T1134.003: Make and Impersonate Token

Make and Impersonate Token is a Windows privilege-escalation and stealth behavior where an adversary with valid credentials can create a new logon session and use that session’s access token to operate as that user. The business issue is not just credential theft; it is whether Windows identity activity can be trusted once an attacker can create and apply a user security context without the user already being logged in.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an identity and Windows endpoint control-validation issue. Leaders should ask whether privileged and sensitive accounts are tightly managed, whether SOC/IR teams can reconstruct unusual logon-session and token-use behavior, and whether evidence exists for audit and incident response when a process begins acting under a different user context. The ATT&CK relationships to FIN13, BlackByte, Cobalt Strike, SILENTTRINITY, and Mafalda show this behavior is relevant across financially motivated groups and post-exploitation tooling, but the supplied data does not establish current activity or exposure in any specific environment.

Technical view

This sub-technique belongs under Access Token Manipulation and applies to Windows. The supplied ATT&CK description specifically references creating a logon session with LogonUserW and assigning the resulting token with SetThreadToken. SOC and detection teams should validate behavior-chain coverage, especially where DET0498 is used as the detection strategy reference: credential use or new logon-session creation followed by a process or thread operating under that token. IR teams should be prepared to correlate account, process, and host timelines rather than treating logon events or process events in isolation.

Likely telemetry

Windows logon-session and authentication audit data showing new user sessions created on a host
Endpoint process telemetry for processes active before and after the suspicious logon/session change
API-level or EDR telemetry, where available, for LogonUserW and SetThreadToken usage
Account context and privilege information for the user whose token is created or impersonated
Host-based security logs that support reconstruction of user context, process lineage, and timing

Detection direction

Validate whether DET0498-style behavior-chain analytics exist for Windows hosts instead of relying on single events.
Correlate new logon-session creation with subsequent process or thread activity under the newly created token.
Tune carefully for legitimate administrative, service, and application behavior that may create logon sessions or impersonate users.
Prioritize higher-risk detections when privileged accounts or sensitive business systems are involved.
Check blind spots where endpoint telemetry lacks API visibility, thread-token context, or reliable process-to-user correlation.

Mitigation priorities

Apply User Account Management: keep account lifecycle, deactivation, and privilege assignment current so unused or overprivileged credentials cannot easily support token creation.
Apply Privileged Account Management: restrict and monitor privileged accounts, enforce least privilege and role-based access, and ensure privileged use is accountable in logs.
Reduce standing privilege on Windows systems so a created token provides less operational reach.
Ensure administrative and service-account practices are documented and reviewable so detection teams can distinguish expected impersonation from suspicious behavior.

Additional notes and limits

This take is based on ATT&CK T1134.003 version 2.0 in enterprise-attack, its Windows platform scope, its stealth and privilege-escalation tactics, the Microsoft LogonUserW reference, and the supplied relationships to DET0498, M1018, M1026, parent technique T1134, groups, and software.

ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object in the supplied fields. Telemetry and detection guidance therefore must be validated against local Windows logging, EDR capability, account model, and administrative workflows. The related groups and software indicate documented ATT&CK use relationships only; they do not prove active exploitation or customer-specific risk.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Make and Impersonate Token

Adversaries may make new tokens and impersonate users to escalate privileges and bypass access controls. For example, if an adversary has a username and password but the user is not logged onto the system the adversary can then create a logon session for the user using the `LogonUser` function.[1] The function will return a copy of the new session's access token and the adversary can use `SetThreadToken` to assign the token to a thread.

This behavior is distinct from Token Impersonation/Theft in that this refers to creating a new user token instead of stealing or duplicating an existing one.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques1 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1134	Access Token Manipulation	This object subtechnique of Access Token Manipulation.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G1043: BlackByte

BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.[1][2][3][4][5]

G1016: FIN13

FIN13 is a financially motivated cyber threat group that has targeted the financial, retail, and hospitality industries in Mexico and Latin America, as early as 2016. FIN13 achieves its objectives by stealing intellectual property, financial data, mergers and acquisition information, or PII.[1][2]

S1060: Mafalda

Mafalda is a flexible interactive implant that has been used by Metador. Security researchers assess the Mafalda name may be inspired by an Argentinian cartoon character that has been popular as a means of political commentary since the 1960s. [1]

Windows

S0692: SILENTTRINITY

SILENTTRINITY is an open source remote administration and post-exploitation framework primarily written in Python that includes stagers written in Powershell, C, and Boo. SILENTTRINITY was used in a 2019 campaign against Croatian government agencies by unidentified cyber actors.[1][2]

Windows

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · MalwareS1060: MafaldaEnterprise uses · GroupG1043: BlackByteEnterprise mitigates · MitigationM1026: Privileged Account ManagementEnterprise detects · Detection StrategyDET0498: Behavior‑chain detection for T1134.003 Make and Impersonate Token (Windows)Enterpriseuses · GroupG1016: FIN13Enterprise uses · ToolS0692: SILENTTRINITYEnterprise mitigates · MitigationM1018: User Account ManagementEnterprise subtechnique of · TechniqueT1134: Access Token ManipulationEnterprise uses · MalwareS0154: Cobalt StrikeEnterprise

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

M1018: User Account Management

User Account Management involves implementing and enforcing policies for the lifecycle of user accounts, including creation, modification, and deactivation. Proper account management reduces the attack surface by limiting unauthorized access, managing account privileges, and ensuring accounts are used according to organizational policies. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Enforcing the Principle of Least Privilege

- Implementation: Assign users only the minimum permissions required to perform their job functions. Regularly audit accounts to ensure no excess permissions are granted. - Use Case: Reduces the risk of privilege escalation by ensuring accounts cannot perform unauthorized actions.

