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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1003: OS Credential Dumping

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.[1] Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.

EnterpriseT1003TechniqueObject v2.2 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

OS Credential Dumping matters because it turns one compromised machine or privileged session into reusable login material: hashes, clear-text passwords, cached credentials, or directory secrets. For leaders, the business issue is not just credential theft; it is whether an attacker can use those credentials for lateral movement and access to restricted information across Windows, Linux, and macOS environments.

Executive priority

Treat T1003 as a core identity and incident-response readiness issue. Executives should ask whether privileged accounts, domain controllers, endpoint credential stores, and Linux/macOS credential exposure paths are governed, monitored, and recoverable. Budget and control prioritization should emphasize credential access protection, privileged account management, Active Directory configuration, hardened OS settings, and endpoint behavior prevention, because these controls determine how far an intrusion can spread after initial compromise.

Technical view

This is an enterprise credential-access technique covering Linux, macOS, and Windows, with Windows-heavy sub-techniques including LSASS memory, SAM, NTDS, LSA Secrets, Cached Domain Credentials, and DCSync, plus Linux paths such as proc filesystem and /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into sensitive memory access, registry or credential-store access, domain replication-like activity, privileged process tampering, and access to OS account databases. The related detection strategy, DET0234, points to correlating sensitive memory and registry access rather than relying on a single event.

Likely telemetry

  • Endpoint process creation and command execution metadata
  • Sensitive process memory access events, especially around authentication-related processes where available
  • Windows Registry access to credential-related hives and secrets
  • File access events for credential stores such as NTDS.dit, SAM, /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, and proc filesystem paths
  • Active Directory and domain controller replication-related logs or network activity relevant to DCSync-style behavior

Detection direction

  • Validate whether telemetry exists on all stated platforms: Windows, Linux, and macOS; many programs have strong Windows coverage but weaker Unix-like credential-store monitoring.
  • Correlate suspicious memory access, registry access, file access, and privileged account context instead of alerting only on known tool names, since ATT&CK notes both adversaries and professional security testers may use similar tools and custom tools may exist.
  • Tune detections with authorized security testing activity in mind to reduce false positives while preserving visibility into unexpected access to credential material.
  • For Active Directory environments, validate monitoring around domain controller data access and replication-related activity, especially where privileges could permit DCSync-like access.
  • During incidents, treat confirmed credential dumping as a trigger for credential reset, privilege review, lateral movement scoping, and restricted-information access review.

Mitigation priorities

  • Prioritize credential access protection and privileged account management to reduce who can reach credential material and how broadly stolen credentials can be reused.
  • Harden Active Directory configuration, especially account permissions, logon policies, and domain administrative access paths.
  • Protect privileged processes and authentication services from tampering or memory access where platform controls support it.
  • Apply OS hardening to reduce unnecessary services, legacy exposure, and default credential-store accessibility.
  • Use endpoint behavior prevention to block or disrupt credential-dumping behaviors rather than depending only on signatures.
Analyst notes and limits

The object has no official ATT&CK detection text, so detection guidance is derived from the technique description, sub-technique relationships, external references, and the related DET0234 detection strategy. The group relationships show that multiple ATT&CK-tracked groups have used this technique, but this take does not infer current activity, targeting, or customer exposure.

Local validation is required to determine actual coverage. ATT&CK lists broad platforms and sub-techniques, but the supplied data does not specify exact event IDs, vendor detections, logging configurations, or guaranteed prevention outcomes. macOS-specific sub-technique detail is sparse in the supplied relationship context.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

OS Credential Dumping

Adversaries may attempt to dump credentials to obtain account login and credential material, normally in the form of a hash or a clear text password. Credentials can be obtained from OS caches, memory, or structures.[1] Credentials can then be used to perform Lateral Movement and access restricted information.

