M1026: Privileged Account Management
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:
Account Permissions and Roles:
- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security:
- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):
- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM):
- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring:
- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access:
- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
*Tools for Implementation*
Privileged Access Management (PAM):
- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management:
- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication:
- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management:
- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access:
- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
Analyst context for executives and security teams
Privileged Account Management is a control area that determines how much damage a stolen or misused administrative account can cause. For leaders, its value is not just “better passwords”; it is limiting blast radius, proving accountability, and reducing the chance that privileged access enables credential dumping, lateral movement, remote administration abuse, or persistent scheduled execution.
Executive priority
Treat this as a resilience and governance priority because the related ATT&CK techniques include OS credential dumping, LSASS/SAM/NTDS access, DCSync, RDP, SMB admin shares, WinRM, WMI, scheduled tasks, process injection, cloud services, and privileged access in Linux and container contexts. Executives should ask whether privileged access is least-privilege, MFA-protected, time-bound where feasible, logged, reviewed, and tied to accountable identities. This mitigation also supports audit evidence for access control, administrative activity monitoring, and separation of duties.
Technical view
SOC, IR, IAM, and cloud teams should validate that privileged accounts are inventoried, permission scope is minimized through RBAC and least privilege, credentials are vaulted or rotated, MFA is enforced for privileged use, and privileged sessions/actions are logged into monitoring systems. Relationship context makes Windows identity infrastructure especially important: LSASS, SAM, NTDS, LSA secrets, cached credentials, and DCSync all become higher-risk when broad administrative privileges are common or poorly monitored. Also validate privileged paths for RDP, SMB admin shares, DCOM, WinRM, WMI, scheduled task/job creation, Linux root/sudo access, and cloud service administration.
Likely telemetry
- Privileged account inventory and group/role membership records
- Directory service administrative group changes and permission changes
- PAM, vault, and credential checkout or rotation logs
- MFA enrollment, challenge, success, failure, and bypass/exception records for privileged accounts
- Privileged login/session records for administrative systems and cloud services
Detection direction
- Validate that monitoring distinguishes normal administrative activity from unusual privileged use by account, host, service, time, source, and target.
- Tune alerts around privileged account use on domain controllers, administrative shares, remote management protocols, task scheduling, and credential stores because the mitigation relationships cluster around credential access and lateral movement.
- Review exceptions: shared admin accounts, service accounts, break-glass accounts, local administrators, cloud roles, and accounts exempt from MFA or rotation are common blind spots.
- Correlate privileged access events with credential-dumping-related activity rather than treating login success alone as sufficient evidence.
- Account for false positives from legitimate administration, maintenance windows, help desk workflows, and automated service activity; require baselines and documented ownership.
Mitigation priorities
- Start with an authoritative inventory of privileged accounts, roles, service accounts, local admins, root/sudo users, and cloud administrative roles.
- Reduce standing privilege using RBAC and least privilege; remove unnecessary membership in highly privileged groups and narrow administrative scope.
- Protect credentials with vaulting, rotation, complexity/uniqueness policies, and controlled checkout where applicable.
- Enforce MFA for privileged accounts, including cloud and identity-provider administrative access where supported.
- Adopt PAM and just-in-time access for sensitive administration so elevation is time-bound, approved, logged, and reviewable.
Analyst notes and limits
MITRE provides this as a mitigation, not a detection analytic. The supplied relationships show broad defensive relevance across credential access, lateral movement, execution, persistence, and privilege-escalation behaviors. Glexia’s practical read is that privileged account governance is a dependency for many other controls: endpoint detections, cloud controls, and IR containment all degrade when administrative access is excessive, shared, unaudited, or always-on.
The ATT&CK object does not specify platforms or official detection guidance for the mitigation itself. Platform references above are derived from the supplied relationship context, not from a platform field on M1026. Local architecture, identity model, PAM tooling, cloud provider configuration, and logging maturity are required to assess actual coverage.
Privileged Account Management
Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:
Account Permissions and Roles:
- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.
