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MITRE ATT&CK® Group

G0027: Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

EnterpriseG0027GroupObject v3.0 Modified
Discuss defensive coverage Back to ATT&CK
Glexia's Take

Analyst context for executives and security teams

Analyst confidence Medium

Threat Group-3390 matters because MITRE describes it as a long-running Chinese threat group associated with strategic Web compromises and targeting of aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing, and gambling/betting organizations. For leaders, the practical issue is not a single indicator but readiness against intrusion paths that can start through trusted websites or Web-facing infrastructure and then move into credential theft, remote access, discovery, and backdoor activity using a mix of public tools, native utilities, and custom malware.

Executive priority

Prioritize this as a resilience and assurance problem for high-value environments, especially where sector exposure overlaps MITRE’s listed targeting. Executives should ask whether Web-facing systems, Windows credential stores, privileged accounts, and remote administration paths have defensible monitoring and response playbooks. The relationship set includes credential dumpers, Web shells, RATs/backdoors, Cobalt Strike, Impacket, and native Windows utilities, so budget and audit discussions should focus on whether the organization can prove coverage across initial Web access, credential protection, lateral movement investigation, and containment.

Technical view

ATT&CK provides no group-level detection text or tactics for this object, so defenders should validate coverage from the related software relationships. Focus on Windows-heavy tradecraft shown by Mimikatz, Windows Credential Editor, pwdump, gsecdump, PlugX, China Chopper, ASPXSpy, gh0st RAT, Net, Tasklist, Systeminfo, ipconfig, netstat, certutil, Impacket, HyperBro, ZxShell, Clambling, RCSession, SysUpdate, Pandora, and Cobalt Strike. SOC and IR teams should test whether they can connect Web server anomalies to endpoint process execution, credential dumping signals, unusual administrative command use, remote service activity, and persistence/backdoor findings without relying on one malware signature.

Likely telemetry

  • Web server access logs, error logs, file integrity monitoring, and records of newly created or modified server-side scripts relevant to Web shell concerns such as China Chopper and ASPXSpy
  • Endpoint process creation, command-line, module load, service creation, scheduled task, and memory-related telemetry on Windows systems
  • Authentication logs, privileged account activity, LSASS/credential access alerts, and password/hash dumping indicators relevant to Mimikatz, WCE, pwdump, and gsecdump
  • Network connection metadata, DNS, proxy, firewall, and EDR network events for RAT/backdoor and Cobalt Strike-like remote access behavior
  • Windows administrative utility usage telemetry for Net, Tasklist, Systeminfo, ipconfig, netstat, and certutil, including parent-child process context

Detection direction

  • Because MITRE does not provide official detection guidance for this group object, build detections around the related tools and behaviors rather than the group name alone.
  • Correlate suspicious Web server file changes or abnormal requests with subsequent process execution, outbound connections, or internal reconnaissance from the same host.
  • Tune detections for credential dumping and access to sensitive Windows credential material, while accounting for legitimate administrative and security testing tools that can resemble Mimikatz, Impacket, or Cobalt Strike usage.
  • Baseline native utility usage on servers and privileged workstations; commands such as net, tasklist, systeminfo, ipconfig, netstat, and certutil are common, so detection value depends on context, user, host role, timing, and command arguments.
  • Watch for clusters: Web shell evidence plus credential dumping plus internal discovery or RAT/backdoor activity should raise priority over isolated commodity-tool alerts.

Mitigation priorities

  • Start with exposure management for Internet-facing Web infrastructure and rapid investigation of unexpected Web server script changes, because MITRE highlights strategic Web compromises and related Web shell use.
  • Harden credential access paths: reduce standing privilege, protect administrative credentials, monitor credential dumping behavior, and enforce disciplined privileged access workflows.
  • Limit and monitor remote administration and lateral movement channels, including Windows administrative utilities and protocol activity associated with tools such as Impacket.
  • Maintain EDR, centralized logging, and retention sufficient to reconstruct activity from Web access through endpoint execution and authentication events.
  • Prepare IR playbooks for Web shell discovery, credential compromise, and backdoor/RAT containment, including account resets and scope determination.
Analyst notes and limits

This take is based on the official ATT&CK group description and the supplied relationship context. The most useful defensive signal is the pattern of related software: Web shells, credential dumpers, RATs/backdoors, Cobalt Strike, Impacket, and native utilities. That combination points to the need for cross-domain telemetry correlation across Web, endpoint, identity, and network data.

