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MITRE ATT&CK® Malware

S0446: Ryuk

Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.[1][2][3]

EnterpriseS0446MalwareObject v1.4Modified
Discuss defensive coverageBack to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take · Automated analysis

Security context for executives and security teams

Automation confidenceMedium

Ryuk matters because ATT&CK records it as Windows ransomware designed for enterprise environments, with related behaviors that span discovery, lateral movement over SMB/admin shares, persistence, defense evasion, recovery inhibition, service stopping, and data encryption for impact. For leaders, this is not just a malware name; it is a resilience test of whether identity controls, Windows telemetry, segmentation, backups, and incident response procedures can hold up when an intrusion turns into business disruption.

Executive priority

Prioritize Ryuk as a business-continuity and recovery-readiness scenario. The decision questions are: can privileged domain account abuse be detected quickly, can lateral movement through Windows shares be constrained, can critical services and recovery mechanisms be protected, and can the organization prove through audit evidence that backups and restore processes work under ransomware conditions? The relationship to ICS impact through Loss of Productivity and Revenue also makes IT/OT dependency mapping relevant where Windows enterprise systems support operational processes.

Technical view

SOC and IR teams should validate coverage around the ATT&CK relationships rather than relying on a single malware signature. Focus on Windows execution through command shell and native APIs, scheduled tasks and Registry Run Keys/Startup Folder persistence, SMB/Windows Admin Shares lateral movement, domain account use, process and file discovery, network configuration discovery, process injection, access token manipulation, masquerading, ACL/permission changes, service stops, recovery inhibition, and high-volume file encryption behavior. FIN6 and Wizard Spider are recorded as groups that use Ryuk, but local detections should be behavior-led and not depend on attribution.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows endpoint process creation and command-line logging
  • Windows registry changes for Run keys and startup locations
  • Scheduled task creation, modification, and execution events
  • SMB/admin share access and remote file activity
  • Active Directory authentication, domain account use, and privileged logon events

Detection direction

  • Build detections from the related techniques because ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object.
  • Correlate domain account activity with SMB/admin share access, remote execution, scheduled task creation, and rapid file modification to reduce false positives from normal administration.
  • Baseline legitimate service management, backup administration, and recovery operations so service stops or recovery inhibition can be triaged in business context.
  • Tune masquerading and obfuscation detections against trusted Windows paths and names, but require supporting behavior to avoid excessive noise.
  • Validate visibility on remote shares and servers, since ransomware impact may occur through file access paths that endpoint-only monitoring can miss.

Mitigation priorities

  • Protect recovery first: maintain offline or otherwise resilient backups and regularly test restore procedures for critical Windows systems and file stores.
  • Reduce blast radius by limiting privileged domain account use, enforcing least privilege, and monitoring administrative logons.
  • Constrain SMB/admin share exposure through segmentation and access control, especially between user workstations, servers, and operationally critical systems.
  • Harden Windows persistence paths by controlling and monitoring scheduled tasks, startup folders, and Registry Run keys.
  • Restrict unauthorized service control, ACL changes, and backup/recovery modification to approved administrative workflows.
Additional notes and limits

The supplied ATT&CK object identifies Ryuk as enterprise-focused Windows ransomware with code similarities to Hermes and relationships to multiple ATT&CK techniques. The most decision-useful context is the combination of credentialed lateral movement, persistence, evasion, service disruption, recovery inhibition, and encryption impact. External references include reporting on Wake-on-LAN use, so defenders should consider whether that telemetry exists, but detections should remain behavior-based and environment-specific.

ATT&CK provides no official detection guidance for this malware object, and the malware object itself lists no tactics. Some related techniques have broader platform metadata than the Ryuk object; this take treats Windows as the supported platform for Ryuk based on the supplied object field. Relationship presence does not prove current activity, customer exposure, or complete behavior in every intrusion. Local asset criticality, logging configuration, identity architecture, and backup design are required to assess actual risk and coverage.

Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Ryuk

Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.[1][2][3]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

22 rows
DomainIDNameRelationship / procedure
EnterpriseT1027Obfuscated Files or Information

Ryuk can use anti-disassembly and code transformation obfuscation techniques.[4]

EnterpriseT1106Native API

Ryuk has used multiple native APIs including ShellExecuteW to run executables,GetWindowsDirectoryW to create folders, and VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread for process injection.[1]

EnterpriseT1057Process Discovery

Ryuk has called CreateToolhelp32Snapshot to enumerate all running processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesSub-technique

Ryuk has used the C$ network share for lateral movement.[5]

EnterpriseT1083File and Directory Discovery

Ryuk has enumerated files and folders on all mounted drives.[1]

EnterpriseT1490Inhibit System Recovery

Ryuk has used vssadmin Delete Shadows /all /quiet to to delete volume shadow copies and vssadmin resize shadowstorage to force deletion of shadow copies created by third-party applications.[1]

