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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1222.001: Windows Permissions

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.[1][2] File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).

Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).[3] Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.[4]

Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.

EnterpriseT1222.001Sub-techniqueObject v2.0 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Windows Permissions matters because changing file or directory DACLs can let an adversary bypass intended access controls, reach protected files, or prepare other activity such as persistence or hijacking execution flow. For leaders, the issue is not just whether Windows permissions are configured once, but whether the organization can prove sensitive paths remain protected and can spot suspicious permission changes made with built-in Windows tools or PowerShell.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a Windows defense-impairment behavior that can weaken access control assumptions during an incident. It is relevant to resilience and audit readiness because file permissions often protect system files, application configuration, scripts, and other high-value operational assets. Executives should ask whether privileged access, least privilege, and file-permission governance are monitored continuously, not only reviewed during build or compliance checks.

Technical view

This sub-technique applies to Windows and concerns adversary modification of file or directory permissions and attributes, including DACL changes. ATT&CK notes built-in commands such as icacls, cacls, takeown, and attrib, and PowerShell cmdlets that can retrieve or modify DACLs. Because MITRE provides no official detection text for this object, SOC and detection teams should validate coverage through the related DET0418 Windows DACL Manipulation Behavioral Chain Detection Strategy where available, and correlate permission-change activity with privileged account use, sensitive paths, persistence-related locations, and execution-flow hijack opportunities.

Likely telemetry

  • Windows process creation telemetry for built-in permission and attribute utilities
  • PowerShell activity and script/module logging where enabled
  • File and directory permission or ownership change audit events
  • Endpoint detection telemetry showing command-line arguments, parent process, user context, and target path
  • Privileged account logon and administrative session records

Detection direction

  • Validate that Windows endpoints collect process command lines and user context for permission-changing utilities and PowerShell-based DACL activity.
  • Tune detections around changes to sensitive directories and files rather than alerting on every administrative permission change, which can be noisy in normal operations.
  • Correlate permission changes with privileged account activity, unusual parent processes, and subsequent persistence or hijack-related file modifications when telemetry permits.
  • Review the related DET0418 strategy for behavioral-chain coverage, since the ATT&CK object itself does not provide official detection guidance.
  • Identify blind spots where file audit policy, PowerShell logging, or endpoint command-line collection is disabled or not retained long enough for incident response.

Mitigation priorities

  • Implement and periodically verify restrictive file and directory permissions for sensitive Windows locations, consistent with M1022 Restrict File and Directory Permissions.
  • Apply privileged account management and least privilege controls, consistent with M1026, so only authorized users, groups, or processes can change important DACLs.
  • Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories, and review ownership settings for high-value paths.
  • Use change-control and monitoring for permission changes on system, application, script, and configuration files that support business-critical services.
  • During incident response, treat unexpected permission or ownership changes as potential defense-impairment evidence and scope adjacent persistence or execution-flow abuse.
Analyst notes and limits

The relationship context links this technique to multiple ransomware or destructive software entries and financially motivated groups, but this take does not infer current activity or customer exposure. The practical value is in validating whether Windows permission boundaries are enforced and observable, especially on assets that support critical operations.

MITRE does not provide official detection text for T1222.001 in the supplied fields. The available object is Windows-specific, and local path criticality, normal administrator behavior, audit policy, and endpoint logging determine whether detections are feasible and reliable.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Windows Permissions

Adversaries may modify file or directory permissions/attributes to evade access control lists (ACLs) and access protected files.[1][2] File and directory permissions are commonly managed by ACLs configured by the file or directory owner, or users with the appropriate permissions. File and directory ACL implementations vary by platform, but generally explicitly designate which users or groups can perform which actions (read, write, execute, etc.).

Windows implements file and directory ACLs as Discretionary Access Control Lists (DACLs).[3] Similar to a standard ACL, DACLs identifies the accounts that are allowed or denied access to a securable object. When an attempt is made to access a securable object, the system checks the access control entries in the DACL in order. If a matching entry is found, access to the object is granted. Otherwise, access is denied.[4]

Adversaries can interact with the DACLs using built-in Windows commands, such as `icacls`, `cacls`, `takeown`, and `attrib`, which can grant adversaries higher permissions on specific files and folders. Further, PowerShell provides cmdlets that can be used to retrieve or modify file and directory DACLs. Specific file and directory modifications may be a required step for many techniques, such as establishing Persistence via Accessibility Features, Boot or Logon Initialization Scripts, or tainting/hijacking other instrumental binary/configuration files via Hijack Execution Flow.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

1 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1222 File and Directory Permissions Modification This object subtechnique of File and Directory Permissions Modification.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Group Enterprise

G0102: Wizard Spider

Wizard Spider is a Russia-based financially motivated threat group originally known for the creation and deployment of TrickBot since at least 2016. Wizard Spider possesses a diverse arsenal of tools and has conducted ransomware campaigns against a variety of organizations, ranging from major corporations to hospitals.[1][2][3]

Group Enterprise

G1046: Storm-1811

Storm-1811 is a financially-motivated entity linked to Black Basta ransomware deployment. Storm-1811 is notable for unique phishing and social engineering mechanisms for initial access, such as overloading victim email inboxes with non-malicious spam to prompt a fake "help desk" interaction leading to the deployment of adversary tools and capabilities.[1][2][3][4]

