims.[1][2] The Android version is tracked separately under Pegasus for Android.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1636.002 | Call LogSub-technique | Pegasus for iOS captures call logs.[1] |
| Mobile | T1421 | System Network Connections Discovery | Pegasus for iOS monitors the connection state and tracks which types of networks the phone is connected to, potentially to determine the bandwidth and ability to send full data across the network.[1] |
| Mobile | T1644 | Out of Band Data | Pegasus for iOS uses SMS for command and control.[1] |
| Mobile | T1456 | Drive-By Compromise | Pegasus for iOS was distributed through a web site by exploiting vulnerabilities in the Safari web browser on iOS devices.[1] |
| Mobile | T1404 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Pegasus for iOS exploits iOS vulnerabilities to escalate privileges.[1] |
| Mobile | T1645 | Compromise Client Software Binary | Pegasus for iOS modifies the system partition to maintain persistence.[1] |
| Mobile | T1426 | System Information Discovery | Pegasus for iOS monitors the victim for status and disables other access to the phone by other jailbreaking software.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.003 | Contact ListSub-technique | Pegasus for iOS gathers contacts from the system by dumping the victim's address book.[1] |
| Mobile | T1636.004 | SMS MessagesSub-technique | Pegasus for iOS captures SMS messages that the victim sends or receives.[1] |
| Mobile | T1660 | Phishing | Pegasus for iOS has been distributed via malicious links in SMS messages.CitationCitizenLab Great iPwn |
| Mobile | T1430 | Location Tracking | Pegasus for iOS update and sends the location of the phone.[1] |
| Mobile | T1664 | Exploitation for Initial Access | Pegasus for iOS has used zero-day iMessage exploits for initial access.CitationCitizenLab Great iPwn |
| Mobile | T1409 | Stored Application Data | Pegasus for iOS accesses sensitive data in files, such as saving Skype calls by reading them out of the Skype database files.[1] |
| Mobile | T1429 | Audio Capture | Pegasus for iOS has the ability to record audio.[1] |
| Mobile | T1658 | Exploitation for Client Execution | Pegasus for iOS can compromise iPhones running iOS 16.6 without any user interaction.CitationScott-Railton_TheCitizenLab Pegasus Apr2022 |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.2 | Current bundle | bc46eb4fc1d3… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Older bundle | bc46eb4fc1d3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Lookout-Pegasus
Lookout. (2016). Technical Analysis of Pegasus Spyware. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
Open source URL - [2]PegasusCitizenLab
Bill Marczak and John Scott-Railton. (2016, August 24). The Million Dollar Dissident: NSO Group’s iPhone Zero-Days used against a UAE Human Rights Defender. Retrieved December 12, 2016.
Open source URL - [3]Pegasus for iOS
(Citation: Lookout-Pegasus) (Citation: PegasusCitizenLab)
- [4]mitre-attackS0289Open source URL
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