Several of the tools mentioned in associated sub-techniques may be used by both adversaries and professional security testers. Additional custom tools likely exist as well.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

8 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1003.002 Security Account Manager Sub-technique Security Account Manager subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.004 LSA Secrets Sub-technique LSA Secrets subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.006 DCSync Sub-technique DCSync subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.007 Proc Filesystem Sub-technique Proc Filesystem subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.003 NTDS Sub-technique NTDS subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.005 Cached Domain Credentials Sub-technique Cached Domain Credentials subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sub-technique LSASS Memory subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1003.008 /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow Sub-technique /etc/passwd and /etc/shadow subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G1003: Ember Bear

Ember Bear is a Russian state-sponsored cyber espionage group that has been active since at least 2020, linked to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 161st Specialist Training Center (Unit 29155).[1] Ember Bear has primarily focused operations against Ukrainian government and telecommunication entities, but has also operated against critical infrastructure entities in Europe and the Americas.[2] Ember Bear conducted the WhisperGate destructive wiper attacks against Ukraine in early 2022.[3][4][1] There is some confusion as to whether Ember Bear overlaps with another Russian-linked entity referred to as Saint Bear. At present available evidence strongly suggests these are distinct activities with different behavioral profiles.[2][5]

Group Enterprise

G0087: APT39

APT39 is one of several names for cyber espionage activity conducted by the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS) through the front company Rana Intelligence Computing since at least 2014. APT39 has primarily targeted the travel, hospitality, academic, and telecommunications industries in Iran and across Asia, Africa, Europe, and North America to track individuals and entities considered to be a threat by the MOIS.[1][2][3][4][5]

Group Enterprise

G0033: Poseidon Group

Poseidon Group is a Portuguese-speaking threat group that has been active since at least 2005. The group has a history of using information exfiltrated from victims to blackmail victim companies into contracting the Poseidon Group as a security firm. [1]

Group Enterprise

G0129: Mustang Panda

Mustang Panda is a China-based cyber espionage threat actor that has been conducting operations since at least 2012. Mustang Panda has been known to use tailored phishing lures and decoy documents to deliver malicious payloads. Mustang Panda has targeted government, diplomatic, and non-governmental organizations, including think tanks, religious institutions, and research entities, across the United States, Europe, and Asia, with notable activity in Russia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Vietnam. [1][2][3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

Group Enterprise

G0131: Tonto Team

Tonto Team is a suspected Chinese state-sponsored cyber espionage threat group that has primarily targeted South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the United States since at least 2009; by 2020 they expanded operations to include other Asian as well as Eastern European countries. Tonto Team has targeted government, military, energy, mining, financial, education, healthcare, and technology organizations, including through the Heartbeat Campaign (2009-2012) and Operation Bitter Biscuit (2017).[1][2][3][4][5][6]

Group Enterprise

G0050: APT32

APT32 is a suspected Vietnam-based threat group that has been active since at least 2014. The group has targeted multiple private sector industries as well as foreign governments, dissidents, and journalists with a strong focus on Southeast Asian countries like Vietnam, the Philippines, Laos, and Cambodia. They have extensively used strategic web compromises to compromise victims.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G1043: BlackByte

BlackByte is a ransomware threat actor operating since at least 2021. BlackByte is associated with several versions of ransomware also labeled BlackByte Ransomware. BlackByte ransomware operations initially used a common encryption key allowing for the development of a universal decryptor, but subsequent versions such as BlackByte 2.0 Ransomware use more robust encryption mechanisms. BlackByte is notable for operations targeting critical infrastructure entities among other targets across North America.[1][2][3][4][5]

Group Enterprise

G0007: APT28

APT28 is a threat group that has been attributed to Russia's General Staff Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 85th Main Special Service Center (GTsSS) military unit 26165.[1][2] This group has been active since at least 2004.[3][4][5][6][7][8][9][10][11][12][13]

APT28 reportedly compromised the Hillary Clinton campaign, the Democratic National Committee, and the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee in 2016 in an attempt to interfere with the U.S. presidential election.[5] In 2018, the US indicted five GRU Unit 26165 officers associated with APT28 for cyber operations (including close-access operations) conducted between 2014 and 2018 against the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA), the US Anti-Doping Agency, a US nuclear facility, the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), the Spiez Swiss Chemicals Laboratory, and other organizations.[14] Some of these were conducted with the assistance of GRU Unit 74455, which is also referred to as Sandworm Team.

