S0009: Hikit
Security context for executives and security teams
S0009: Hikit describes [Hikit](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0009) is malware that has been used by [Axiom](https://attack.mitre.org/groups/G0001) for late-stage persistence and exfiltration after the initial compromise.(Citation: Novetta-Axiom)(Citation: FireEye Hikit Rootkit)
Executive priority
S0009: Hikit is an official MITRE ATT&CK software. Glexia treats it as defensive behavior context for prioritizing monitoring, control validation, and response planning without using the object by itself as an attribution claim.
Technical view
Security teams should validate S0009: Hikit by reviewing the official ATT&CK relationships, mapped tactics (the mapped ATT&CK tactic context), supported platforms (Windows), and available local telemetry before making detection or mitigation decisions.
Likely telemetry
- Official ATT&CK relationships and object metadata
- Network, endpoint, and security-tool telemetry
Detection direction
- Validate whether S0009: Hikit appears in your detection coverage and tabletop scenarios.
- Use the object to align executive risk language with SOC, incident response, and detection engineering work.
- Do not treat ATT&CK relationship context as attribution without corroborating evidence.
Mitigation priorities
- Map the object to existing controls and identify missing telemetry or response ownership.
- Prioritize mitigations that reduce exposure on the listed platforms and tactics.
- Review adjacent ATT&CK relationships before changing policy, detections, or reporting language.
Additional notes and limits
Baseline Glexia take generated from the official MITRE ATT&CK STIX object, source hash, tactics, platforms, and detection fields. It is safe to replace with a richer model-generated take for the same source hash later.
This baseline take is source-grounded and schema-validated, but it does not include environment-specific telemetry, incident evidence, or threat-intelligence corroboration.
Generated from the cited source records. This long-tail analysis has not been individually reviewed by a named human.
Hikit
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1566 | Phishing | |
| Enterprise | T1574.001 | DLLSub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1573.001 | Symmetric CryptographySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1553.006 | Code Signing Policy ModificationSub-technique | Hikit has attempted to disable driver signing verification by tampering with several Registry keys prior to the loading of a rootkit driver component.CitationFireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2 |
| Enterprise | T1059.003 | Windows Command ShellSub-technique | Hikit has the ability to create a remote shell and run given commands.CitationFireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2 |
| Enterprise | T1071.001 | Web ProtocolsSub-technique | Hikit has used HTTP for C2.CitationFireEye HIKIT Rootkit Part 2 |
| Enterprise | T1553.004 | Install Root CertificateSub-technique | Hikit installs a self-generated certificate to the local trust store as a root CA and Trusted Publisher.CitationSood and Enbody |
| Enterprise | T1014 | Rootkit | |
| Enterprise | T1090.001 | Internal ProxySub-technique | |
| Enterprise | T1005 | Data from Local System | |
| Enterprise | T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer |
Groups, software, and campaigns
G0001: Axiom
Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates.
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases(2)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.2 | 1.3 | Current bundle | 06fedead2abd… | ||
| 19.1 | 1.3 | Older bundle | 06fedead2abd… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
- [1]Novetta-Axiom
Novetta. (n.d.). Operation SMN: Axiom Threat Actor Group Report. Retrieved November 12, 2014.
Open source URL - [2]FireEye Hikit Rootkit
Glyer, C., Kazanciyan, R. (2012, August 20). The “Hikit” Rootkit: Advanced and Persistent Attack Techniques (Part 1). Retrieved November 17, 2024.
Open source URL - [3]mitre-attackS0009Open source URL
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