S0584: AppleJeus
AppleJeus is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. AppleJeus has been used by Lazarus Group, targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. AppleJeus has been used to distribute the FALLCHILL RAT.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0584: AppleJeus describes [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. [AppleJeus](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0584) has been used by [Lazarus Group](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0032), targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Rus...
Executive priority
S0584: AppleJeus is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0584: AppleJeus by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows, macOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0584: AppleJeus appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
AppleJeus
AppleJeus is a family of downloaders initially discovered in 2018 embedded within trojanized cryptocurrency applications. AppleJeus has been used by Lazarus Group, targeting companies in the energy, finance, government, industry, technology, and telecommunications sectors, and several countries including the United States, United Kingdom, South Korea, Australia, Brazil, New Zealand, and Russia. AppleJeus has been used to distribute the FALLCHILL RAT.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1070.004 | File DeletionSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1546.016 | Installer PackagesSub-technique | During AppleJeus's installation process, it uses `postinstall` scripts to extract a hidden plist from the application's `/Resources` folder and execute the `plist` file as a Launch Daemon with elevated permissions.CitationObjectiveSee AppleJeus 2019 |
| Enterprise | T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | |
| Enterprise | T1566.002 | Spearphishing LinkSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.003 | Windows ServiceSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1564.001 | Hidden Files and DirectoriesSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1569.001 | LaunchctlSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1553.002 | Code SigningSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1059.004 | Unix ShellSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1082 | System Information Discovery | |
| Enterprise | T1218.007 | MsiexecSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled TaskSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account ControlSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1204.002 | Malicious FileSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1027 | Obfuscated Files or Information | |
| Enterprise | T1497.003 | Time Based ChecksSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1543.004 | Launch DaemonSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1204.001 | Malicious LinkSub-technique |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0032: Lazarus Group
Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored cyber threat group attributed to the Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB). [1] [2] Lazarus Group has been active since at least 2009 and is reportedly responsible for the November 2014 destructive wiper attack on Sony Pictures Entertainment, identified by Novetta as part of Operation Blockbuster. Malware used by Lazarus Group correlates to other reported campaigns, including Operation Flame, Operation 1Mission, Operation Troy, DarkSeoul, and Ten Days of Rain.[3]
North Korea’s cyber operations have shown a consistent pattern of adaptation, forming and reorganizing units as national priorities shift. These units frequently share personnel, infrastructure, malware, and tradecraft, making it difficult to attribute specific operations with high confidence. Public reporting often uses “Lazarus Group” as an umbrella term for multiple North Korean cyber operators conducting espionage, destructive attacks, and financially motivated campaigns.[4][5][6]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.1 | Current bundle | f4d42ce75d8f… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.1 | Older bundle | f4d42ce75d8f… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency. (2021, February 21). AppleJeus: Analysis of North Korea’s Cryptocurrency Malware. Retrieved March 1, 2021.
Open source URL - [2]AppleJeus
(Citation: CISA AppleJeus Feb 2021)
- [3]mitre-attackS0584Open source URL
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