Group Enterprise

G0054: Sowbug

Sowbug is a threat group that has conducted targeted attacks against organizations in South America and Southeast Asia, particularly government entities, since at least 2015. [1]

Group Enterprise

G1053: Storm-0501

Storm-0501 is a financially motivated cyber criminal group that uses commodity and open-source tools to conduct ransomware operations. Storm-0501 has been active since 2021 and has previously been affiliated with Sabbath Ransomware and other Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) variants such as Hive, BlackCat, Hunters International, LockBit 3.0, and Embargo ransomware.[1][2][3][4]

Group Enterprise

G0001: Axiom

Axiom is a suspected Chinese cyber espionage group that has targeted the aerospace, defense, government, manufacturing, and media sectors since at least 2008. Some reporting suggests a degree of overlap between Axiom and Winnti Group but the two groups appear to be distinct based on differences in reporting on TTPs and targeting.[1][2][3]

Malware Enterprise

S0030: Carbanak

Carbanak is a full-featured, remote backdoor used by a group of the same name (Carbanak). It is intended for espionage, data exfiltration, and providing remote access to infected machines. [1] [2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1146: MgBot

MgBot is a modular malware framework exclusively associated with Daggerfly operations since at least 2012. MgBot was developed in C++ and features a module design with multiple available plugins that have been under active development through 2024.[1][2][3]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Group G1003: Ember Bear Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1003.002: Security Account Manager Enterprise uses · Group G0087: APT39 Enterprise uses · Malware S0030: Carbanak Enterprise uses · Malware S1146: MgBot Enterprise uses · Malware S0379: Revenge RAT Enterprise uses · Malware S0048: PinchDuke Enterprise uses · Group G0033: Poseidon Group Enterprise uses · Malware S0052: OnionDuke Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1003.004: LSA Secrets Enterprise uses · Group G0129: Mustang Panda Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information Enterprise uses · Group G0131: Tonto Team Enterprise uses · Group G0050: APT32 Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1027: Password Policies Enterprise uses · Malware S0232: HOMEFRY Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1017: User Training Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1003.006: DCSync Enterprise uses · Group G0039: Suckfly Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1026: Privileged Account Management Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1025: Privileged Process Integrity Enterprise uses · Group G1043: BlackByte Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1003.007: Proc Filesystem Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1041: Encrypt Sensitive Information

Protect sensitive information at rest, in transit, and during processing by using strong encryption algorithms. Encryption ensures the confidentiality and integrity of data, preventing unauthorized access or tampering. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Encrypt Data at Rest:

- Use Case: Use full-disk encryption or file-level encryption to secure sensitive data stored on devices. - Implementation: Implement BitLocker for Windows systems or FileVault for macOS devices to encrypt hard drives.

Encrypt Data in Transit:

- Use Case: Use secure communication protocols (e.g., TLS, HTTPS) to encrypt sensitive data as it travels over networks. - Implementation: Enable HTTPS for all web applications and configure mail servers to enforce STARTTLS for email encryption.

Encrypt Backups:

- Use Case: Ensure that backup data is encrypted both during storage and transfer to prevent unauthorized access. - Implementation: Encrypt cloud backups using AES-256 before uploading them to Amazon S3 or Google Cloud.

Encrypt Application Secrets:

- Use Case: Store sensitive credentials, API keys, and configuration files in encrypted vaults. - Implementation: Use HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager to manage and encrypt secrets.

