T1548.006: TCC Manipulation
Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).
When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.[1]
Adversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through Process Injection or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious AppleScript. When executing under the Finder App, the malicious AppleScript inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and Launchctl.[2][3]
Analyst context for executives and security teams
TCC Manipulation matters because macOS privacy prompts are often treated as a user-facing safeguard, but ATT&CK describes ways adversaries may abuse existing TCC permissions or weakened system protections to access sensitive services such as camera, microphone, screen sharing, or Full Disk Access without a new prompt. For leaders, this is a macOS privilege-escalation concern tied to endpoint hardening, privileged access discipline, and auditability of privacy-control changes.
Executive priority
Prioritize this where macOS systems handle regulated data, executive activity, developer workstations, or sensitive communications. The key business question is whether the organization can prove that TCC-protected permissions, SIP posture, privileged account use, and TCC database access are controlled and auditable. This supports resilience, compliance evidence, and incident scoping when a macOS endpoint is suspected of unauthorized data or device access.
Technical view
This is a macOS sub-technique under Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism for privilege escalation. ATT&CK highlights abuse of applications that already have TCC permissions, execution under trusted apps such as Finder, AppleScript inheritance of access, Process Injection context, and manipulation of TCC database behavior when SIP is disabled, including Launchctl-related context. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into TCC.db access at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` and user equivalents, SIP state, tccd-related activity, execution chains involving Finder or AppleScript, and privileged changes to privacy/security settings. The related detection strategy DET0534 specifically references TCC database manipulation via Launchctl and unprotected SIP.
Likely telemetry
- macOS endpoint process execution and parent-child process relationships
- File access and modification events for system and user TCC.db locations
- tccd activity and macOS privacy permission change evidence where available
- SIP status or configuration evidence
- Launchctl usage and environment-variable-related process context
Detection direction
- Validate that macOS telemetry covers both system-level and user-level TCC database paths, not only generic process logs.
- Review process chains where apps with existing TCC permissions launch scripts or binaries, especially Finder and AppleScript-related activity described by ATT&CK.
- Tune for suspicious Launchctl and environment-variable context when SIP is not enabled or cannot be verified, aligning to the DET0534 relationship.
- Correlate TCC permission changes with privileged account activity and MDM/profile changes to reduce false positives from legitimate administration.
- Account for blind spots: ATT&CK provides no official detection text for this object, so local logging, EDR capability, and macOS audit configuration determine practical coverage.
Mitigation priorities
- Keep macOS privilege boundaries hardened by validating SIP is enabled where organizationally supported, since ATT&CK notes TCC protections are disabled when SIP is disabled.
- Apply least privilege and restrict file and directory permissions around sensitive system and user privacy-control data, consistent with M1022.
- Limit and monitor administrative/root-equivalent access on macOS endpoints, consistent with M1026 Privileged Account Management.
- Audit TCC-related configuration, database access, privacy permissions, and privileged changes on a recurring basis, consistent with M1047.
- Use MDM governance where applicable to make authorized TCC/privacy permissions explicit and reviewable rather than dependent on unmanaged user prompts.
Analyst notes and limits
The supplied ATT&CK relationships identify XCSSET as software that uses this technique, but this take does not infer current activity or attribution. The most useful defensive value is validating whether macOS privacy permissions are observable, governed, and correlated with privileged execution paths.
Official ATT&CK detection guidance is not provided for T1548.006. The detection strategy relationship name is available, but detailed analytics are not supplied here. Local macOS version, SIP state, MDM use, endpoint telemetry depth, and legitimate administrative workflows must be assessed before judging coverage or risk.
TCC Manipulation
Adversaries can manipulate or abuse the Transparency, Consent, & Control (TCC) service or database to grant malicious executables elevated permissions. TCC is a Privacy & Security macOS control mechanism used to determine if the running process has permission to access the data or services protected by TCC, such as screen sharing, camera, microphone, or Full Disk Access (FDA).
When an application requests to access data or a service protected by TCC, the TCC daemon (`tccd`) checks the TCC database, located at `/Library/Application Support/com.apple.TCC/TCC.db` (and `~/` equivalent), and an overwrites file (if connected to an MDM) for existing permissions. If permissions do not exist, then the user is prompted to grant permission. Once permissions are granted, the database stores the application's permissions and will not prompt the user again unless reset. For example, when a web browser requests permissions to the user's webcam, once granted the web browser may not explicitly prompt the user again.[1]
Adversaries may access restricted data or services protected by TCC through abusing applications previously granted permissions through Process Injection or executing a malicious binary using another application. For example, adversaries can use Finder, a macOS native app with FDA permissions, to execute a malicious AppleScript. When executing under the Finder App, the malicious AppleScript inherits access to all files on the system without requiring a user prompt. When System Integrity Protection (SIP) is disabled, TCC protections are also disabled. For a system without SIP enabled, adversaries can manipulate the TCC database to add permissions to their malicious executable through loading an adversary controlled TCC database using environment variables and Launchctl.[2][3]
How security teams should use this page
Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.
Related techniques
This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.
| Domain | ID | Name | Relationship / procedure |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enterprise | T1548 | Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism | This object subtechnique of Abuse Elevation Control Mechanism. |
Groups, software, and campaigns
S0658: XCSSET
XCSSET is a modular macOS malware family delivered through infected Xcode projects and executed when the project is compiled. Active since August 2020, it has been observed installing backdoors, spoofed browsers, collecting data, and encrypting user files. It is composed of SHC-compiled shell scripts and run-only AppleScripts, often hiding in apps that mimic system tools (such as Xcode, Mail, or Notes) or use familiar icons (like Launchpad) to avoid detection.[1][2][3]
All related ATT&CK context
Mitigation direction
Object version and sync metadata
The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
| Release | Bundle imported | Object version | Modified | Status | Raw hash |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 19.1 | 2.0 | Current bundle | 81fb2193d0b5… |
Mirrored ATT&CK source object
The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.
External references and citations
MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.
-
[1]
welivesecurity TCC
Marc-Etienne M.Léveillé. (2022, July 19). I see what you did there: A look at the CloudMensis macOS spyware. Retrieved March 21, 2024.
Open source URL -
[2]
TCC macOS bypass
Phil Stokes. (2021, July 1). Bypassing macOS TCC User Privacy Protections By Accident and Design. Retrieved March 21, 2024.
Open source URL -
[3]
TCC Database
Marina Liang. (2024, April 23). Return of the mac(OS): Transparency, Consent, and Control (TCC) Database Manipulation. Retrieved March 28, 2024.
Open source URL -
[4]
mitre-attack T1548.006Open source URL
Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.