T1638: Adversary-in-the-Middle
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as Transmitted Data Manipulation or Endpoint Denial of Service.
Adversary-in-the-Middle can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.
Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage.[1][2][3] To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (`READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE` and `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.
Outside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as ARP Cache Poisoning or DHCP Spoofing.
If applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.[4]
Security context for executives and security teams
T1638: Adversary-in-the-Middle describes Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as [Transmitted Data Manipulation](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1565/002) or [Endpoint Denial of Service](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1642). [Adversary-in-the-Middle](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1638) can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-ow...
Executive priority
T1638: Adversary-in-the-Middle is an official MITRE ATT&CK technique. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate T1638: Adversary-in-the-Middle by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (collection), supported platforms (Android, iOS), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether T1638: Adversary-in-the-Middle appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Adversary-in-the-Middle
Adversaries may attempt to position themselves between two or more networked devices to support follow-on behaviors such as Transmitted Data Manipulation or Endpoint Denial of Service.
Adversary-in-the-Middle can be achieved through several mechanisms. For example, a malicious application may register itself as a VPN client, effectively redirecting device traffic to adversary-owned resources. Registering as a VPN client requires user consent on both Android and iOS; additionally, a special entitlement granted by Apple is needed for iOS devices. Alternatively, a malicious application with escalation privileges may utilize those privileges to gain access to network traffic.
Specific to Android devices, adversary-in-the-disk is a type of AiTM attack where adversaries monitor and manipulate data that is exchanged between applications and external storage.[1][2][3] To accomplish this, a malicious application firsts requests for access to multimedia files on the device (`READ_EXTERNAL STORAGE` and `WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE`), then the application reads data on the device and/or writes malware to the device. Though the request for access is common, when used maliciously, adversaries may access files and other sensitive data due to abusing the permission. Multiple applications were shown to be vulnerable against this attack; however, scrutiny of permissions and input validations may mitigate this attack.
Outside of a mobile device, adversaries may be able to capture traffic by employing a rogue base station or Wi-Fi access point. These devices will allow adversaries to capture network traffic after it has left the device, while it is flowing to its destination. On a local network, enterprise techniques could be used, such as ARP Cache Poisoning or DHCP Spoofing.
If applications properly encrypt their network traffic, sensitive data may not be accessible to adversaries, depending on the point of capture. For example, properly implementing Apple’s Application Transport Security (ATS) and Android’s Network Security Configuration (NSC) may prevent sensitive data leaks.[4]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mobile | T1439 | Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication | Eavesdrop on Insecure Network Communication revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1410 | Network Traffic Capture or Redirection | Network Traffic Capture or Redirection revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1465 | Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points | Rogue Wi-Fi Access Points revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1466 | Downgrade to Insecure Protocols | Downgrade to Insecure Protocols revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1467 | Rogue Cellular Base Station | Rogue Cellular Base Station revoked by this object. |
| Mobile | T1463 | Manipulate Device Communication | Manipulate Device Communication revoked by this object. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0288: KeyRaider
S1062: S.O.V.A.
S.O.V.A. is an Android banking trojan that was first identified in August 2021 and has subsequently been found in a variety of applications, including banking, cryptocurrency wallet/exchange, and shopping apps. S.O.V.A., which is Russian for "owl", contains features not commonly found in Android malware, such as session cookie theft.[1][2]
S0407: Monokle
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 2.2 | Current bundle | 2fc740a9ad3c… | ||
| 19.1 | 2.2 | Older bundle | 2fc740a9ad3c… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]mitd_kaspersky
Drozhzhin, A. (2018, August 27). Man-in-the-Disk: A new and dangerous way to hack Android. Retrieved October 31, 2023.
Open source URL - [2]mitd_checkpoint
Check Point Research Team. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: A New Attack Surface for Android Apps. Retrieved October 31, 2023.
Open source URL - [3]mitd_checkpoint_research
Makkaveev, S. (2018, August 12). Man-in-the-Disk: Android Apps Exposed via External Storage. Retrieved October 31, 2023.
Open source URL - [4]NSC_Android
Lee, A., Ramirez, T. (2018, August 15). A Security Analyst’s Guide to Network Security Configuration in Android P . Retrieved February 7, 2024.
Open source URL - [5]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-0Open source URL
- [6]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-1Open source URL
- [7]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueAPP-8Open source URL
- [8]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueCEL-3Open source URL
- [9]NIST Mobile Threat CatalogueECO-12Open source URL
- [10]mitre-attackT1638Open source URL
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