Database Encryption:

- Use Case: Enable Transparent Data Encryption (TDE) or column-level encryption in database management systems. - Implementation: Use MySQL’s built-in encryption features to encrypt sensitive database fields such as social security numbers.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1040: Behavior Prevention on Endpoint

Behavior Prevention on Endpoint refers to the use of technologies and strategies to detect and block potentially malicious activities by analyzing the behavior of processes, files, API calls, and other endpoint events. Rather than relying solely on known signatures, this approach leverages heuristics, machine learning, and real-time monitoring to identify anomalous patterns indicative of an attack. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Suspicious Process Behavior:

- Implementation: Use Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) tools to monitor and block processes exhibiting unusual behavior, such as privilege escalation attempts. - Use Case: An attacker uses a known vulnerability to spawn a privileged process from a user-level application. The endpoint tool detects the abnormal parent-child process relationship and blocks the action.

Unauthorized File Access:

- Implementation: Leverage Data Loss Prevention (DLP) or endpoint tools to block processes attempting to access sensitive files without proper authorization. - Use Case: A process tries to read or modify a sensitive file located in a restricted directory, such as /etc/shadow on Linux or the SAM registry hive on Windows. The endpoint tool identifies this anomalous behavior and prevents it.

Abnormal API Calls:

- Implementation: Implement runtime analysis tools to monitor API calls and block those associated with malicious activities. - Use Case: A process dynamically injects itself into another process to hijack its execution. The endpoint detects the abnormal use of APIs like `OpenProcess` and `WriteProcessMemory` and terminates the offending process.

Exploit Prevention:

- Implementation: Use behavioral exploit prevention tools to detect and block exploits attempting to gain unauthorized access. - Use Case: A buffer overflow exploit is launched against a vulnerable application. The endpoint detects the anomalous memory write operation and halts the process.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1027: Password Policies

Set and enforce secure password policies for accounts to reduce the likelihood of unauthorized access. Strong password policies include enforcing password complexity, requiring regular password changes, and preventing password reuse. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Windows Systems:

- Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure: - Minimum password length (e.g., 12+ characters). - Password complexity requirements. - Password history (e.g., disallow last 24 passwords). - Account lockout duration and thresholds.

Linux Systems:

- Configure Pluggable Authentication Modules (PAM): - Use `pam_pwquality` to enforce complexity and length requirements. - Implement `pam_tally2` or `pam_faillock` for account lockouts. - Use `pwunconv` to disable password reuse.

Password Managers:

- Enforce usage of enterprise password managers (e.g., Bitwarden, 1Password, LastPass) to generate and store strong passwords.

Password Blacklisting:

- Use tools like Have I Been Pwned password checks or NIST-based blacklist solutions to prevent users from setting compromised passwords.

Regular Auditing:

- Periodically audit password policies and account configurations to ensure compliance using tools like LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution) and vulnerability scanners.

*Tools for Implementation*

Windows:

- Group Policy Management Console (GPMC): Enforce password policies. - Microsoft Local Administrator Password Solution (LAPS): Enforce random, unique admin passwords.

Linux/macOS:

- PAM Modules (pam_pwquality, pam_tally2, pam_faillock): Enforce password rules. - Lynis: Audit password policies and system configurations.

Cross-Platform:

- Password Managers (Bitwarden, 1Password, KeePass): Manage and enforce strong passwords. - Have I Been Pwned API: Prevent the use of breached passwords. - NIST SP 800-63B compliant tools: Enforce password guidelines and blacklisting.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1017: User Training

User Training involves educating employees and contractors on recognizing, reporting, and preventing cyber threats that rely on human interaction, such as phishing, social engineering, and other manipulative techniques. Comprehensive training programs create a human firewall by empowering users to be an active component of the organization's cybersecurity defenses. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Create Comprehensive Training Programs:

- Design training modules tailored to the organization's risk profile, covering topics such as phishing, password management, and incident reporting. - Provide role-specific training for high-risk employees, such as helpdesk staff or executives.

Use Simulated Exercises:

- Conduct phishing simulations to measure user susceptibility and provide targeted follow-up training. - Run social engineering drills to evaluate employee responses and reinforce protocols.

Leverage Gamification and Engagement:

- Introduce interactive learning methods such as quizzes, gamified challenges, and rewards for successful detection and reporting of threats.