ATT&CK supplies no official detection text, no tactics, and no platforms on the group object itself. Sector targeting and aliases come from the supplied ATT&CK description and references, but local risk depends on the organization’s exposure, geography, technology stack, and telemetry quality. This summary does not assert current activity, customer exposure, or confirmed detection coverage.

Official MITRE ATT&CK definition

Threat Group-3390

Threat Group-3390 is a Chinese threat group that has extensively used strategic Web compromises to target victims.[1] The group has been active since at least 2010 and has targeted organizations in the aerospace, government, defense, technology, energy, manufacturing and gambling/betting sectors.[2][3][4]

View the same entry on attack.mitre.org (MITRE-hosted reference; in-page links above use the Glexia ATT&CK library.)

Glexia analysis

How security teams should use this page

Treat this object as behavior context, not an attribution claim. Validate the related groups, software, data sources, and mitigations against official ATT&CK relationships and your own telemetry before making control-coverage decisions.

ATT&CK relationship table

Techniques used

This mirrors the MITRE pattern of making group, software, campaign, and technique relationships scannable. Relationship notes come from mirrored ATT&CK relationship text when available.

56 rows
Domain ID Name Relationship / procedure
Enterprise T1068 Exploitation for Privilege Escalation

Threat Group-3390 has used CVE-2014-6324 and CVE-2017-0213 to escalate privileges.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017CitationProfero APT27 December 2020
Enterprise T1030 Data Transfer Size Limits

Threat Group-3390 actors have split RAR files for exfiltration into parts.CitationDell TG-3390
Enterprise T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application

Threat Group-3390 has exploited the Microsoft SharePoint vulnerability CVE-2019-0604 and CVE-2021-26855, CVE-2021-26857, CVE-2021-26858, and CVE-2021-27065 in Exchange Server.CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021
Enterprise T1046 Network Service Discovery

Threat Group-3390 actors use the Hunter tool to conduct network service discovery for vulnerable systems.CitationDell TG-3390CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Enterprise T1053.002 At Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 actors use at to schedule tasks to run self-extracting RAR archives, which install HTTPBrowser or PlugX on other victims on a network.CitationDell TG-3390
Enterprise T1055.012 Process Hollowing Sub-technique

A Threat Group-3390 tool can spawn `svchost.exe` and inject the payload into that process.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018
Enterprise T1074.001 Local Data Staging Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has locally staged encrypted archives for later exfiltration efforts.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

Threat Group-3390 has exploited CVE-2018-0798 in Equation Editor.CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021
Enterprise T1567.002 Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has exfiltrated stolen data to Dropbox.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1003.001 LSASS Memory Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 actors have used a modified version of Mimikatz called Wrapikatz to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.CitationDell TG-3390CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1059.003 Windows Command Shell Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used command-line interfaces for execution.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Enterprise T1555.005 Password Managers Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 obtained a KeePass database from a compromised host.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used e-mail to deliver malicious attachments to victims.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1012 Query Registry

A Threat Group-3390 tool can read and decrypt stored Registry values.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018
Enterprise T1003.004 LSA Secrets Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.CitationDell TG-3390CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1027.015 Compression Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 malware is compressed with LZNT1 compression.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Enterprise T1204.002 Malicious File Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has lured victims into opening malicious files containing malware.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1033 System Owner/User Discovery

Threat Group-3390 has used `whoami` to collect system user information.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1608.001 Upload Malware Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has hosted malicious payloads on Dropbox.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1505.003 Web Shell Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used a variety of Web shells.CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Enterprise T1547.001 Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390's malware can add a Registry key to `Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run` for persistence.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018CitationLunghi Iron Tiger Linux
Enterprise T1027.013 Encrypted/Encoded File Sub-technique

A Threat Group-3390 tool can encrypt payloads using XOR. Threat Group-3390 malware is also obfuscated using Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Enterprise T1543.003 Windows Service Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390's malware can create a new service, sometimes naming it after the config information, to gain persistence.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018CitationLunghi Iron Tiger Linux
Enterprise T1199 Trusted Relationship