Credential Security:
- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).
Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):
- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.
Privileged Access Management (PAM):
- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.
Auditing and Monitoring:
- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.
Just-In-Time Access:
- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.
*Tools for Implementation*
Privileged Access Management (PAM):
- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.
Credential Management:
- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.
Multi-Factor Authentication:
- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.
Linux Privilege Management:
- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.
Just-In-Time Access:
- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Techniques used
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1053.005 | Scheduled Task Sub-technique | Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. CitationTechNet Scheduling Priority |
| Enterprise | T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket Sub-technique | Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts.CitationADSecurity AD Kerberos Attacks |
| Enterprise | T1555.006 | Cloud Secrets Management Stores Sub-technique | Limit the number of cloud accounts and services with permission to query the secrets manager to only those required. Ensure that accounts and services with permissions to query the secrets manager only have access to the secrets they require. |
| Enterprise | T1505.004 | IIS Components Sub-technique | Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add IIS components to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose these permissions to potential adversaries and/or other unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1556.005 | Reversible Encryption Sub-technique | Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account.CitationTechNet Credential TheftCitationTechNet Least Privilege These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.CitationMicrosoft Securing Privileged Access |
| Enterprise | T1555 | Credentials from Password Stores | Limit the number of accounts and services with permission to query information from password stores to only those required. Ensure that accounts and services with permissions to query password stores only have access to the secrets they require. |
| Enterprise | T1569.002 | Service Execution Sub-technique | Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. |
| Enterprise | T1505.002 | Transport Agent Sub-technique | Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to add component software on these services to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts. CitationFireEye WMI 2015 |
| Enterprise | T1552.002 | Credentials in Registry Sub-technique | If it is necessary that software must store credentials in the Registry, then ensure the associated accounts have limited permissions so they cannot be abused if obtained by an adversary. |
| Enterprise | T1098.003 | Additional Cloud Roles Sub-technique | Ensure that all accounts use the least privileges they require. In Azure AD environments, consider using Privileged Identity Management (PIM) to define roles that require two or more approvals before assignment to users.CitationMicrosoft Requests for Azure AD Roles in Privileged Identity Management |
| Enterprise | T1222.001 | Windows Permissions Sub-technique | Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality. |
| Enterprise | T1556.003 | Pluggable Authentication Modules Sub-technique | Limit access to the root account and prevent users from modifying PAM components through proper privilege separation (ex SELinux, grsecurity, AppArmor, etc.) and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. |
| Enterprise | T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management Sub-technique | If the service is necessary, lock down critical enclaves with separate WinRM accounts and permissions. |
| Enterprise | T1569 | System Services | Ensure that permissions disallow services that run at a higher permissions level from being created or interacted with by a user with a lower permission level. |
| Enterprise | T1599 | Network Boundary Bridging | Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints. |
| Enterprise | T1003.008 | /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Sub-technique | Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive information. |
| Enterprise | T1072 | Software Deployment Tools | Grant access to application deployment systems only to a limited number of authorized administrators. |
| Enterprise | T1543 | Create or Modify System Process | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| Enterprise | T1553.006 | Code Signing Policy Modification Sub-technique | Limit the usage of local administrator and domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries. |
| Enterprise | T1484 | Domain or Tenant Policy Modification | Use least privilege and protect administrative access to the Domain Controller and Active Directory Federation Services (AD FS) server. Do not create service accounts with administrative privileges. |
| Enterprise | T1547.006 | Kernel Modules and Extensions Sub-technique | Limit access to the root account and prevent users from loading kernel modules and extensions through proper privilege separation and limiting Privilege Escalation opportunities. |