Incorporate Security Policies into Onboarding:

- Include cybersecurity training as part of the onboarding process for new employees. - Provide easy-to-understand materials outlining acceptable use policies and reporting procedures.

Regular Refresher Courses:

- Update training materials to include emerging threats and techniques used by adversaries. - Ensure all employees complete periodic refresher courses to stay informed.

Emphasize Real-World Scenarios:

- Use case studies of recent attacks to demonstrate the consequences of successful phishing or social engineering. - Discuss how specific employee actions can prevent or mitigate such attacks.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1025: Privileged Process Integrity

Privileged Process Integrity focuses on defending highly privileged processes (e.g., system services, antivirus, or authentication processes) from tampering, injection, or compromise by adversaries. These processes often interact with critical components, making them prime targets for techniques like code injection, privilege escalation, and process manipulation. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Protected Process Mechanisms:

- Enable RunAsPPL on Windows systems to protect LSASS and other critical processes. - Use registry modifications to enforce protected process settings: `HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Lsa\RunAsPPL`

Anti-Injection and Memory Protection:

- Enable Control Flow Guard (CFG), DEP, and ASLR to protect against process memory tampering. - Deploy endpoint protection tools that actively block process injection attempts.

Code Signing Validation:

- Implement policies for Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or AppLocker to enforce execution of signed binaries. - Ensure critical processes are signed with valid certificates.

Access Controls:

- Use DACLs and MIC to limit which users and processes can interact with privileged processes. - Disable unnecessary debugging capabilities for high-privileged processes.

Kernel-Level Protections:

- Ensure Kernel Patch Protection (PatchGuard) is enabled on Windows systems. - Leverage SELinux or AppArmor on Linux to enforce kernel-level security policies.

*Tools for Implementation*

Protected Process Light (PPL):

- RunAsPPL (Windows) - Windows Defender Credential Guard

Code Integrity and Signing:

- Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) - AppLocker - SELinux/AppArmor (Linux)

Memory Protection:

- Control Flow Guard (CFG), Data Execution Prevention (DEP), ASLR

Process Isolation/Sandboxing:

- Firejail (Linux Sandbox) - Windows Sandbox - QEMU/KVM-based isolation

Kernel Protection:

- PatchGuard (Windows Kernel Patch Protection) - SELinux (Mandatory Access Control for Linux) - AppArmor

Mitigation Enterprise

M1043: Credential Access Protection

Credential Access Protection focuses on implementing measures to prevent adversaries from obtaining credentials, such as passwords, hashes, tokens, or keys, that could be used for unauthorized access. This involves restricting access to credential storage mechanisms, hardening configurations to block credential dumping methods, and using monitoring tools to detect suspicious credential-related activity. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Restrict Access to Credential Storage:

- Use Case: Prevent adversaries from accessing the SAM (Security Account Manager) database on Windows systems. - Implementation: Enforce least privilege principles and restrict administrative access to credential stores such as `C:\Windows\System32\config\SAM`.

Use Credential Guard:

- Use Case: Isolate LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service) memory to prevent credential dumping. - Implementation: Enable Windows Defender Credential Guard on enterprise endpoints to isolate secrets and protect them from unauthorized access.

Monitor for Credential Dumping Tools:

- Use Case: Detect and block known tools like Mimikatz or Windows Credential Editor. - Implementation: Flag suspicious process behavior related to credential dumping.

Disable Cached Credentials:

- Use Case: Prevent adversaries from exploiting cached credentials on endpoints. - Implementation: Configure group policy to reduce or eliminate the use of cached credentials (e.g., set Interactive logon: Number of previous logons to cache to 0).

Enable Secure Boot and Memory Protections:

- Use Case: Prevent memory-based attacks used to extract credentials. - Implementation: Configure Secure Boot and enforce hardware-based security features like DEP (Data Execution Prevention) and ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization).