Implementing Strong Password Policies

- Implementation: Enforce password complexity requirements (e.g., length, character types). Require password expiration every 90 days and disallow password reuse. - Use Case: Prevents adversaries from gaining unauthorized access through password guessing or brute force attacks.

Managing Dormant and Orphaned Accounts

- Implementation: Implement automated workflows to disable accounts after a set period of inactivity (e.g., 30 days). Remove orphaned accounts (e.g., accounts without an assigned owner) during regular account audits. - Use Case: Eliminates dormant accounts that could be exploited by attackers.

Account Lockout Policies

- Implementation: Configure account lockout thresholds (e.g., lock accounts after five failed login attempts). Set lockout durations to a minimum of 15 minutes. - Use Case: Mitigates automated attack techniques that rely on repeated login attempts.

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for High-Risk Accounts

- Implementation: Require MFA for all administrative accounts and high-risk users. Use MFA mechanisms like hardware tokens, authenticator apps, or biometrics. - Use Case: Prevents unauthorized access, even if credentials are stolen.

Restricting Interactive Logins

- Implementation: Restrict interactive logins for privileged accounts to specific secure systems or management consoles. Use group policies to enforce logon restrictions. - Use Case: Protects sensitive accounts from misuse or exploitation.

*Tools for Implementation*

Built-in Tools:

- Microsoft Active Directory (AD): Centralized account management and RBAC enforcement. - Group Policy Object (GPO): Enforce password policies, logon restrictions, and account lockout policies.

Identity and Access Management (IAM) Tools:

- Okta: Centralized user provisioning, MFA, and SSO integration. - Microsoft Azure Active Directory: Provides advanced account lifecycle management, role-based access, and conditional access policies.

Privileged Account Management (PAM): - CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic: Manage and monitor privileged account usage, enforce session recording, and JIT access.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 2.0
Created: Feb 18, 2020, 18:03 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 2e9c2b9032770546...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	Jul 14, 2026, 09:14 UTC (UTC+00:00)	2.0	May 12, 2026, 15:12 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`2e9c2b903277…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
LogonUserW function
Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.
Open source URL
[2]
SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.
Open source URL
[3]
Microsoft BlackByte 2023
Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL
[4]
Microsoft Create Token
Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Create a token object. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
Open source URL
[5]
Microsoft Replace Process Token
Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Replace a process level token. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
Open source URL
[6]
Microsoft runas
Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
Open source URL
[7]
Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022
Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
Open source URL
[8]
Github_SILENTTRINITY
byt3bl33d3r. (n.d.). SILENTTRINITY. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL
[9]
cobaltstrike manual
Strategic Cyber LLC. (2017, March 14). Cobalt Strike Manual. Retrieved May 24, 2017.
Open source URL
[10]
LogonUserW function
Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.
Open source URL
[11]
LogonUserW function
Microsoft. (2023, March 10). LogonUserW function (winbase.h). Retrieved January 8, 2024.
Open source URL
[12]
mitre-attackT1134.003
Open source URL
[13]
mitre-attackT1134.003
Open source URL
[14]
mitre-attackT1134.003
Open source URL
[15]
SentinelLabs Metador Technical Appendix Sept 2022
SentinelLabs. (2022, September 22). Metador Technical Appendix. Retrieved April 4, 2023.
Open source URL
[16]
Microsoft BlackByte 2023
Microsoft Incident Response. (2023, July 6). The five-day job: A BlackByte ransomware intrusion case study. Retrieved December 16, 2024.
Open source URL
[17]
Microsoft Create Token
Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Create a token object. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
Open source URL
[18]
Microsoft Replace Process Token
Brower, N., Lich, B. (2017, April 19). Replace a process level token. Retrieved December 19, 2017.
Open source URL
[19]
Microsoft runas
Microsoft TechNet. (n.d.). Runas. Retrieved April 21, 2017.
Open source URL
[20]
Sygnia Elephant Beetle Jan 2022
Sygnia Incident Response Team. (2022, January 5). TG2003: ELEPHANT BEETLE UNCOVERING AN ORGANIZED FINANCIAL-THEFT OPERATION. Retrieved February 9, 2023.
Open source URL
[21]
Github_SILENTTRINITY
byt3bl33d3r. (n.d.). SILENTTRINITY. Retrieved September 12, 2024.
Open source URL

Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

Official MITRE ATT&CK site Official STIX data repository MITRE ATT&CK terms of use