| Enterprise | T1134.003 | Make and Impersonate Token Sub-technique | Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. CitationMicrosoft Create Token Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.CitationMicrosoft Replace Process Token Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command |
| Enterprise | T1542.001 | System Firmware Sub-technique | Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to perform this technique. |
| Enterprise | T1078.002 | Domain Accounts Sub-technique | Audit domain account permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled and use of accounts is segmented, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent access if account credentials are obtained. |
| Enterprise | T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | Use least privilege for service accounts will limit what permissions the exploited process gets on the rest of the system. |
| Enterprise | T1078.004 | Cloud Accounts Sub-technique | Review privileged cloud account permission levels routinely to look for those that could allow an adversary to gain wide access, such as Global Administrator and Privileged Role Administrator in Azure AD.CitationTechNet Credential TheftCitationTechNet Least PrivilegeCitationMicrosoft Azure security baseline for Azure Active Directory These reviews should also check if new privileged cloud accounts have been created that were not authorized. For example, in Azure AD environments configure alerts to notify when accounts have gone many days without using privileged roles, as these roles may be able to be removed.CitationMicrosoft Security Alerts for Azure AD Roles Consider using temporary, just-in-time (JIT) privileged access to Azure AD resources rather than permanently assigning privileged roles.CitationMicrosoft Azure security baseline for Azure Active Directory |
| Enterprise | T1078.003 | Local Accounts Sub-technique | Audit local accounts permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. CitationTechNet Credential Theft CitationTechNet Least Privilege Limit the usage of local administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries. For example, audit the use of service accounts in Kubernetes, and avoid automatically granting them access to the Kubernetes API if this is not required.CitationKubernetes Service Accounts Implementing LAPS may also help prevent reuse of local administrator credentials across a domain.CitationMicrosoft Remote Use of Local |
| Enterprise | T1688 | Safe Mode Boot | Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles, that may be abused to remotely boot a machine in safe mode.CitationCyberArk Labs Safe Mode 2016 |
| Enterprise | T1558.002 | Silver Ticket Sub-technique | Limit service accounts to minimal required privileges, including membership in privileged groups such as Domain Administrators.CitationAdSecurity Cracking Kerberos Dec 2015 |
| Enterprise | T1612 | Build Image on Host | Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.CitationKubernetes Hardening Guide |
| Enterprise | T1484.002 | Trust Modification Sub-technique | Use the principal of least privilege and protect administrative access to domain trusts and identity tenants. |
| Enterprise | T1098.002 | Additional Email Delegate Permissions Sub-technique | Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1059.013 | Container CLI/API Sub-technique | Restrict permissions on API access. RBAC in Kubernetes involve permissions that are additive, meaning there are no explicit "deny" rules. These permissions can be defined within a particular namespace or within cluster-scoped resources. Securing the Docker daemon can be done by using SSH or TLS with certificate authorization. Container management tools such as Docker and Podman may offer ways to run containers as rootless, which prevents them from running with privileged permissions. |
| Enterprise | T1003.003 | NTDS Sub-technique | Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. |
| Enterprise | T1222.002 | Linux and Mac Permissions Sub-technique | Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality. |
| Enterprise | T1542.005 | TFTP Boot Sub-technique | Use of Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) systems will limit actions administrators can perform and provide a history of user actions to detect unauthorized use and abuse. TACACS+ can keep control over which commands administrators are permitted to use through the configuration of authentication and command authorization. CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - AAA CitationCisco IOS Software Integrity Assurance - TACACS |
| Enterprise | T1134.002 | Create Process with Token Sub-technique | Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. CitationMicrosoft Create Token Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.CitationMicrosoft Replace Process Token Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command |
| Enterprise | T1606 | Forge Web Credentials | Restrict permissions and access to the AD FS server to only originate from privileged access workstations.CitationFireEye ADFS |
