T1558.001: Golden Ticket

Golden Ticket is a Windows Active Directory risk where possession of the KRBTGT password hash can let an adversary forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets and generate authentication material for accounts in the domain. For leaders, this is material because it points to a potential domain-wide identity compromise path rather than a single stolen password.

Executive priority

Treat this as a high-priority identity resilience issue for Active Directory environments. The key business question is whether privileged access to domain controllers, KRBTGT exposure paths, Kerberos monitoring, and incident response procedures are strong enough to prove or disprove forged ticket activity during an intrusion. Budget and audit discussions should prioritize Active Directory configuration, privileged account management, and evidence collection from domain controllers/KDC services.

Technical view

MITRE lists this as a Windows credential-access sub-technique under Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets. The technique depends on access to the KRBTGT hash, which MITRE notes may be obtained through OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller. SOC and IR teams should validate visibility into Kerberos TGT/TGS activity involving the KDC on domain controllers, privileged account use, and suspicious credential-dumping or domain-controller access patterns. ATT&CK does not provide native detection text for this object, but the relationship to DET0144 indicates a detection strategy focused on forged Kerberos Golden Tickets.

Likely telemetry

Domain controller security and authentication logs
Kerberos KDC activity, including TGT and TGS request evidence
Active Directory account and privilege change records
Privileged logon and administrative activity on domain controllers
Endpoint telemetry on domain controllers and privileged workstations for credential access behavior

Detection direction

Confirm that Kerberos authentication evidence from domain controllers is retained and searchable for incident response timelines.
Validate DET0144-aligned analytics or equivalent logic for forged Kerberos Golden Ticket activity rather than assuming standard log collection is sufficient.
Correlate Kerberos ticket activity with privileged account use and domain-controller access, because the KRBTGT hash exposure path is central to the technique.
Tune carefully for legitimate administrative Kerberos activity to reduce false positives, while treating unusual domain-wide authentication material or privileged-ticket behavior as high-investigation value.
Maintain relationship context: public tools listed by ATT&CK as using this technique include Mimikatz, Empire, Sliver, and Rubeus, but tool sightings alone should not be treated as proof of Golden Ticket use.

Mitigation priorities

Prioritize M1015 Active Directory Configuration: harden account settings, logon policies, permissions, and group policy controls to reduce attack surface and unauthorized movement.
Prioritize M1026 Privileged Account Management: restrict, monitor, and audit privileged accounts, especially access paths to domain controllers and KRBTGT-related exposure.
Ensure incident response plans explicitly address suspected KRBTGT or domain-controller credential compromise, including evidence preservation and executive decision points.
Use vulnerability and control validation efforts to test whether domain-controller access, credential dumping prerequisites, and Kerberos monitoring gaps are being reduced.

Analyst notes and limits

This object is most useful as an identity-compromise severity marker. If an investigation has credible evidence of KRBTGT hash exposure or forged Kerberos tickets, responders should assume ordinary account-level remediation may be insufficient until Active Directory trust and privileged access paths are assessed. The technique is associated in ATT&CK with Ke3chang and several tools, but those relationships should be used for detection context, not attribution.

MITRE provides no official detection text for this technique in the supplied object. This take is therefore based on the official description, platforms, tactics, external reference metadata, and supplied relationships. Local domain architecture, log retention, Kerberos configuration, and privileged access practices are required to determine actual exposure or coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Golden Ticket

Adversaries who have the KRBTGT account password hash may forge Kerberos ticket-granting tickets (TGT), also known as a golden ticket.[1] Golden tickets enable adversaries to generate authentication material for any account in Active Directory.[2]

Using a golden ticket, adversaries are then able to request ticket granting service (TGS) tickets, which enable access to specific resources. Golden tickets require adversaries to interact with the Key Distribution Center (KDC) in order to obtain TGS.[3]

The KDC service runs all on domain controllers that are part of an Active Directory domain. KRBTGT is the Kerberos Key Distribution Center (KDC) service account and is responsible for encrypting and signing all Kerberos tickets.[4] The KRBTGT password hash may be obtained using OS Credential Dumping and privileged access to a domain controller.