EnterpriseT1614.001System Language DiscoverySub-technique

Ryuk has been observed to query the registry key HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Nls\Language and the value InstallLanguage. If the machine has the value 0x419 (Russian), 0x422 (Ukrainian), or 0x423 (Belarusian), it stops execution.[1]

EnterpriseT1078.002Domain AccountsSub-technique

Ryuk can use stolen domain admin accounts to move laterally within a victim domain.[6]

EnterpriseT1059.003Windows Command ShellSub-technique

Ryuk has used cmd.exe to create a Registry entry to establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationSub-technique

Ryuk has constructed legitimate appearing installation folder paths by calling GetWindowsDirectoryW and then inserting a null byte at the fourth character of the path. For Windows Vista or higher, the path would appear as C:\Users\Public.[1]

EnterpriseT1489Service Stop

Ryuk has called kill.bat for stopping services, disabling services and killing processes.[1]

EnterpriseT1222.001Windows PermissionsSub-technique

Ryuk can launch icacls /grant Everyone:F /T /C /Q to delete every access-based restrictions on files and directories.[6]

EnterpriseT1685Disable or Modify Tools

Ryuk has stopped services related to anti-virus.[2]

EnterpriseT1053.005Scheduled TaskSub-technique

Ryuk can remotely create a scheduled task to execute itself on a system.[6]

EnterpriseT1680Local Storage Discovery

Ryuk has called GetLogicalDrives to emumerate all mounted drives, and GetDriveTypeW to determine the drive type.[1]

EnterpriseT1205Traffic Signaling

Ryuk has used Wake-on-Lan to power on turned off systems for lateral movement.[5]

EnterpriseT1486Data Encrypted for Impact

Ryuk has used a combination of symmetric (AES) and asymmetric (RSA) encryption to encrypt files. Files have been encrypted with their own AES key and given a file extension of .RYK. Encrypted directories have had a ransom note of RyukReadMe.txt written to the directory.[1][4]

EnterpriseT1055Process Injection

Ryuk has injected itself into remote processes to encrypt files using a combination of VirtualAlloc, WriteProcessMemory, and CreateRemoteThread.[1]

EnterpriseT1036Masquerading

Ryuk can create .dll files that actually contain a Rich Text File format document.[6]

EnterpriseT1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderSub-technique

Ryuk has used the Windows command line to create a Registry entry under HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run to establish persistence.[1]

EnterpriseT1016System Network Configuration Discovery

Ryuk has called GetIpNetTable in attempt to identify all mounted drives and hosts that have Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) entries.[1][5]

EnterpriseT1134Access Token Manipulation

Ryuk has attempted to adjust its token privileges to have the SeDebugPrivilege.[1]

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

GroupEnterprise

G0102: Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]

GroupEnterprise

G0037: FIN6

FIN6 is a cyber crime group that has stolen payment card data and sold it for profit on underground marketplaces. This group has aggressively targeted and compromised point of sale (PoS) systems in the hospitality and retail sectors.[1][2]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · TechniqueT1027: Obfuscated Files or InformationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1106: Native APIEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1057: Process DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1021.002: SMB/Windows Admin SharesEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1083: File and Directory DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1490: Inhibit System RecoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1614.001: System Language DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1078.002: Domain AccountsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1059.003: Windows Command ShellEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036.005: Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1489: Service StopEnterpriseuses · GroupG0102: Wizard SpiderEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1222.001: Windows PermissionsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1685: Disable or Modify ToolsEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1053.005: Scheduled TaskEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1680: Local Storage DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1205: Traffic SignalingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1486: Data Encrypted for ImpactEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1055: Process InjectionEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1036: MasqueradingEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1547.001: Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEnterpriseuses · GroupG0037: FIN6Enterpriseuses · TechniqueT1016: System Network Configuration DiscoveryEnterpriseuses · TechniqueT1134: Access Token ManipulationEnterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
1.4
Created
Modified
Raw hash
bbedbff5a2d4dac0...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(1)
ReleaseBundle importedObject versionModifiedStatusRaw hash
19.11.4Current bundlebbedbff5a2d4…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSONOpen MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019

    Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019

    McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020

    Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020

    Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020

    DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020

    Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020

    The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020

    The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  12. [12]
    DFIR Ryuk in 5 Hours October 2020

    The DFIR Report. (2020, October 18). Ryuk in 5 Hours. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  13. [13]
    Sophos New Ryuk Attack October 2020

    Sean Gallagher, Peter Mackenzie, Elida Leite, Syed Shahram, Bill Kearney, Anand Aijan, Sivagnanam Gn, Suraj Mundalik. (2020, October 14). They’re back: inside a new Ryuk ransomware attack. Retrieved October 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  14. [14]
    Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021

    Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  17. [17]
    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  18. [18]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019

    McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  21. [21]
    FireEye FIN6 Apr 2019

    McKeague, B. et al. (2019, April 5). Pick-Six: Intercepting a FIN6 Intrusion, an Actor Recently Tied to Ryuk and LockerGoga Ransomware. Retrieved April 17, 2019.