| Enterprise | T1559.001 | Component Object Model Sub-technique | Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Classes\\AppID\\{AppID_GUID}` associated with the process-wide security of individual COM applications.CitationMicrosoft Process Wide Com Keys Modify Registry settings (directly or using Dcomcnfg.exe) in `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\\SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Ole` associated with system-wide security defaults for all COM applications that do no set their own process-wide security.CitationMicrosoft System Wide Com Keys CitationMicrosoft COM ACL |
| Enterprise | T1611 | Escape to Host | Ensure containers are not running as root by default and do not use unnecessary privileges or mounted components. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.CitationKubernetes Hardening Guide |
| Enterprise | T1136.003 | Cloud Account Sub-technique | Limit the number of accounts with permissions to create other accounts. Do not allow privileged accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1218 | System Binary Proxy Execution | Restrict execution of particularly vulnerable binaries to privileged accounts or groups that need to use it to lessen the opportunities for malicious usage. |
| Enterprise | T1550 | Use Alternate Authentication Material | Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. |
| Enterprise | T1053.007 | Container Orchestration Job Sub-technique | Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers.CitationKubernetes Hardening Guide |
| Enterprise | T1553 | Subvert Trust Controls | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| Enterprise | T1003.002 | Security Account Manager Sub-technique | Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. |
| Enterprise | T1055 | Process Injection | Utilize Yama (ex: /proc/sys/kernel/yama/ptrace_scope) to mitigate ptrace based process injection by restricting the use of ptrace to privileged users only. Other mitigation controls involve the deployment of security kernel modules that provide advanced access control and process restrictions such as SELinux, grsecurity, and AppArmor. |
| Enterprise | T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. By requiring a password, even if an adversary can get terminal access, they must know the password to run anything in the sudoers file. Setting the timestamp_timeout to 0 will require the user to input their password every time sudo is executed. |
| Enterprise | T1556.001 | Domain Controller Authentication Sub-technique | Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. CitationTechNet Credential Theft CitationTechNet Least Privilege These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not be authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. CitationMicrosoft Securing Privileged Access |
| Enterprise | T1552.007 | Container API Sub-technique | Use the principle of least privilege for privileged accounts such as the service account in Kubernetes. For example, if a pod is not required to access the Kubernetes API, consider disabling the service account altogether.CitationKubernetes Service Accounts |
| Enterprise | T1078 | Valid Accounts | Audit domain and local accounts as well as their permission levels routinely to look for situations that could allow an adversary to gain wide access by obtaining credentials of a privileged account. CitationTechNet Credential Theft CitationTechNet Least Privilege These audits should also include if default accounts have been enabled, or if new local accounts are created that have not been authorized. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. CitationMicrosoft Securing Privileged Access |
| Enterprise | T1098.001 | Additional Cloud Credentials Sub-technique | Do not allow domain administrator or root accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1525 | Implant Internal Image | Limit permissions associated with creating and modifying platform images or containers based on the principle of least privilege. |
| Enterprise | T1053 | Scheduled Task/Job | Configure the Increase Scheduling Priority option to only allow the Administrators group the rights to schedule a priority process. This can be can be configured through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Increase scheduling priority. CitationTechNet Scheduling Priority |
| Enterprise | T1548.002 | Bypass User Account Control Sub-technique | Remove users from the local administrator group on systems. |
| Enterprise | T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares Sub-technique | Deny remote use of local admin credentials to log into systems. Do not allow domain user accounts to be in the local Administrators group multiple systems. |
| Enterprise | T1548.006 | TCC Manipulation Sub-technique | Remove unnecessary users from the local administrator group on systems. |
| Enterprise | T1542.003 | Bootkit Sub-technique | Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to install a bootkit. |
| Enterprise | T1222 | File and Directory Permissions Modification | Ensure critical system files as well as those known to be abused by adversaries have restrictive permissions and are owned by an appropriately privileged account, especially if access is not required by users nor will inhibit system functionality. |
| Enterprise | T1609 | Container Administration Command | Ensure containers are not running as root by default. In Kubernetes environments, consider defining Pod Security Standards that prevent pods from running privileged containers and using the `NodeRestriction` admission controller to deny the kublet access to nodes and pods outside of the node it belongs to.CitationKubernetes Hardening Guide CitationKubernetes Admission Controllers |