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Related techniques

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

Filter related techniques 1 rows

Domain	ID	Name	Relationship / procedure
Enterprise	T1558	Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets	This object subtechnique of Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets.

Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

G0004: Ke3chang

Ke3chang is a threat group attributed to actors operating out of China. Ke3chang has targeted oil, government, diplomatic, military, and NGOs in Central and South America, the Caribbean, Europe, and North America since at least 2010.[1][2][3][4]

S0363: Empire

Empire is an open-source, cross-platform remote administration and post-exploitation framework that is publicly available on GitHub. While the tool itself is primarily written in Python, the post-exploitation agents are written in pure PowerShell for Windows and Python for Linux/macOS. Empire was one of five tools singled out by a joint report on public hacking tools being widely used by adversaries.[1][2][3]

LinuxmacOSWindows

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows

S0633: Sliver

Sliver is an open source, cross-platform, red team command and control (C2) framework written in Golang. Sliver includes its own package manager, "armory," for staging and downloading additional tools and payloads to the primary C2 framework.[1][2]

WindowsLinuxmacOS

S1071: Rubeus

Rubeus is a C# toolset designed for raw Kerberos interaction that has been used since at least 2020, including in ransomware operations.[1][2][3][4]

Windows

Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Group G0004: Ke3chang Enterprise uses · Tool S0363: Empire Enterprise uses · Tool S0002: Mimikatz Enterprise detects · Detection Strategy DET0144: Detect Forged Kerberos Golden Tickets (T1558.001) Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1026: Privileged Account Management Enterprise uses · Tool S0633: Sliver Enterprise uses · Tool S1071: Rubeus Enterprise subtechnique of · Technique T1558: Steal or Forge Kerberos Tickets Enterprise mitigates · Mitigation M1015: Active Directory Configuration Enterprise

Mitigations

Mitigation direction

M1026: Privileged Account Management

Privileged Account Management focuses on implementing policies, controls, and tools to securely manage privileged accounts (e.g., SYSTEM, root, or administrative accounts). This includes restricting access, limiting the scope of permissions, monitoring privileged account usage, and ensuring accountability through logging and auditing.This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Permissions and Roles:

- Implement RBAC and least privilege principles to allocate permissions securely. - Use tools like Active Directory Group Policies to enforce access restrictions.

Credential Security:

- Deploy password vaulting tools like CyberArk, HashiCorp Vault, or KeePass for secure storage and rotation of credentials. - Enforce password policies for complexity, uniqueness, and expiration using tools like Microsoft Group Policy Objects (GPO).

Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA):

- Enforce MFA for all privileged accounts using Duo Security, Okta, or Microsoft Azure AD MFA.

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- Use PAM solutions like CyberArk, BeyondTrust, or Thycotic to manage, monitor, and audit privileged access.

Auditing and Monitoring:

- Integrate activity monitoring into your SIEM (e.g., Splunk or QRadar) to detect and alert on anomalous privileged account usage.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Deploy JIT solutions like Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM) or configure ephemeral roles in AWS and GCP to grant time-limited elevated permissions.

*Tools for Implementation*

Privileged Access Management (PAM):

- CyberArk, BeyondTrust, Thycotic, HashiCorp Vault.

Credential Management:

- Microsoft LAPS (Local Admin Password Solution), Password Safe, HashiCorp Vault, KeePass.

Multi-Factor Authentication:

- Duo Security, Okta, Microsoft Azure MFA, Google Authenticator.

Linux Privilege Management:

- sudo configuration, SELinux, AppArmor.

Just-In-Time Access:

- Azure Privileged Identity Management (PIM), AWS IAM Roles with session constraints, GCP Identity-Aware Proxy.