Tool Enterprise

S9002: Diskpart

Diskpart is a Windows command-line utility that is used to manage the computer’s drives, which includes disks, partitions, volumes and virtual hard disks.[1]

Adversaries may abuse Diskpart to perform discovery and destructive actions on a system’s storage. For example, adversaries have been observed using Diskpart to conduct Discovery techniques to enumerate disks and volumes to gather information about the host environment, and to execute commands such as `clean all` to remove partition information and overwrite data across disks, resulting in data destruction.[2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0570: BitPaymer

BitPaymer is a ransomware variant first observed in August 2017 targeting hospitals in the U.K. BitPaymer uses a unique encryption key, ransom note, and contact information for each operation. BitPaymer has several indicators suggesting overlap with the Dridex malware and is often delivered via Dridex.[1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0531: Grandoreiro

Grandoreiro is a banking trojan written in Delphi that was first observed in 2016 and uses a Malware-as-a-Service (MaaS) business model. Grandoreiro has confirmed victims in Brazil, Mexico, Portugal, and Spain.[1][2]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0446: Ryuk

Ryuk is a ransomware designed to target enterprise environments that has been used in attacks since at least 2018. Ryuk shares code similarities with Hermes ransomware.[1][2][3]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S1068: BlackCat

BlackCat is ransomware written in Rust that has been offered via the Ransomware-as-a-Service (RaaS) model. First observed November 2021, BlackCat has been used to target multiple sectors and organizations in various countries and regions in Africa, the Americas, Asia, Australia, and Europe.[1][2][3]

LinuxWindows
Malware Enterprise

S0366: WannaCry

WannaCry is ransomware that was first seen in a global attack during May 2017, which affected more than 150 countries. It contains worm-like features to spread itself across a computer network using the SMBv1 exploit EternalBlue.[1][2][3][4]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Malware S0201: JPIN Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1026: Privileged Account Management Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions Enterprise uses · Tool S9002: Diskpart Enterprise uses · Malware S0570: BitPaymer Enterprise uses · Malware S0531: Grandoreiro Enterprise uses · Group G0102: Wizard Spider Enterprise detects · Detection Strategy DET0418: Windows DACL Manipulation Behavioral Chain Detection Strategy Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1222: File and Directory Permissions Modification Enterprise uses · Malware S0693: CaddyWiper Enterprise uses · Malware S0446: Ryuk Enterprise uses · Malware S1068: BlackCat Enterprise uses · Malware S0366: WannaCry Enterprise uses · Malware S1180: BlackByte Ransomware Enterprise uses · Malware S0612: WastedLocker Enterprise uses · Group G1046: Storm-1811 Enterprise
Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Mitigation Enterprise

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

Mitigation Enterprise

M1022: Restrict File and Directory Permissions

Restricting file and directory permissions involves setting access controls at the file system level to limit which users, groups, or processes can read, write, or execute files. By configuring permissions appropriately, organizations can reduce the attack surface for adversaries seeking to access sensitive data, plant malicious code, or tamper with system files.

Enforce Least Privilege Permissions:

- Remove unnecessary write permissions on sensitive files and directories. - Use file ownership and groups to control access for specific roles.

Example (Windows): Right-click the shared folder → Properties → Security tab → Adjust permissions for NTFS ACLs.

Harden File Shares:

- Disable anonymous access to shared folders. - Enforce NTFS permissions for shared folders on Windows.

Example: Set permissions to restrict write access to critical files, such as system executables (e.g., `/bin` or `/sbin` on Linux). Use tools like `chown` and `chmod` to assign file ownership and limit access.

On Linux, apply: `chmod 750 /etc/sensitive.conf` `chown root:admin /etc/sensitive.conf`

File Integrity Monitoring (FIM):

- Use tools like Tripwire, Wazuh, or OSSEC to monitor changes to critical file permissions.

Audit File System Access:

- Enable auditing to track permission changes or unauthorized access attempts. - Use auditd (Linux) or Event Viewer (Windows) to log activities.

Restrict Startup Directories:

- Configure permissions to prevent unauthorized writes to directories like `C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu`.

Example: Restrict write access to critical directories like `/etc/`, `/usr/local/`, and Windows directories such as `C:\Windows\System32`.

- On Windows, use icacls to modify permissions: `icacls "C:\Windows\System32" /inheritance:r /grant:r SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F` - On Linux, monitor permissions using tools like `lsattr` or `auditd`.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
47c7233df2648c16...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle 47c7233df264…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Hybrid Analysis Icacls1 June 2018

    Hybrid Analysis. (2018, June 12). c9b65b764985dfd7a11d3faf599c56b8.exe. Retrieved August 19, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    Hybrid Analysis Icacls2 May 2018

    Hybrid Analysis. (2018, May 30). 2a8efbfadd798f6111340f7c1c956bee.dll. Retrieved August 19, 2018.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Microsoft DACL May 2018

    Microsoft. (2018, May 30). DACLs and ACEs. Retrieved August 19, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Microsoft Access Control Lists May 2018

    M. Satran, M. Jacobs. (2018, May 30). Access Control Lists. Retrieved February 4, 2020.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    mitre-attack T1222.001
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

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