    Open source URL
  22. [22]
    FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019

    Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  23. [23]
    FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019

    Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  24. [24]
    Ryuk

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)

  25. [25]
    Ryuk

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)

  26. [26]
    Ryuk

    (Citation: CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019) (Citation: Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL)

  27. [27]
    mitre-attackS0446
    Open source URL
  28. [28]
    mitre-attackS0446
    Open source URL
  29. [29]
    mitre-attackS0446
    Open source URL
  30. [30]
    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020

    Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  31. [31]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  32. [32]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  33. [33]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  34. [34]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  35. [35]
    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  36. [36]
    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
  37. [37]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  38. [38]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  39. [39]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  40. [40]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  41. [41]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  42. [42]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  43. [43]
    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  44. [44]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  45. [45]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  46. [46]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  47. [47]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  48. [48]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  49. [49]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  50. [50]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  51. [51]
    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  52. [52]
    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020

    Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  53. [53]
    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020

    Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
  54. [54]
    DFIR Ryuk 2 Hour Speed Run November 2020

    The DFIR Report. (2020, November 5). Ryuk Speed Run, 2 Hours to Ransom. Retrieved November 6, 2020.

    Open source URL
  55. [55]
    DFIR Ryuk in 5 Hours October 2020

    The DFIR Report. (2020, October 18). Ryuk in 5 Hours. Retrieved October 19, 2020.

    Open source URL
  56. [56]
    DFIR Ryuk's Return October 2020

    The DFIR Report. (2020, October 8). Ryuk’s Return. Retrieved October 9, 2020.

    Open source URL
  57. [57]
    DHS/CISA Ransomware Targeting Healthcare October 2020

    DHS/CISA. (2020, October 28). Ransomware Activity Targeting the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Retrieved October 28, 2020.

    Open source URL
  58. [58]
    FireEye KEGTAP SINGLEMALT October 2020

    Kimberly Goody, Jeremy Kennelly, Joshua Shilko, Steve Elovitz, Douglas Bienstock. (2020, October 28). Unhappy Hour Special: KEGTAP and SINGLEMALT With a Ransomware Chaser. Retrieved October 28, 2020.

    Open source URL
  59. [59]
    Mandiant FIN12 Oct 2021

    Shilko, J., et al. (2021, October 7). FIN12: The Prolific Ransomware Intrusion Threat Actor That Has Aggressively Pursued Healthcare Targets. Retrieved June 15, 2023.

    Open source URL
  60. [60]
    Microsoft Ransomware as a Service

    Microsoft. (2022, May 9). Ransomware as a service: Understanding the cybercrime gig economy and how to protect yourself. Retrieved March 10, 2023.

    Open source URL
  61. [61]
    Red Canary Hospital Thwarted Ryuk October 2020

    Brian Donohue, Katie Nickels, Paul Michaud, Adina Bodkins, Taylor Chapman, Tony Lambert, Jeff Felling, Kyle Rainey, Mike Haag, Matt Graeber, Aaron Didier.. (2020, October 29). A Bazar start: How one hospital thwarted a Ryuk ransomware outbreak. Retrieved October 30, 2020.

    Open source URL
  62. [62]
    Sophos New Ryuk Attack October 2020

    Sean Gallagher, Peter Mackenzie, Elida Leite, Syed Shahram, Bill Kearney, Anand Aijan, Sivagnanam Gn, Suraj Mundalik. (2020, October 14). They’re back: inside a new Ryuk ransomware attack. Retrieved October 14, 2020.

    Open source URL
  63. [63]
    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  64. [64]
    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
  65. [65]
    FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019

    Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
  66. [66]
    FireEye Ryuk and Trickbot January 2019

    Goody, K., et al (2019, January 11). A Nasty Trick: From Credential Theft Malware to Business Disruption. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    Bleeping Computer - Ryuk WoL

    Abrams, L. (2021, January 14). Ryuk Ransomware Uses Wake-on-Lan To Encrypt Offline Devices. Retrieved February 11, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020

    Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Wizard Spider October 2020

    Podlosky, A., Hanel, A. et al. (2020, October 16). WIZARD SPIDER Update: Resilient, Reactive and Resolute. Retrieved June 15, 2021.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    CrowdStrike Ryuk January 2019

    Hanel, A. (2019, January 10). Big Game Hunting with Ryuk: Another Lucrative Targeted Ransomware. Retrieved May 12, 2020.

    Open source URL
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    ANSSI RYUK RANSOMWARE

    ANSSI. (2021, February 25). RYUK RANSOMWARE. Retrieved March 29, 2021.

    Open source URL
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