M1015: Active Directory Configuration

Implement robust Active Directory (AD) configurations using group policies to secure user accounts, control access, and minimize the attack surface. AD configurations enable centralized control over account settings, logon policies, and permissions, reducing the risk of unauthorized access and lateral movement within the network. This mitigation can be implemented through the following measures:

Account Configuration:

- Implementation: Use domain accounts instead of local accounts to leverage AD’s centralized management, including group policies, auditing, and access control. - Use Case: For IT staff managing shared resources, provision domain accounts that allow IT teams to log in centrally, reducing the risk of unmanaged, rogue local accounts on individual machines.

Interactive Logon Restrictions:

- Implementation: Configure group policies to restrict interactive logons (e.g., direct physical or RDP logons) for service accounts or privileged accounts that do not require such access. - Use Case: Prevent service accounts, such as SQL Server accounts, from having interactive logon privileges. This reduces the risk of these accounts being leveraged for lateral movement if compromised.

Remote Desktop Settings:

- Implementation: Limit Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) access to specific, authorized accounts. Use group policies to enforce this, allowing only necessary users to establish RDP sessions. - Use Case: On sensitive servers (e.g., domain controllers or financial databases), restrict RDP access to administrative accounts only, while all other users are denied access.

Dedicated Administrative Accounts:

- Implementation: Create domain-wide administrative accounts that are restricted from interactive logons, designed solely for high-level tasks (e.g., software installation, patching). - Use Case: Create separate administrative accounts for different purposes, such as one set of accounts for installations and another for managing repository access. This limits exposure and helps reduce attack vectors.

Authentication Silos:

- Implementation: Configure Authentication Silos in AD, using group policies to create access zones with restrictions based on membership, such as the Protected Users security group. This restricts access to critical accounts and minimizes exposure to potential threats. - Use Case: Place high-risk or high-value accounts, such as executive or administrative accounts, in an Authentication Silo with extra controls, limiting their exposure to only necessary systems. This reduces the risk of credential misuse or abuse if these accounts are compromised.

**Tools for Implementation**:

- Active Directory Group Policies: Use Group Policy Management Console (GPMC) to configure, deploy, and enforce policies across AD environments. - PowerShell: Automate account configuration, logon restrictions, and policy application using PowerShell scripts. - AD Administrative Center: Manage Authentication Silos and configure high-level policies for critical user groups within AD.

Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release: 19.1
Object version: 1.2
Created: Feb 11, 2020, 19:13 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Modified: Oct 24, 2025, 17:48 UTC (UTC+00:00)
Raw hash: 127fded18f19598b...

Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)

Release	Bundle imported	Object version	Modified	Status	Raw hash
19.1	May 18, 2026, 07:08 UTC (UTC+00:00)	1.2	Oct 24, 2025, 17:48 UTC (UTC+00:00)	Current bundle	`127fded18f19…`

Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy

Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

[1]
AdSecurity Kerberos GT Aug 2015

Metcalf, S. (2015, August 7). Kerberos Golden Tickets are Now More Golden. Retrieved December 1, 2017.
Open source URL
[2]
CERT-EU Golden Ticket Protection

Abolins, D., Boldea, C., Socha, K., Soria-Machado, M. (2016, April 26). Kerberos Golden Ticket Protection. Retrieved July 13, 2017.
Open source URL
[3]
ADSecurity Detecting Forged Tickets

Metcalf, S. (2015, May 03). Detecting Forged Kerberos Ticket (Golden Ticket & Silver Ticket) Use in Active Directory. Retrieved December 23, 2015.
Open source URL
[4]
ADSecurity Kerberos and KRBTGT

Sean Metcalf. (2014, November 10). Kerberos & KRBTGT: Active Directory’s Domain Kerberos Service Account. Retrieved January 30, 2020.
Open source URL
[5]
Microsoft Kerberos Golden Ticket

Microsoft. (2015, March 24). Kerberos Golden Ticket Check (Updated). Retrieved February 27, 2020.
Open source URL
[6]
Stealthbits Detect PtT 2019

Jeff Warren. (2019, February 19). How to Detect Pass-the-Ticket Attacks. Retrieved February 27, 2020.
Open source URL
[7]
mitre-attack T1558.001
Open source URL

Source and licensing

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