Threat Group-3390 has compromised third party service providers to gain access to victim's environments.CitationProfero APT27 December 2020
Enterprise T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery

Threat Group-3390 actors use NBTscan to discover vulnerable systems.CitationDell TG-3390
Enterprise T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer

Threat Group-3390 has downloaded additional malware and tools, including through the use of `certutil`, onto a compromised host .CitationDell TG-3390CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1056.001 Keylogging Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 actors installed a credential logger on Microsoft Exchange servers. Threat Group-3390 also leveraged the reconnaissance framework, ScanBox, to capture keystrokes.CitationDell TG-3390CitationHacker News LuckyMouse June 2018CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018
Enterprise T1059.001 PowerShell Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used PowerShell for execution.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1078 Valid Accounts

Threat Group-3390 actors obtain legitimate credentials using a variety of methods and use them to further lateral movement on victim networks.CitationDell TG-3390
Enterprise T1608.004 Drive-by Target Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has embedded malicious code into websites to screen a potential victim's IP address and then exploit their browser if they are of interest.CitationGallagher 2015
Enterprise T1588.002 Tool Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has obtained and used tools such as Impacket, pwdump, Mimikatz, gsecdump, NBTscan, and Windows Credential Editor.CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019CitationDell TG-3390
Enterprise T1018 Remote System Discovery

Threat Group-3390 has used the net view command.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018
Enterprise T1583.001 Domains Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has registered domains for C2.CitationLunghi Iron Tiger Linux
Enterprise T1189 Drive-by Compromise

Threat Group-3390 has extensively used strategic web compromises to target victims.CitationDell TG-3390CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018
Enterprise T1140 Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information

During execution, Threat Group-3390 malware deobfuscates and decompresses code that was encoded with Metasploit’s shikata_ga_nai encoder as well as compressed with LZNT1 compression.CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018
Enterprise T1003.002 Security Account Manager Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 actors have used gsecdump to dump credentials. They have also dumped credentials from domain controllers.CitationDell TG-3390CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1133 External Remote Services

Threat Group-3390 actors look for and use VPN profiles during an operation to access the network using external VPN services.CitationDell TG-3390 Threat Group-3390 has also obtained OWA account credentials during intrusions that it subsequently used to attempt to regain access when evicted from a victim network.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1005 Data from Local System

Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1087.001 Local Account Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used net user to conduct internal discovery of systems.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1195.002 Compromise Software Supply Chain Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has compromised the Able Desktop installer to gain access to victim's environments.CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021
Enterprise T1548.002 Bypass User Account Control Sub-technique

A Threat Group-3390 tool can use a public UAC bypass method to elevate privileges.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018
Enterprise T1119 Automated Collection

Threat Group-3390 ran a command to compile an archive of file types of interest from the victim user's directories.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1560.002 Archive via Library Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used RAR to compress, encrypt, and password-protect files prior to exfiltration.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1027.002 Software Packing Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has packed malware and tools, including using VMProtect.CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021
Enterprise T1588.003 Code Signing Certificates Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has obtained stolen valid certificates, including from VMProtect and the Chinese instant messaging application Youdu, for their operations.CitationLunghi Iron Tiger Linux
Enterprise T1047 Windows Management Instrumentation

A Threat Group-3390 tool can use WMI to execute a binary.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018
Enterprise T1071.001 Web Protocols Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 malware has used HTTP for C2.CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018
Enterprise T1070.005 Network Share Connection Removal Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has detached network shares after exfiltrating files, likely to evade detection.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1021.006 Windows Remote Management Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used WinRM to enable remote execution.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1574.001 DLL Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has performed DLL search order hijacking to execute their payload.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018 Threat Group-3390 has also used DLL side-loading, including by using legitimate Kaspersky antivirus variants as well as `rc.exe`, a legitimate Microsoft Resource Compiler.CitationDell TG-3390CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017CitationSecurelist LuckyMouse June 2018CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019CitationLunghi Iron Tiger Linux
Enterprise T1070.004 File Deletion Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has deleted existing logs and exfiltrated file archives from a victim.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017CitationTrend Micro DRBControl February 2020
Enterprise T1685.001 Disable or Modify Windows Event Log Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has used appcmd.exe to disable logging on a victim server.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Enterprise T1608.002 Upload Tool Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has staged tools, including gsecdump and WCE, on previously compromised websites.CitationDell TG-3390
Enterprise T1112 Modify Registry

