S9018: HeartCrypt
HeartCrypt is a packer-as-a-service (PaaS) used to protect malware that has been available since at least 2024. HeartCrypt has been used to pack a variety of malware including Lumma Stealer, Remcos, and Rhadamanthys. In the HeartCrypt PaaS model, customers submit malware via private messaging services and it is then packed and returned by the operator as a new binary.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S9018: HeartCrypt describes [HeartCrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9018) is a packer-as-a-service (PaaS) used to protect malware that has been available since at least 2024. [HeartCrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9018) has been used to pack a variety of malware including [Lumma Stealer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1213), [Remcos](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0332), and Rhadamanthys. In the [HeartCrypt](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9018) PaaS model, customers submit malware via private messaging services an...
Executive priority
S9018: HeartCrypt is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S9018: HeartCrypt by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Linux, Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S9018: HeartCrypt appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
HeartCrypt
HeartCrypt is a packer-as-a-service (PaaS) used to protect malware that has been available since at least 2024. HeartCrypt has been used to pack a variety of malware including Lumma Stealer, Remcos, and Rhadamanthys. In the HeartCrypt PaaS model, customers submit malware via private messaging services and it is then packed and returned by the operator as a new binary.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1055.004 | Asynchronous Procedure CallSub-technique | HeartCrypt has the ability to use `NtQueueApcThread` as an alternate method for process injection.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1036.008 | Masquerade File TypeSub-technique | HeartCrypt can append a BMP header to encoded malicious payloads to masquerade them as BMP files.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1055.012 | Process HollowingSub-technique | For .NET payloads, HeartCrypt can use process hollowing to inject into processes spawned by csc.exe or AppLaunch.exe.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1497.001 | System ChecksSub-technique | HeartCrypt will attempt to load non-existent DLLs in attempt to detect sandbox creation of a dummy DLL to prevent the program from crashing.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information | HeartCrypt can decrypt payloads prior to execution.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1027.002 | Software PackingSub-technique | HeartCrypt can pack malicious Windows x86 and .NET payloads in order to evade detection.[1]CitationCheck Point Blind Eagle MAR 2025 |
| Enterprise | T1027.013 | Encrypted/Encoded FileSub-technique | HeartCrypt strings are encrypted via a single-byte XOR operation rotating over a hard-coded key, possibly provided by the PaaS customers. [1] |
| Enterprise | T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique | HeartCrypt can set the `CurrentVersion\Run` key to establish persistence.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | HeartCrypt can use the `reg add` command via `cmd.exe` for Registry modification.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1106 | Native API | HeartCrypt can use Windows API functions to modify the Registry and `FindResourceW`, `LoadResource`, and `LockResource` to acquire a pointer to corresponding code resources.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1027.001 | Binary PaddingSub-technique | HeartCrypt can add several hundred thousand kilobytes of null padding to payloads before saving onto the file system.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0099: APT-C-36
APT-C-36 is a suspected South American threat group that has engaged in espionage and financially motivated operations since at least 2018. APT-C-36 has targeted government institutions and entities in the financial, energy, and professional manufacturing sectors across Colombia and other Latin American countries.[1][2][3][4]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | b7dc5c7c190e… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | b7dc5c7c190e… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Palo Alto HeartCrypt DEC 2024
Tujague, J., Bunce, D. (n.d.). Crypted Hearts: Exposing the HeartCrypt Packer-as-a-Service Operation. Retrieved April 16, 2026.
Open source URL - [2]mitre-attackS9018Open source URL
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