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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0690: Green Lambert

Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.[1][2]

EnterpriseS0690MalwareObject v1.0Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

S0690: Green Lambert describes [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of [Green Lambert](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0690) may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.(Citation: Kaspersky Lamberts Toolkit April 2017)(Citation: Objective See Green Lambert for OSX Oct 2021)

Executive priority

S0690: Green Lambert is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate S0690: Green Lambert by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, iOS, macOS, Linux), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether S0690: Green Lambert appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Green Lambert

Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.[1][2]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

18 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1543.004Launch DaemonSub-technique

Green Lambert can add a plist file in the `Library/LaunchDaemons` to establish persistence.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1555.001KeychainSub-technique

Green Lambert can use Keychain Services API functions to find and collect passwords, such as `SecKeychainFindInternetPassword` and `SecKeychainItemCopyAttributesAndData`.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1082System Information Discovery

Green Lambert can use `uname` to identify the operating system name, version, and processor type.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1071.004DNSSub-technique

Green Lambert can use DNS for C2 communications.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

Green Lambert can use multiple custom routines to decrypt strings prior to execution.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Green Lambert can obtain proxy information from a victim's machine using system environment variables.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1090Proxy

Green Lambert can use proxies for C2 traffic.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1547.015Login ItemsSub-technique

Green Lambert can add Login Items to establish persistence.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1070.004File DeletionSub-technique

Green Lambert can delete the original executable after initial installation in addition to unused functions.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1005Data from Local System

Green Lambert can collect data from a compromised host.[2]

EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Green Lambert has encrypted strings.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1059.004Unix ShellSub-technique

Green Lambert can use shell scripts for execution, such as /bin/sh -c.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1546.004Unix Shell Configuration ModificationSub-technique

Green Lambert can establish persistence on a compromised host through modifying the `profile`, `login`, and run command (rc) files associated with the `bash`, `csh`, and `tcsh` shells. [2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1543.001Launch AgentSub-technique

Green Lambert can create a Launch Agent with the `RunAtLoad` key-value pair set to true, ensuring the `com.apple.GrowlHelper.plist` file runs every time a user logs in.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1037.004RC ScriptsSub-technique

Green Lambert can add init.d and rc.d files in the /etc folder to establish persistence.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceSub-technique

Green Lambert has created a new executable named `Software Update Check` to appear legitimate.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Green Lambert has been disguised as a Growl help file.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

EnterpriseT1124System Time Discovery

Green Lambert can collect the date and time from a compromised host.[2]CitationGlitch-Cat Green Lambert ATTCK Oct 2021

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
20.0
Object version
1.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
57f9d6092e67052f...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(3)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
20.01.0Current bundle57f9d6092e67…
19.21.0Older bundle57f9d6092e67…
19.11.0Older bundle57f9d6092e67…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Kaspersky Lamberts Toolkit April 2017

    GREAT. (2017, April 11). Unraveling the Lamberts Toolkit. Retrieved March 21, 2022.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Objective See Green Lambert for OSX Oct 2021

    Sandvik, Runa. (2021, October 1). Made In America: Green Lambert for OS X. Retrieved March 21, 2022.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Green Lambert

    (Citation: Kaspersky Lamberts Toolkit April 2017)

  4. [4]
    mitre-attackS0690
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.