A Threat Group-3390 tool has created new Registry keys under `HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\` and `HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\services`.CitationNccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018CitationTrend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021
Enterprise T1210 Exploitation of Remote Services

Threat Group-3390 has exploited MS17-010 to move laterally to other systems on the network.CitationUnit42 Emissary Panda May 2019
Enterprise T1074.002 Remote Data Staging Sub-technique

Threat Group-3390 has moved staged encrypted archives to Internet-facing servers that had previously been compromised with China Chopper prior to exfiltration.CitationSecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017
Associated objects

Groups, software, and campaigns

Tool Enterprise

S0039: Net

The Net utility is a component of the Windows operating system. It is used in command-line operations for control of users, groups, services, and network connections. [1]

Net has a great deal of functionality, [2] much of which is useful for an adversary, such as gathering system and network information for Discovery, moving laterally through SMB/Windows Admin Shares using net use commands, and interacting with services. The net1.exe utility is executed for certain functionality when net.exe is run and can be used directly in commands such as net1 user.

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0008: gsecdump

gsecdump is a publicly-available credential dumper used to obtain password hashes and LSA secrets from Windows operating systems. [1]

Windows
Malware Enterprise

S0154: Cobalt Strike

Cobalt Strike is a commercial, full-featured, remote access tool that bills itself as “adversary simulation software designed to execute targeted attacks and emulate the post-exploitation actions of advanced threat actors”. Cobalt Strike’s interactive post-exploit capabilities cover the full range of ATT&CK tactics, all executed within a single, integrated system.[1]

In addition to its own capabilities, Cobalt Strike leverages the capabilities of other well-known tools such as Metasploit and Mimikatz.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Tool Enterprise

S0002: Mimikatz

Mimikatz is a credential dumper capable of obtaining plaintext Windows account logins and passwords, along with many other features that make it useful for testing the security of networks. [1] [2]

Windows
Tool Enterprise

S0357: Impacket

Impacket is an open source collection of modules written in Python for programmatically constructing and manipulating network protocols. Impacket contains several tools for remote service execution, Kerberos manipulation, Windows credential dumping, packet sniffing, and relay attacks.[1]

LinuxmacOSWindows
Tool Enterprise

S0160: certutil

certutil is a command-line utility that can be used to obtain certificate authority information and configure Certificate Services. [1]

Windows
Relationship explorer

All related ATT&CK context

uses · Technique T1068: Exploitation for Privilege Escalation Enterprise uses · Technique T1030: Data Transfer Size Limits Enterprise uses · Technique T1190: Exploit Public-Facing Application Enterprise uses · Technique T1046: Network Service Discovery Enterprise uses · Technique T1053.002: At Enterprise uses · Technique T1055.012: Process Hollowing Enterprise uses · Technique T1074.001: Local Data Staging Enterprise uses · Technique T1203: Exploitation for Client Execution Enterprise uses · Technique T1567.002: Exfiltration to Cloud Storage Enterprise uses · Technique T1003.001: LSASS Memory Enterprise uses · Technique T1059.003: Windows Command Shell Enterprise uses · Technique T1555.005: Password Managers Enterprise uses · Tool S0039: Net Enterprise uses · Technique T1566.001: Spearphishing Attachment Enterprise uses · Tool S0096: Systeminfo Enterprise uses · Technique T1012: Query Registry Enterprise uses · Technique T1003.004: LSA Secrets Enterprise uses · Tool S0008: gsecdump Enterprise uses · Technique T1027.015: Compression Enterprise uses · Technique T1204.002: Malicious File Enterprise uses · Malware S0013: PlugX Enterprise uses · Malware S0073: ASPXSpy Enterprise uses · Malware S0154: Cobalt Strike Enterprise uses · Tool S0002: Mimikatz Enterprise
Change history

Object version and sync metadata

The fields below describe the current mirrored snapshot. When Glexia retains multiple ATT&CK source imports, you can open the table to compare the same object across releases (hashes and MITRE timestamps). For MITRE’s own release notes and roadmap, see ATT&CK resources — Updates .