Mitigation Enterprise

M1015: Active Directory Configuration

Implement robust Active Directory (AD) configurations using group policies to secure user accounts, control access, and minimize the attack surface. AD configurations enable centralized control over account settings, logon policies, and permissions, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Configuration:

- Implementation: Use domain accounts instead of local accounts to leverage AD’s centralized management, including group policies, auditing, and access control. - Use Case: For IT staff managing shared resources, provision domain accounts that allow IT teams to log in centrally, reducing the risk of unmanaged, rogue local accounts on individual machines.

Interactive Logon Restrictions:

- Implementation: Configure group policies to restrict interactive logons (e.g., direct physical or RDP logons) for service accounts or privileged accounts that do not require such access. - Use Case: Prevent service accounts, such as SQL Server accounts, from having interactive logon privileges. This reduces the risk of these accounts being leveraged for lateral movement if compromised.

Remote Desktop Settings:

- Implementation: Limit Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access to specific, authorized accounts. Use group policies to enforce this, allowing only necessary users to establish RDP sessions. - Use Case: On sensitive servers (e.g., domain controllers or financial databases), restrict RDP access to administrative accounts only, while all other users are denied access.

Dedicated Administrative Accounts:

- Implementation: Create domain-wide administrative accounts that are restricted from interactive logons, designed solely for high-level tasks (e.g., software installation, patching). - Use Case: Create separate administrative accounts for different purposes, such as one set of accounts for installations and another for managing repository access. This limits exposure and helps reduce attack vectors.

Authentication Silos:

- Implementation: Configure Authentication Silos in AD, using group policies to create access zones with restrictions based on membership, such as the Protected Users security group. This restricts access to critical accounts and minimizes exposure to potential threats. - Use Case: Place high-risk or high-value accounts, such as executive or administrative accounts, in an Authentication Silo with extra controls, limiting their exposure to only necessary systems. This reduces the risk of credential misuse or abuse if these accounts are compromised.

**Tools for Implementation**:

- Active Directory Group Policies: Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure, deploy, and enforce policies across AD environments. - PowerShell: Automate account configuration, logon restrictions, and policy application using PowerShell scripts. - AD Administrative Center: Manage Authentication Silos and configure high-level policies for critical user groups within AD.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.2
Created
Modified
Raw hash
0395545e0e026fd8...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.2 Current bundle 0395545e0e02…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Brining MimiKatz to Unix

    Tim Wadhwa-Brown. (2018, November). Where 2 worlds collide Bringing Mimikatz et al to UNIX. Retrieved October 13, 2021.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    AdSecurity DCSync Sept 2015

    Metcalf, S. (2015, September 25). Mimikatz DCSync Usage, Exploitation, and Detection. Retrieved December 4, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Harmj0y DCSync Sept 2015

    Schroeder, W. (2015, September 22). Mimikatz and DCSync and ExtraSids, Oh My. Retrieved December 4, 2017.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Medium Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory

    French, D. (2018, October 2). Detecting Attempts to Steal Passwords from Memory. Retrieved October 11, 2019.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    Microsoft DRSR Dec 2017

    Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-DRSR Directory Replication Service (DRS) Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 4, 2017.

    Open source URL
  6. [6]
    Microsoft GetNCCChanges

    Microsoft. (n.d.). IDL_DRSGetNCChanges (Opnum 3). Retrieved December 4, 2017.

    Open source URL
  7. [7]
    Microsoft NRPC Dec 2017

    Microsoft. (2017, December 1). MS-NRPC - Netlogon Remote Protocol. Retrieved December 6, 2017.

    Open source URL
  8. [8]
    Microsoft SAMR

    Microsoft. (n.d.). MS-SAMR Security Account Manager (SAM) Remote Protocol (Client-to-Server) - Transport. Retrieved December 4, 2017.

    Open source URL
  9. [9]
    Powersploit

    PowerSploit. (n.d.). Retrieved December 4, 2014.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Samba DRSUAPI

    SambaWiki. (n.d.). DRSUAPI. Retrieved December 4, 2017.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    mitre-attack T1003
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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