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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1543.004: Launch Daemon

Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.[4][5]

Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.[6][7]

EnterpriseT1543.004Sub-techniqueObject v1.3Modified
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

T1543.004: Launch Daemon describes Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from pli...

Executive priority

T1543.004: Launch Daemon is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.

Technical view

Security teams should validate T1543.004: Launch Daemon by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (persistence, privilege-escalation), supported platforms (macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.

Likely telemetry

  • Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
  • Identity, privilege, and authentication events
  • Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry

Detection direction

  • Validate whether T1543.004: Launch Daemon appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
  • Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
  • Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.

Mitigation priorities

  • Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
  • Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
  • Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits

Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.

This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Launch Daemon

Adversaries may create or modify Launch Daemons to execute malicious payloads as part of persistence. Launch Daemons are plist files used to interact with Launchd, the service management framework used by macOS. Launch Daemons require elevated privileges to install, are executed for every user on a system prior to login, and run in the background without the need for user interaction. During the macOS initialization startup, the launchd process loads the parameters for launch-on-demand system-level daemons from plist files found in /System/Library/LaunchDaemons/ and /Library/LaunchDaemons/. Required Launch Daemons parameters include a Label to identify the task, Program to provide a path to the executable, and RunAtLoad to specify when the task is run. Launch Daemons are often used to provide access to shared resources, updates to software, or conduct automation tasks.[1][2][3]

Adversaries may install a Launch Daemon configured to execute at startup by using the RunAtLoad parameter set to true and the Program parameter set to the malicious executable path. The daemon name may be disguised by using a name from a related operating system or benign software (i.e. Masquerading). When the Launch Daemon is executed, the program inherits administrative permissions.[4][5]

Additionally, system configuration changes (such as the installation of third party package managing software) may cause folders such as usr/local/bin to become globally writeable. So, it is possible for poor configurations to allow an adversary to modify executables referenced by current Launch Daemon's plist files.[6][7]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

2 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1543Create or Modify System ProcessThis object subtechnique of Create or Modify System Process.
EnterpriseT1160Launch DaemonLaunch Daemon revoked by this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

MalwareEnterprise

S1105: COATHANGER

COATHANGER is a remote access tool (RAT) targeting FortiGate networking appliances. First used in 2023 in targeted intrusions against military and government entities in the Netherlands along with other victims, COATHANGER was disclosed in early 2024, with a high confidence assessment linking this malware to a state-sponsored entity in the People's Republic of China. COATHANGER is delivered after gaining access to a FortiGate device, with in-the-wild observations linked to exploitation of CVE-2022-42475. The name COATHANGER is based on a unique string in the malware used to encrypt configuration files on disk: “She took his coat and hung it up”.[1]

LinuxNetwork Devices
MalwareEnterprise

S1219: REPTILE

REPTILE is an open-source Linux rootkit with multiple components that provides backdoor access and functionality.[1]

Linux
MalwareEnterprise

S0690: Green Lambert

Green Lambert is a modular backdoor that security researchers assess has been used by an advanced threat group referred to as Longhorn and The Lamberts. First reported in 2017, the Windows variant of Green Lambert may have been used as early as 2008; a macOS version was uploaded to a multiscanner service in September 2014.[1][2]

WindowsiOSmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0595: ThiefQuest

ThiefQuest is a virus, data stealer, and wiper that presents itself as ransomware targeting macOS systems. ThiefQuest was first seen in 2020 distributed via trojanized pirated versions of popular macOS software on Russian forums sharing torrent links.[1] Even though ThiefQuest presents itself as ransomware, since the dynamically generated encryption key is never sent to the attacker it may be more appropriately thought of as a form of wiper malware.[2][3]

macOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0482: Bundlore

Bundlore is adware written for macOS that has been in use since at least 2015. Though categorized as adware, Bundlore has many features associated with more traditional backdoors.[1]

macOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0658: XCSSET

XCSSET is a modular macOS malware family delivered through infected Xcode projects and executed when the project is compiled. Active since August 2020, it has been observed installing backdoors, spoofed browsers, collecting data, and encrypting user files. It is composed of SHC-compiled shell scripts and run-only AppleScripts, often hiding in apps that mimic system tools (such as Xcode, Mail, or Notes) or use familiar icons (like Launchpad) to avoid detection.[1][2][3]

macOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0584: AppleJeus

AppleJeus is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. AppleJeus has been used by Lazarus Group, targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. AppleJeus has been used to distribute the FALLCHILL RAT.[1]

WindowsmacOS
MalwareEnterprise

S0451: LoudMiner

LoudMiner is a cryptocurrency miner which uses virtualization software to siphon system resources. The miner has been bundled with pirated copies of Virtual Studio Technology (VST) for Windows and macOS.[1]

macOSWindows
CampaignEnterprise

C0057: 3CX Supply Chain Attack

The 3CX Supply Chain Attack was the first publicly reported case of one supply chain compromise triggering another, leading to a cascading, two-stage intrusion. The initial supply chain attack began when a 3CX employee downloaded and executed a trojanized, end-of-life version of the X_Trader trading software from Trading Technologies. This provided UNC4736, a threat cluster associated with AppleJeus, access to the 3CX environment. From there UNC4736 compromised the Windows and macOS build environments used to distribute the 3CX desktop application to their customers.[1] While 3CX serves more than 600,000 customers and 12 million users, only a subset of systems were affected. Subsequent targeting focused on victims in the defense and cryptocurrency sectors, where attackers deployed secondary payloads such as Gopuram for credential theft and persistence.[2] The campaign began in late 2022 and was disrupted after security vendors publicly reported the compromise in March 2023.[3][4]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.2
Object version
1.3
Created
Modified
Raw hash
c04d09ec3c3d469d...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.21.3Current bundlec04d09ec3c3d…
19.11.3Older bundlec04d09ec3c3d…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    AppleDocs Launch Agent Daemons

    Apple. (n.d.). Creating Launch Daemons and Agents. Retrieved July 10, 2017.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Methods of Mac Malware Persistence

    Patrick Wardle. (2014, September). Methods of Malware Persistence on Mac OS X. Retrieved July 5, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    launchd Keywords for plists

    Dennis German. (2020, November 20). launchd Keywords for plists. Retrieved October 7, 2021.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    WireLurker

    Claud Xiao. (n.d.). WireLurker: A New Era in iOS and OS X Malware. Retrieved July 10, 2017.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    OSX Malware Detection

    Patrick Wardle. (2016, February 29). Let's Play Doctor: Practical OS X Malware Detection & Analysis. Retrieved November 17, 2024.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    LaunchDaemon Hijacking

    Bradley Kemp. (2021, May 10). LaunchDaemon Hijacking: privilege escalation and persistence via insecure folder permissions. Retrieved July 26, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    sentinelone macos persist Jun 2019

    Stokes, Phil. (2019, June 17). HOW MALWARE PERSISTS ON MACOS. Retrieved September 10, 2019.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    mitre-attackT1543.004
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.