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MITRE ATT&CK® Technique

T1550: Use Alternate Authentication Material

Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.

Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.[1][2]

Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.

EnterpriseT1550TechniqueObject v2.0 Modified
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence High

Use Alternate Authentication Material matters because attackers do not need a user’s plaintext password if they can obtain material that systems already trust, such as hashes, Kerberos tickets, application access tokens, or web session cookies. For leaders, this is a lateral movement risk across Windows, cloud, SaaS, identity provider, container, Linux, and office-suite environments: MFA and password controls may not be enough if authenticated tokens or tickets are stolen and reused.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as an identity and lateral-movement resilience issue. Ask whether the organization can prove where authentication material is created, cached, logged, expired, and revoked across AD, cloud, SaaS, and identity-provider services. This technique is especially relevant to incident decision-making because response may require session/token invalidation, account containment, privilege review, and audit evidence—not just password resets.

Technical view

ATT&CK lists this as a lateral movement technique with sub-techniques for application access tokens, pass-the-hash, pass-the-ticket, and web session cookies. SOC and IR teams should validate telemetry across authentication services, endpoint credential material exposure, Kerberos activity, session/token usage, SaaS/API access, and privileged account behavior. MITRE does not provide detection text for the parent technique, but the related DET0338 detection strategy indicates behavior-based detection is relevant. Detection engineering should be organized by sub-technique and platform rather than relying on a single generic alert.

Likely telemetry

  • Identity provider sign-in and token/session logs
  • Active Directory and Kerberos authentication logs
  • Windows security events related to account logon and lateral access
  • Endpoint telemetry for credential material access or abnormal authentication reuse
  • SaaS, office suite, IaaS, container, and API access logs

Detection direction

  • Validate coverage separately for application access tokens, password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and web session cookies.
  • Correlate authentication success with unusual source systems, session reuse, privileged account use, and lateral movement patterns.
  • Tune for legitimate administrative tooling and service account behavior to reduce false positives while preserving visibility into abnormal use.
  • Confirm that cloud, SaaS, office suite, and identity-provider logs are retained and normalized; these are common blind spots for token and cookie misuse.
  • Use ATT&CK relationship context, including DET0338 and the listed sub-techniques, to structure detection content and test cases.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with auditing: confirm authentication, token, session, account, and privileged activity logs exist and are reviewable.
  • Harden Active Directory configuration and account use policies to reduce lateral movement paths and constrain where accounts can authenticate.
  • Apply user and privileged account management, including least privilege, lifecycle controls, and monitoring of elevated accounts.
  • Review password policy as one layer of control, while recognizing this technique can bypass plaintext password knowledge.
  • For applications and APIs, apply secure development guidance so authentication material is handled, stored, expired, and revoked safely.
Analyst notes and limits

The parent technique is broad and should be operationalized through its ATT&CK sub-techniques: Application Access Token, Pass the Hash, Pass the Ticket, and Web Session Cookie. ATT&CK relationship context also links this technique to the SolarWinds Compromise campaign and FoggyWeb software, which supports prioritizing identity, federation, and token/session visibility without implying current activity in any specific environment.

The official parent technique does not include detection guidance. This take is based only on the supplied ATT&CK description, platforms, tactics, external references, mitigations, sub-techniques, and relationships. Local architecture, identity providers, logging configuration, retention, and incident history are required to determine actual exposure or coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Use Alternate Authentication Material

Adversaries may use alternate authentication material, such as password hashes, Kerberos tickets, and application access tokens, in order to move laterally within an environment and bypass normal system access controls.

Authentication processes generally require a valid identity (e.g., username) along with one or more authentication factors (e.g., password, pin, physical smart card, token generator, etc.). Alternate authentication material is legitimately generated by systems after a user or application successfully authenticates by providing a valid identity and the required authentication factor(s). Alternate authentication material may also be generated during the identity creation process.[1][2]

Caching alternate authentication material allows the system to verify an identity has successfully authenticated without asking the user to reenter authentication factor(s). Because the alternate authentication must be maintained by the system—either in memory or on disk—it may be at risk of being stolen through Credential Access techniques. By stealing alternate authentication material, adversaries are able to bypass system access controls and authenticate to systems without knowing the plaintext password or any additional authentication factors.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

4 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1550.004 Web Session Cookie Sub-technique Web Session Cookie subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1550.001 Application Access Token Sub-technique Application Access Token subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1550.003 Pass the Ticket Sub-technique Pass the Ticket subtechnique of this object.
Enterprise T1550.002 Pass the Hash Sub-technique Pass the Hash subtechnique of this object.
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Malware Enterprise

S0661: FoggyWeb

FoggyWeb is a passive and highly-targeted backdoor capable of remotely exfiltrating sensitive information from a compromised Active Directory Federated Services (AD FS) server. It has been used by APT29 since at least early April 2021.[1]

Windows
Campaign Enterprise

C0024: SolarWinds Compromise

The SolarWinds Compromise was a sophisticated supply chain cyber operation conducted by APT29 that was discovered in mid-December 2020. APT29 used customized malware to inject malicious code into the SolarWinds Orion software build process that was later distributed through a normal software update; they also used password spraying, token theft, API abuse, spear phishing, and other supply chain attacks to compromise user accounts and leverage their associated access. Victims of this campaign included government, consulting, technology, telecom, and other organizations in North America, Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. This activity has been labled the StellarParticle campaign in industry reporting.[1] Industry reporting also initially referred to the actors involved in this campaign as UNC2452, NOBELIUM, Dark Halo, and SolarStorm.[2][3][4][5][1][6][7][8]

In April 2021, the US and UK governments attributed the SolarWinds Compromise to Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR); public statements included citations to APT29, Cozy Bear, and The Dukes.[9][10][11] The US government assessed that of the approximately 18,000 affected public and private sector customers of Solar Winds’ Orion product, a much smaller number were compromised by follow-on APT29 activity on their systems.[12]

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
2.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
36d59ebe6710ad56...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 2.0 Current bundle 36d59ebe6710…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    NIST Authentication

    NIST. (n.d.). Authentication. Retrieved January 30, 2020.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    NIST MFA

    NIST. (n.d.). Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA). Retrieved September 25, 2024.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    mitre-attack T1550
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.