| Enterprise | T1210 | Exploitation of Remote Services | Minimize permissions and access for service accounts to limit impact of exploitation. |
| Enterprise | T1098 | Account Manipulation | Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1003 | OS Credential Dumping | Windows: Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers.CitationMicrosoft Securing Privileged Access Linux: Scraping the passwords from memory requires root privileges. Follow best practices in restricting access to privileged accounts to avoid hostile programs from accessing such sensitive regions of memory. |
| Enterprise | T1546 | Event Triggered Execution | Manage the creation, modification, use, and permissions associated to privileged accounts, including SYSTEM and root. |
| Enterprise | T1601.001 | Patch System Image Sub-technique | Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints. |
| Enterprise | T1558.001 | Golden Ticket Sub-technique | Limit domain admin account permissions to domain controllers and limited servers. Delegate other admin functions to separate accounts. |
| Enterprise | T1556.007 | Hybrid Identity Sub-technique | Limit on-premises accounts with access to the hybrid identity solution in place. For example, limit Entra ID Global Administrator accounts to only those required, and ensure that these are dedicated cloud-only accounts rather than hybrid ones.CitationMagicWeb |
| Enterprise | T1546.003 | Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription Sub-technique | Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts.CitationFireEye WMI 2015 |
| Enterprise | T1003.001 | LSASS Memory Sub-technique | Do not put user or admin domain accounts in the local administrator groups across systems unless they are tightly controlled, as this is often equivalent to having a local administrator account with the same password on all systems. Follow best practices for design and administration of an enterprise network to limit privileged account use across administrative tiers. |
| Enterprise | T1059 | Command and Scripting Interpreter | When PowerShell is necessary, consider restricting PowerShell execution policy to administrators. Be aware that there are methods of bypassing the PowerShell execution policy, depending on environment configuration.CitationNetspi PowerShell Execution Policy Bypass PowerShell JEA (Just Enough Administration) may also be used to sandbox administration and limit what commands admins/users can execute through remote PowerShell sessions.CitationMicrosoft PS JEA |
| Enterprise | T1056.003 | Web Portal Capture Sub-technique | Do not allow administrator accounts that have permissions to modify the Web content of organization login portals to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1550.002 | Pass the Hash Sub-technique | Limit credential overlap across systems to prevent the damage of credential compromise and reduce the adversary's ability to perform Lateral Movement between systems. |
| Enterprise | T1601.002 | Downgrade System Image Sub-technique | Restrict administrator accounts to as few individuals as possible, following least privilege principles. Prevent credential overlap across systems of administrator and privileged accounts, particularly between network and non-network platforms, such as servers or endpoints. |
| Enterprise | T1542 | Pre-OS Boot | Ensure proper permissions are in place to help prevent adversary access to privileged accounts necessary to perform these actions |
| Enterprise | T1136 | Create Account | Limit the number of accounts with permissions to create other accounts. Do not allow domain administrator accounts to be used for day-to-day operations that may expose them to potential adversaries on unprivileged systems. |
| Enterprise | T1495 | Firmware Corruption | Prevent adversary access to privileged accounts or access necessary to replace system firmware. |
| Enterprise | T1606.002 | SAML Tokens Sub-technique | Restrict permissions and access to the AD FS server to only originate from privileged access workstations.CitationFireEye ADFS |
| Enterprise | T1563.002 | RDP Hijacking Sub-technique | Consider removing the local Administrators group from the list of groups allowed to log in through RDP. |
| Enterprise | T1134 | Access Token Manipulation | Limit permissions so that users and user groups cannot create tokens. This setting should be defined for the local system account only. GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Create a token object. CitationMicrosoft Create Token Also define who can create a process level token to only the local and network service through GPO: Computer Configuration > [Policies] > Windows Settings > Security Settings > Local Policies > User Rights Assignment: Replace a process level token.CitationMicrosoft Replace Process Token Administrators should log in as a standard user but run their tools with administrator privileges using the built-in access token manipulation command |
All related ATT&CK context
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 1.2 | Current bundle | 68fe84597cc3… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
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mitre-attack M1026Open source URL
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