S0503: FrameworkPOS
FrameworkPOS is a point of sale (POS) malware used by FIN6 to steal payment card data from sytems that run physical POS devices.[1]
Security context for executives and security teams
S0503: FrameworkPOS describes [FrameworkPOS](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0503) is a point of sale (POS) malware used by [FIN6](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0037) to steal payment card data from sytems that run physical POS devices.(Citation: SentinelOne FrameworkPOS September 2019)
Executive priority
S0503: FrameworkPOS is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0503: FrameworkPOS by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (the platforms named in the official object), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0503: FrameworkPOS appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
FrameworkPOS
FrameworkPOS is a point of sale (POS) malware used by FIN6 to steal payment card data from sytems that run physical POS devices.[1]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | FrameworkPOS can collect elements related to credit card data from process memory.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1048 | Exfiltration Over Alternative Protocol | FrameworkPOS can use DNS tunneling for exfiltration of credit card data.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1074.001 | Local Data StagingSub-technique | FrameworkPOS can identifiy payment card track data on the victim and copy it to a local file in a subdirectory of C:\Windows\.CitationFireEye FIN6 April 2016 |
| Enterprise | T1057 | Process Discovery | FrameworkPOS can enumerate and exclude selected processes on a compromised host to speed execution of memory scraping.[1] |
| Enterprise | T1560.003 | Archive via Custom MethodSub-technique | FrameworkPOS can XOR credit card information before exfiltration.[1] |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0037: FIN6
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.0 | Current bundle | c8d4e1ab06d8… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.0 | Older bundle | c8d4e1ab06d8… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]SentinelOne FrameworkPOS September 2019
Kremez, V. (2019, September 19). FIN6 “FrameworkPOS”: Point-of-Sale Malware Analysis & Internals. Retrieved September 8, 2020.
Open source URL - [2]Trinity
(Citation: SentinelOne FrameworkPOS September 2019)
- [3]mitre-attackS0503Open source URL
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