ATT&CK release
19.1
Object version
3.0
Created
Modified
Raw hash
1e505909bbd306fb...
Imported snapshots across ATT&CK releases (1)
Release Bundle imported Object version Modified Status Raw hash
19.1 3.0 Current bundle 1e505909bbd3…
Raw source

Mirrored ATT&CK source object

The raw object is retained through the mirrored ATT&CK source bundle and object hash. The raw endpoint returns the exact object from the mirrored bundle when available.

Open mirrored raw JSON Open MITRE-hosted copy
Source references

External references and citations

MITRE external references are preserved separately from Glexia analysis so citations remain traceable to their original source records.

  1. [1]
    Dell TG-3390

    Dell SecureWorks Counter Threat Unit Threat Intelligence. (2015, August 5). Threat Group-3390 Targets Organizations for Cyberespionage. Retrieved August 18, 2018.

    Open source URL
  2. [2]
    SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017

    Counter Threat Unit Research Team. (2017, June 27). BRONZE UNION Cyberespionage Persists Despite Disclosures. Retrieved July 13, 2017.

    Open source URL
  3. [3]
    Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018

    Legezo, D. (2018, June 13). LuckyMouse hits national data center to organize country-level waterholing campaign. Retrieved August 18, 2018.

    Open source URL
  4. [4]
    Trend Micro DRBControl February 2020

    Lunghi, D. et al. (2020, February). Uncovering DRBControl. Retrieved November 12, 2021.

    Open source URL
  5. [5]
    APT27

    (Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)

  6. [6]
    BRONZE UNION

    (Citation: SecureWorks BRONZE UNION June 2017)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)

  7. [7]
    Earth Smilodon

    (Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)

  8. [8]
    Emissary Panda

    (Citation: Gallagher 2015)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)

  9. [9]
    Gallagher 2015

    Gallagher, S.. (2015, August 5). Newly discovered Chinese hacking group hacked 100+ websites to use as “watering holes”. Retrieved January 25, 2016.

    Open source URL
  10. [10]
    Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018

    Khandelwal, S. (2018, June 14). Chinese Hackers Carried Out Country-Level Watering Hole Attack. Retrieved August 18, 2018.

    Open source URL
  11. [11]
    Iron Tiger

    (Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)

  12. [12]
    Linen Typhoon

    (Citation: Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated)

  13. [13]
    LuckyMouse

    (Citation: Securelist LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)(Citation: Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021)

  14. [14]
    Microsoft Naming Conventions Frequently Updated

    Microsoft. (2025, September 8). How Microsoft names threat actors. Retrieved September 10, 2025.

    Open source URL
  15. [15]
    Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018

    Pantazopoulos, N., Henry T. (2018, May 18). Emissary Panda – A potential new malicious tool. Retrieved June 25, 2018.

    Open source URL
  16. [16]
    TG-3390

    (Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Nccgroup Emissary Panda May 2018)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)

  17. [17]
    Threat Group-3390

    (Citation: Dell TG-3390)(Citation: Hacker News LuckyMouse June 2018)

  18. [18]
    Trend Micro Iron Tiger April 2021

    Lunghi, D. and Lu, K. (2021, April 9). Iron Tiger APT Updates Toolkit With Evolved SysUpdate Malware. Retrieved November 12, 2021.

    Open source URL
  19. [19]
    Unit42 Emissary Panda May 2019

    Falcone, R. and Lancaster, T. (2019, May 28). Emissary Panda Attacks Middle East Government Sharepoint Servers. Retrieved July 9, 2019.

    Open source URL
  20. [20]
    mitre-attack G0027
    Open source URL
Source and licensing

Source: MITRE ATT&CK®. © 2026 The MITRE Corporation. This work is reproduced and distributed with the permission of The MITRE Corporation. MITRE ATT&CK and ATT&CK are registered trademarks of The MITRE Corporation. Glexia is not affiliated with or endorsed by MITRE.

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